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Introduction 
Tim Callan and Philip J. O’Connell 
 
Pension systems in OECD countries face challenges arising from increases in life 
expectancy and from downward pressures on public expenditure. Changes to 
public and private pension systems have effects that are both complex and long-
lived. Careful analysis is needed to tease out the implications of different reform 
options. Recognising this, the EU Directorate-General for Employment, Social 
Affairs and Inclusion set up a call for research which specifically included models 
for the analysis of pensions. The first two papers in this volume flow directly 
from that work, while the third tackles a complementary topic in the pension 
area. 
 
Pension contributions and entitlements are typically built up over the working 
lifetime, and pension benefits drawn down in retirement. In order to capture 
the impact of policy changes which affect both the build-up and draw down of 
pensions, best practice is to analyse a model which follows a cohort of 
individuals over their lifetime. While it is not possible to follow an actual cohort 
in real time, the key features can be captured in what are termed dynamic 
cohort simulation models: these take a cohort of diverse individuals, and apply 
changes over time to their age, relationship status, labour market and savings 
behaviour which reflect the changes experienced by real people. In a series of 
papers, Justin van de Ven has developed this approach in the UK, building what 
is known as the National Institute pension model or NIBAX.  
 
The first paper (by Justin van de Ven, of the National Institute of Economic and 
Social Research and Melbourne University) is one application of this approach. 
Decisions on pension savings may be skewed because undue weight is given to 
short-term considerations. As a result, individuals may regret their past 
decisions in later years. Justin van de Ven’s paper gives a more precise 
characterisation of such “myopic” behaviour, and finds that there is evidence 
that this bias is important in practice. He uses the National Institute’s dynamic 
cohort model to examine whether defined contribution pensions can help to 
correct for this bias in consumer decision-making. In particular, he looks at one 
element of recent pension reform in the UK, introducing a state-run defined 
contribution pension scheme, known as the National Employment Savings Trust 
(NEST). This was introduced following recommendations made by the UK 
Pensions Commission, which found that administration costs made it 
unprofitable for existing private sector pension providers to serve employees on 
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modest incomes. Key features of the UK system include a requirement for 
employers to provide a matching contribution and low management charges 
(0.3 per cent annually). Van de Ven’s analysis finds that the pre-commitment 
involved in a defined contribution scheme such as the UK's NEST can help to 
offset myopic tendencies, and make for a smoother pattern of consumption 
over the life course. These results have implications not just for the UK, but for 
the wider group of countries – including Ireland – facing similar challenges due 
to population ageing. 
 
Changes in pension policy have complex and long-term effects. In order to 
understand the impact of alternative policy choices, models are needed that can 
capture the long-term dynamic impact of the policy changes. It is not enough to 
base decisions on a “snapshot” of the current population; policies need to take 
into account how people's employment and pension savings evolve over their 
life course. Responding to this need, the new model for analysing Ireland's 
pension policies has been constructed by Tim Callan and Claire Keane of the 
ESRI in collaboration with Justin van de Ven of the National Institute of 
Economic and Social Research and the University of Melbourne. The National 
Institute model was taken as a building block, and calibrated to the Irish 
situation. We first document the technical approach, the difficulties 
encountered, and the approaches used to overcome them. An indication of the 
potential of the approach is given by applying the model to explore the trade-
off, for given tax rates, of raising the State Pension Age or reducing the level of 
the State Pension. Work of this type can provide an improved evidence base on 
which policy debate and policymakers can draw.  
 
The final paper, by Gerard Hughes of Trinity College Dublin examines a more 
specific policy issue: whether the current system of tax reliefs for pensions 
represents a level-playing field as between executive directors and employees. 
Using information from the annual accounts for 2009 of 48 large companies, 
most of which are quoted on the Irish Stock Exchange, Hughes found that the 
average pension contribution rate for executive directors was almost 26 per 
cent of salary – as against a rate of about 7 per cent for other private sector 
employees. The average value of an executive director's pension fund amounts 
to €4.1 million or 34 times more than the average value of the pension fund of 
€120,000 for other employees. Given these disparities, the benefit of the 
current tax treatment of pension contributions is correspondingly greater for 
executive directors as compared with other employees. In 2011 the government 
reduced the cap on the annual earnings contribution eligible for pensions tax 
relief from €150,000 to €115,000 and it reduced the lifetime cap on the size of 
an individual pension fund from €5.4 million to €2.3 million. Hughes argues that 
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further reductions in the both the annual earnings ceiling and lifetime cap on 
fund size would help to focus relief on low and middle income earners.  
 
The complexities of pension systems mean that careful analysis is needed to 
tease out the implications of potential changes to policy over the long term. The 
papers included in this volume bring insights from research in the UK into the 
potential for low-cost DC schemes (van de Ven), from a new model for analysis 
of pension issues in Ireland (Callan et al.) and from careful analysis using data on 
company accounts (Hughes). These papers are intended as a contribution to 
policy debate, and as a springboard for further research in this area. 
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Do Deﬁned ContribuƟon
Pensions Correct for
Short-Sighted Savings
Decisions? Evidence
from the UK*
JusƟn van de Veny
INTRODUCTION
Without government intervenƟon, individual decisions on provision for reƟrement
may pay insuﬃcient aƩenƟon to the longer term, and be unduly inﬂuenced by near
term consideraƟons. Recent policy debate in the United Kingdom has emphasised
the role of such “myopia”1 in jusƟfying state involvement in reƟrement provisions
(e.g. Pensions Commission, 2005, pp. 68-69, Department for Work and Pensions,
2006, p. 31). Very few studies have, however, examined the empirical support for
myopia in the real world, or the pracƟcal implicaƟons of myopia for responses to
pension alternaƟves. Without such work, it is not possible to say how far myopia
creates a need for publicly sponsored pensions, or whether a parƟcular pension
scheme is well suited to the needs of myopic individuals. This study therefore
explores the empirical support for myopia on ﬁeld data for the UK. It then considers
the implicaƟons of myopia for behavioural and welfare responses to the NaƟonal
Employment Savings Trust (NEST), a Deﬁned ContribuƟon (DC) pension scheme that
will be introduced in the UK from 2012.
* I am grateful to the Leverhulme Trust for support under grant F/00/059/B, and to useful comments fromMarƟn
Weale. The usual disclaimer applies.
† NaƟonal InsƟtute of Economic and Social Research, 2 Dean Trench Street, London SW1P 3HE, UK.
jusƟn.van@unimelb.edu.au
1 In this study myopia is deﬁned as a state in which preferences are biased in favour of consumpƟon in the short
term. The term “bias” is used here to indicate that the associated preferences are inconsistent – the individual
will later regret having given such weight to the short term. Technically, the compensaƟon required to agree
to delay consumpƟon by say, one month, is lower for a deferral of consumpƟon in the more distant future
compared to a delay in the near-term.
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The introducƟon of the NEST reﬂects a contemporary trend toward greater reliance
on DC pension provision in the (third Ɵer) private sector of the UK, and a similar
trend among OECD countries more generally.2 It is being introduced following
recommendaƟons made by the Pensions Commission (2005), which found that
administraƟon costs made it unproﬁtable for exisƟng private sector pension
providers to serve employees on modest incomes. The NEST is consequently
designed to improve saving incenƟves by reducing management charges, and by
requiring all employers to oﬀer a 3% matching pension contribuƟon on banded
earnings to parƟcipaƟng employees. It has been forecast that the scheme will serve
between 6 and 10million people – one out of every four people of working age – and
will receive contribuƟons worth £8 billion annually, 60% of which is projected to be
new saving. The success or failure of the scheme will have a profound inﬂuence on
the future of the UK pensions system, and will have important implicaƟons for the
wider group of countries that face similar challenges due to populaƟon ageing.
2. PREVIOUS STUDIES OF RETIREMENT BEHAVIOUR AND MYOPIA
Although reƟrement behaviour has been studied at length in realisƟc policy contexts
and on the assumpƟon of Ɵme consistent preferences, few studies have considered
the associated implicaƟons of myopia. Some aspects of this informaƟon gap are
eﬀecƟvely addressed by the extensive literature that focuses upon policy design
where the objecƟve funcƟon of the government is diﬀerent from that of individuals
(e.g. Kanbur et al. (2006)). But this literature does not address the welfare advantage
of commitment mechanisms in the context of Ɵme-inconsistent preferences, which
has an important bearing on the responses of myopic agents to (illiquid) pension
schemes.
A number of studies have focused upon the implicaƟons of myopia for the
disƟncƟon between funded and Pay As You Go systems of social security, without
focusing upon responses to voluntary pension schemes in parƟcular (e.g. Schwarz
& Sheshinski (2007), and Fehr & Kindermann (2009)). The only study of which I
am aware that has explored responses of myopic agents to voluntary DC pensions
is by Laibson et al. (1998), who used a structural model calibrated to the US
economy to consider responses to IRA and 401(k) plans. Laibson et al. ﬁnd that
saving in the pension asset responds posiƟvely to agent myopia, increasing by a
factor of between 1.2 and 1.6 on their preferredmodel speciﬁcaƟon, relaƟve to Ɵme
consistent preferences. Furthermore, they ﬁnd that myopia tends to improve the
welfare response to the introducƟon of a DC pension measured at the beginning of
the simulated life.
12 On contemporary pension arrangements in OECD countries, see OECD (2009).
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These results add support to the premise that myopia tends to jusƟfy the
introducƟon of a DC pension scheme. The intuiƟon behind this proposiƟon is well
understood; sophisƟcatedlymyopic agents, who are aware of the Ɵme-inconsistency
of their own preferences, aƩach a welfare beneﬁt to commitment mechanisms that
resolve their intra-personal conﬂict in favour of their present self. An individual, for
example, may be happy to lock their money away in an (illiquid) pension fund, if they
believe that they will exhibit a propensity to over-consume in the future.
However, the analysis reported by Laibson et al. is based upon a model of
endogenous saving in a liquid asset and a pension asset; it omits endogenous labour
supply. This is potenƟally important because labour supply and savings are likely
to be jointly determined, parƟcularly close to reƟrement. The stylised analysis by
Diamond & Köszegi (2003) – which omits a pension asset, but includes both saving
and labour supply – also highlights the potenƟal for interesƟng intertemporal feed-
back eﬀects between saving and labour supply in the context of Ɵme-inconsistent
preferences.3 Furthermore, an important caveat that Laibson et al. raise in relaƟon
to their results is the degree of sensiƟvity to their model calibraƟon, parƟcularly in
relaƟon to the intertemporal elasƟcity of subsƟtuƟon.
An alternaƟve approach to model calibraƟon is to specify the model using an
econometric criterion. Very few studies have, however, invesƟgated the empirical
evidence formyopia beyond controlled laboratory experiments. The small number of
studies that have esƟmatedmodelswithmyopic preferences on ﬁeld data focus upon
margins of decision making that are disƟnguished by the Ɵming of their associated
welfare eﬀects. Laibson et al. (2007), for example, esƟmate a life-cycle model of
consumpƟon and investment decisions that disƟnguishes between (net) liquid assets
on the one hand, and a composite illiquid asset that is speciﬁed to reﬂect housing
and pensions on the other.
Laibson et al. (2007) esƟmate their model on US data for households with a high-
school but not a college degree. They report that restricƟng their model to constant
exponenƟal discounƟng results in an esƟmate for the (per period) discount factor
of 0.846/0.942 (depending on the weighƟng matrix applied). Allowing for quasi-
hyperbolic discounƟng results in an esƟmate for the short-run discount factor of
0.674/0.687 and a long-run discount factor of 0.958/0.960. These results imply
that individuals are strongly averse to any delay of immediate consumpƟon,
but otherwise exhibit a high degree of paƟence. This combinaƟon of short-term
impaƟence and longer-term paƟence generates a range of interesƟng behavioural
13 See Cremer et al. (2007) and Fehr & Kindermann (2009) for studies that take account of savings and labour
supply decisions when exploring the implicaƟons of myopia for the design of social security. Neither paper,
however, focuses upon the implicaƟons for DC pension schemes that are the focus here.
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eﬀects, including demand for commitment mechanisms that is a focus of the current
study. Almost all of the speciﬁcaƟons that Laibson et al. consider reject the restricƟon
that discount rates are equal across all Ɵme horizons, and suggest that myopia is of
pracƟcal importance.
In a similar vein, Fang & Silverman (2007) esƟmate a model of labour supply and
welfare programme parƟcipaƟon for never-married mothers, again on US data. Like
Laibson et al. (2007), Fang & Silverman (2007) allow for present biassed preferences
in the form of quasi-hyperbolic discounƟng. They consider the hypothesis that
people with myopic preferences fail to account fully for the experience eﬀect on
future wages of short-run labour supply decisions (an illiquid investment in human
capital), resulƟng in a bias toward welfare dependency. The esƟmates that Fang
and Silverman report reﬂect in exaggerated form those reported by Laibson et al.:
the short-run discount factor at 0.296/0.308 (depending on assumed preferences) is
signiﬁcantly lower than the long-run discount factor at 0.875/0.868.
However, neither of these studies, nor others that have esƟmated Ɵme varying
discount rates on survey data (e.g. DellaVigna and Paserman, 2005, Paserman, 2008,
and Shui and Ausubel, 2004), take into account joint decisions over savings and
labour supply. This paper consequently extends the literature in two important
dimensions: by reporƟng esƟmates for myopic preferences in relaƟon to joint
decisions over liquid savings, pension savings, and labour supply calculated on
data for a broad segment of the UK populaƟon; and by exploring the associated
implicaƟons of myopia for DC pension schemes.
SecƟon 2 describes the model that was used to conduct the analysis. SecƟon 3
reports parameter esƟmates for the model. The inﬂuence of myopia on responses
to the introducƟon of a DC pension are analysed in SecƟon 4; readers who are
interested only in the policy relevant results may skip to SecƟon 4 without excessive
handicap. A summary and direcƟons for further research are provided in the
conclusion.
2. THE STRUCTURAL MODEL
The unit of analysis is the household, deﬁned as a single adult or partner couple
and their dependent children. Household decisions regarding consumpƟon, labour
supply, and pension scheme contribuƟons are considered at annual intervals
throughout the life course, which is assumed to run from age 20 to a maximum
potenƟal age of 120. Endogenous decisions are based on the assumpƟon that
households maximise expected lifeƟme uƟlity, given their prevailing circumstances,
preferences, and beliefs regarding the future. A household’s circumstances are
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described by its age, number of adults, number of children, earnings, net liquid
worth, pension rights, and survival. The belief structure is raƟonal in the sense that
expectaƟons are consistent with the intertemporal decision making environment,
and the model is a parƟal equilibrium in that there are no feed-back eﬀects from
the macro-economy on wages or the returns to investment. The raƟonality of
the belief structure also extends to expectaƟons over future preferences, so that
myopic consumers are aware of the Ɵme-inconsistency of their preferences. This
secƟon gives an abbreviated descripƟon of the structural model; for a more detailed
descripƟon, see van de Ven (2009).
A. Preferences
Expected lifeƟme uƟlity of household i at age t is described by the Ɵme separable
von-Neumann Morgenstern funcƟon:
Ui;t = 11 γ
8<:u
 ci;t
θi;t
; li;t
1 γ
+ βEt
24 tdeathX
j=t+1
δ j tu
 ci; j
θi; j
; li; j
1 γ359=; (1a)
u
 ci; j
θi; j
; li;t

=
  ci; j
θi; j
(1 1=ϵ)
+ α1=ϵl(1 1=ϵ)i;t
! 1
1 1=ϵ
(1b)
so that intratemporal uƟlity u takes a Constant ElasƟcity of SubsƟtuƟon form, where
α > 0 is the uƟlity price of leisure, and ϵ > 0 the (period speciﬁc) elasƟcity
of subsƟtuƟon between equivalised consumpƟon (ci;t=θi;t) and leisure (li;t). u is
combined in the intertemporal speciﬁcaƟon through an isoelasƟc transformaƟon.
Households choose over discreƟonary composite consumpƟon, ci;t 2 R+, and Ɵme
spent in leisure, li;t 2 [0; 1]. Although the consumpƟon decision is taken over a
conƟnuous domain, labour status is chosen from a set of discrete alternaƟves that
represent full-Ɵme, part-Ɵme, and non-employment of adult household members.
A discrete speciﬁcaƟon is adopted for labour supply to reﬂect the substanƟal labour
market rigidiƟes that conƟnue to exist, despite the increased ﬂexibility of working
Ɵme arrangements that has occurred since the 1970s.4
The discount factors β and δ are assumed to be Ɵme invariant and the same for all
households. Quasi-hyperbolic discounƟng that reﬂects a present bias in consumpƟon
applies when β < 1. The analysis that is reported in SecƟon IV explores how
alternaƟve values of β inﬂuence responses to a DC pension scheme.
14 Fagan (2003), for example, reports that approximately 1 in 5 employed people in Europe work full-Ɵme
when they would prefer to work part-Ɵme. The reasons most commonly given for the mis-match include
the percepƟon that it would not be possible to do a desired job part-Ɵme, that part-Ɵme employment is not
oﬀered by a desired employer, and that it would damage career prospects.
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θi;t 2 R+ is adult equivalent size based on the “modiﬁed” OECD scale. It is included
in the preference relaƟon to reﬂect the empirical ﬁnding that household size is an
important determinant of the evoluƟon of consumpƟon during the life course. To ﬁx
terms, themodel assumes that bothmembers of a couple are of the same age, which
deﬁnes the household’s age, t. Et is the expectaƟons operator at Ɵme t, tdeath is the
age at death, which deﬁnes the Ɵme of death of all adult household members and is
assumed to be uncertain. Deﬁne φj t;t as the probability of surviving to age j given
survival to age t, where φT t;t = 0 for all t. Then it is possible to replace tdeath by
T, bring the expectaƟons operator into the summaƟon sign, and include φj t;t as an
addiƟonal discount factor. φj t;t is assumed to be non-stochasƟc for all j, t. Although
not explicitly included in the preference relaƟon, accidental bequests do occur due
to the uncertainty assumed over the Ɵme of death. Where a household dies with
posiƟve wealth balances, these are assumed to accrue to the state in the form of a
100% inheritance tax.
B. The liquidity constraint
Deﬁne wi;t as liquid net worth, which covers total non-pension wealth, including
the value of housing, cash balances, and other tradeable assets. EquaƟon (1a) is
maximised, subject to the age speciﬁc liquidity constraint, wi;t  Dt for all (i; t),
where:
wi;t =
8><>:
w^i;t t 6= tSPA
w^i;t + πpw pi;t t = tSPA
(2a)
w^i;t =
8<:
πdiv (wi;t 1   ci;t 1 + τi;t 1) nat < nat 1; t < tSPA
wi;t 1   ci;t 1 + τi;t 1 otherwise
(2b)
τi;t = τ(li;t; xi;t; nai;t; nci;t; ri;twi;t; pci;t; t) (2c)
w pi;t denoteswealth held in personal pensions. πp is the proporƟon of pensionwealth
that is taken as a tax free lump-sum at age tSPA. πdiv is the proporƟon of net liquid
worth that is lost upon marital dissoluƟon (to capture the impact of divorce).
τ (:) is disposable income net of non-discreƟonary expenditure. EquaƟon (2c)
indicates that taxes and beneﬁts are calculated with respect to labour supply, li;t;
private non-property income, xi;t; the numbers of adults, nai;t, and children, nci;t;
the return to liquid assets, ri;twi;t (which is negaƟve when wi;t < 0); private
contribuƟons to pensions, pci;t; and age, t.
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C. Disposable income
The lifeƟme is divided into two periods when calculaƟng disposable income: the
working lifeƟme t < tSPA, and pension receipt tSPA  t; tSPA denotes state pension
age. Throughout the lifeƟme, household disposable income is calculated by ﬁrst
evaluaƟng aggregate take-home pay from the taxable incomes of each adultmember
of a household – this reﬂects the taxaƟon of individual incomes in the UK. Household
beneﬁts (excluding adjustments for childcare and housing costs) are then calculated,
given aggregate household take-home pay – this reﬂects the provision of beneﬁts
at the level of the family unit. Next, non-discreƟonary net childcare costs (aŌer
adjusƟng for childcare related beneﬁts) are evaluated, given aggregate household
take-home pay. This is of separate importance because childcare costs inﬂuence
labour supply decisions. Non-discreƟonary net housing costs (aŌer adjusƟng for
relevant beneﬁts) are then calculated on aggregate take-home pay plus beneﬁts less
childcare costs – this reﬂects themeans tesƟng of housing related beneﬁts in the UK,
which is administered with respect to income net of most other elements of the tax
and beneﬁts system. Finally, disposable income is equal to aggregate take-home pay,
plus beneﬁts, less net childcare costs, less net housing costs.
CalculaƟon of taxable income for each adult in a household depends on the
household’s age, with property and non-property income treated separately. For all
t < tSPA, household non-property income xi;t is equal to labour income gi;t less
pension contribuƟons. For t  tSPA, xi;t is equal to labour income plus pension
annuity income:
xi;t =
(
gi;t   pci;t
gi;t + ppi;t + spt
t < tSPA
t  tSPA
(3)
where: ppi;t =
8>><>>:
χ (1  πp)wpi;t t = tSPA 
πs + (1  πs) :(nai;t   1)
πs + (1  πs) :(nai;t 1   1)
!
ppi;t 1 t > tSPA
(4)
ppi;t denotes private pension annuity, spt denotes state pension income, and χ is the
annuity rate. This speciﬁcaƟon reﬂects the EET form of taxaƟon applied to pension
savings in the UK, which is in commonwithmost other OECD countries.5 The annuity
purchased at age tSPA is inﬂaƟon linked, and reduces to a fracƟon πs of its (real) value
in the preceding year if one member of a couple dies.6
15 EET taxaƟon of pension savings, Exempts pension contribuƟons, Expempts pension investment returns, and
Taxes pension fund dispersals.
16 When a household transiƟons from being comprised of a couple at age t to a single adult at age t + 1, then it
is assumed to be the result of divorce if t+ 1 < tSPA, and of death otherwise.
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Where the household is idenƟﬁed as supplying labour, and is younger than state
pension age, then non-property (employment) income is split between spouses (in
the case of married couples) on the basis of their respecƟve labour supplies. A
household without an employed adult has all of its non-property (pension) income
allocated to a single spouse. Similarly, property income is only allocated between
spouses for households below state pension age, and who supply some labour. In
this case, property income is allocated evenly between working couples. Property
income, yi;t, is equal to the return from posiƟve balances of liquid net worth:
yi;t =
(
ri;twi;t if wi;t > 0
0 otherwise (5)
Hence, the model assumes that the interest cost on loans (whenwi;t < 0) cannot be
wriƩen oﬀ against labour income for tax purposes.
The interest rate on liquid net worth is determinisƟc, and depends upon whether
wi;t indicates net investment assets or net debts:
ri;t =
8>>><>>>:
rI if wi;t > 0
rDl +
 
rDu   rDl

min
8<:  wi;tmax hgi;t; 0:7g(hi;t; l fti;t)i ;1
9=; ; rDl < rDu if wi;t  0
where l fti;t is household leisure when one adult in household i at age t is full-Ɵme
employed. This speciﬁcaƟon for the interest rate implies that the interest charge on
debt increases from a minimum of rDl when the debt to income raƟo is low, up to
a maximum rate of rDu , when the raƟo is high. The speciﬁcaƟon also implies that
households that are in debt are treated less puniƟvely if they have at least one adult
earning a full-Ɵme wage.
D. Pension saving
As is implicit in the above discussion, pensions are modelled at the household
level, and are deﬁned contribuƟon in the sense that every household is assigned an
account intowhich their respecƟve pension contribuƟons are (noƟonally) deposited.
Pension wealth accrues a (post-tax) rate of return, r p, which is certain. Prior to age
tSPA, all households with labour income in excess of a lower limit in the prevailing
year, gi;t > πpl, choose whether, and what fracƟon of their labour income, πpci;t , to
contribute to their pension, subject to the lower bound πpc0 . Households that choose
to parƟcipate in the pension during a given year also receive a matching employer
contribuƟon, equal to a ﬁxed fracƟon of their employment income, πpec. All pension
contribuƟons are tax exempt (as discussed above). The balance of household i’s
pension account at any age, t < tSPA, is given by:
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wpi;t =
(
πdivw^pi;t nat < nat 1
w^pi;t otherwise
w^pi;t =
(
(1+ r p)wpi;t 1 +

πpci;t 1 + π
p
ec

gi;t 1
(1+ r p)wpi;t 1
if πpci;t 1 > π
pc
0 ; gi;t 1 > πpl
otherwise
(6)
where gi;t denotes aggregate household labour income in period t, and all other
variables are as deﬁned previously.
E. Labour income dynamics
Three household characterisƟcs inﬂuence labour income: the household’s labour
supply decision li;t, the latent wage hi;t, and whether a wage oﬀerwoi;t is received.7
A wage oﬀer is received at any age t with a relaƟonship speciﬁc (exogenous)
probability, pwo

nai;t

, which is included to capture the incidence of (involuntary)
unemployment. If a household receives a wage oﬀer, then its labour income for the
respecƟve year is equal to a fracƟon of its latentwage, with the fracƟon deﬁned as an
increasing funcƟon of its labour supply; gi;t = μ (li;t) hi;t. A household that receives
a wage oﬀer and chooses to supply the maximum amount of labour receives its full
latent wage, in which case gi;t = hi;t. A household that does not receive a wage oﬀer
is assumed to receive gi;t = 0 regardless of its labour supply (implying no labour
supply where employment incurs a leisure penalty).
Latent wages evolve as a random walk with driŌ:
ln (hi;t+1)  ln (hi;t) = fh
 
nai;t; t

+ κ
 
nai;t; li;t

+ ωi;t (7a)
ωi;t  N

0; σ2ω;nai;t

(7b)
where κ (:) is an experience eﬀect, andωi;t is a household speciﬁc disturbance term.
Most of the associated literature omits an experience eﬀect from the wage process
as this complicates soluƟon of the uƟlity maximisaƟon problem by invalidaƟng two-
stage budgeƟng. Related studies have, however, found it diﬃcult to match the high
rates of labour market parƟcipaƟon that are reported in survey data among the
young relaƟve to the old in the context of the strong wage growth that is typically
17 Deﬁning wage potenƟal at the household level rather than at the level of the individual signiﬁcantly simpliﬁes
the analyƟcal problemby omiƫng the need to take account of a range of issues including the sex of employees,
imperfect correlaƟon of temporal innovaƟons experienced by spouses, and so on.
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observed with age. French (2005) suggests that this consideraƟon was behind the
high esƟmated values that he reports for the discount factor. Career building appears
to be a plausible explanaƟon for the high rates of employment parƟcipaƟon that are
observed among young people, and an experience eﬀect is included to capture this;
see SeŌon et al. (2008) and SeŌon & van de Ven (2009).
F. Household demographics
Household relaƟonship status is modelled explicitly, and is uncertain from one year
to the next. The probabiliƟes of relaƟonship transiƟons – including the formaƟon of
cohabitaƟng unions and their dissoluƟon through death, divorce, and annulment –
are described by the reduced form logit equaƟon:
si;t+1 = fs(t) + αAsi;t (8)
where si;t is a dummy variable, that takes the value 1 if household i is comprised of
a single adult at age t and zero otherwise. The number of children in a household
evolves in a determinisƟc fashion, based upon a household’s age and relaƟonship
status, so that: nci;t = nc

nai;t; t

.
G. Model soluƟon
The allowance for uncertainty in the model implies that an analyƟcal soluƟon to
the uƟlity maximisaƟon problem does not exist, and numerical soluƟon rouƟnes
need to be employed. StarƟng in the last possible period of a household’s life, T,
uncertainty plays no further role and the opƟmisaƟon problem is simple to solve for
given numbers of adults nat , liquid networthwT, and annuity income pT, omiƫng the
household index i for brevity. We denote the maximum achievable uƟlity in period
T, the value funcƟon, by VT(naT;wT; pT):
VT(naT;wT; pT) = u
bcT (naT;wT; pT)
θT
;1

(9)
WT(naT;wT; pT) = VT(naT;wT; pT) (10)
where bcT denotes the opƟmised measure of consumpƟon, and leisure l^T = 1
by assumpƟon. VT is solved at each node of the three dimensional grid over the
permissable state space (naT;wT; pT). WT is an intermediate term that is stored to
evaluate uƟlity maximising soluƟons in period T  1; it is necessarily equal to VT (as
indicated above) in the ﬁnal period, but may diﬀer from VT in earlier periods as is
described below.
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At Ɵme T  1, the problem reduces to solving the Bellman equaƟon:
VT 1(naT 1;wT 1; pT 1) =
max
cT 1
1
1  γ
(
u
 cT 1
θT 1
; 1
1 γ
+ βδφ1;T 1ET 1

WT(naT;wT; pT)1 γ
)
(11)
WT 1(naT 1;wT 1; pT 1) =
1
1  γ
(
u
bcT 1
θT 1
; 1
1 γ
+ δφ1;T 1ET 1

WT(naT;wT; pT)1 γ
)
(12)
subject to the intertemporal dynamics that are described above. Note that,WT 1 6=
VT 1, if β 6= 1, which indicates the inﬂuence of Ɵme inconsistency in the context of
myopic preferences. This opƟmisaƟon problem is solved for the T 1 value funcƟon
VT 1 and intermediate termWT 1 at each node of the three dimensional grid over
the permissable state-space. SoluƟons for ages less than T   1 then proceed via
backward inducƟon, based upon the soluƟons obtained for later ages.8Where labour
supply is permiƩed, the opƟmisaƟon includes the alternaƟve labour decisions, and
the state space expands to include latent wages ht and wage oﬀers wot. For ages
under tSPA, soluƟons are also required for pension contribuƟons, and pensionwealth
replaces annuity income in the state space. A more complete descripƟon of the
analyƟcal problem, including the treatment of boundary condiƟons, is reported in
van de Ven (2009).
SoluƟons to the opƟmisaƟon problem are idenƟﬁed by searching over the value
funcƟon, using Powell’s method in mulƟple dimensions and Brent’s method in a
single dimension (see Press et al. (1986)). The expectaƟons operator is evaluated in
the context of the log-normal distribuƟon assumed forwages using theGauss-Hermi-
te quadrature, which permits evaluaƟon at a set of discrete abscissae (ﬁve abscissae
are used). Linear interpolaƟon methods are used to evaluate the value funcƟon
at points between the assumed grid nodes throughout the simulated lifeƟme.
Although the search rouƟnes that are used are eﬃcient when the objecƟve funcƟon
is reasonably well behaved, they are not designed to disƟnguish between local and
global opƟma. A supplementary search rouƟne is consequently used, which tests
over a localised grid above and below an idenƟﬁed opƟmum for a preferred decision
set. If a preferred decision set is idenƟﬁed, then the supplementary rouƟne searches
18 In the context of Ɵme-inconsistent preferences, the soluƟon consequently takes the form of a Stackelberg
equilibrium, where younger selves have a ﬁrst-mover advantage. SoluƟon by backward inducƟon is made
possible by the assumpƟon that future selves cannot commit to strategies that react to the decisions of past
selves.
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recursively for any further soluƟons. This process is repeated unƟl no further
soluƟons are found, and the one that maximises the value funcƟon is selected.
Having solved for uƟlitymaximising behavioural responses at grid nodes as described
above, the life-courses of individual households are simulated by running households
forward through the grids. This is done by ﬁrst populaƟng a simulated sample by
taking random draws from a joint distribuƟon of all potenƟal state variables at the
youngest age considered for analysis. The behaviour of each simulated household,
i, at the youngest age is then idenƟﬁed by interpolaƟng over the decisions
stored about their respecƟve grid co-ordinates. Given household i’s characterisƟcs
(state variables) and behaviour, its characterisƟcs are aged one year following
the processes that govern their intertemporal variaƟon. Where these processes
depend upon stochasƟc terms, new random draws are taken from their respecƟve
distribuƟons (commonly referred to as Monte Carlo simulaƟon). This process is
repeated for the enƟre simulated life of each household. The data generated for the
simulated cohort are then used as the basis for esƟmaƟon and analysis.
3. PARAMETER ESTIMATES
A. EsƟmaƟon method
The parameters of the model described in SecƟon 2 were esƟmated by the Method
of SimulatedMoments (MSMs), which is now fairly standard in comparable analyƟcal
contexts.9 The approach esƟmates the model in two discrete stages. In the ﬁrst
stage, parameters that are exogenously observable are esƟmated without reference
to the structural model. EsƟmates for unobserved parameters are then esƟmated
endogenously to the model in a second stage, taking the parameter esƟmates
calculated in the ﬁrst stage as given. The endogenous esƟmaƟon of the second
stage is conducted by matching the populaƟon moments for a selected set of
characterisƟcs that are implied by the structural model (simulated moments) to
associated moments esƟmated from survey data (sample moments). This matching
is undertaken by minimising a weighted loss funcƟon of the diﬀerence between the
simulated and sample moments, where the weighƟng matrix is opƟmally designed
to capture uncertainty over the model parameters esƟmated in the ﬁrst stage.
B. Data
The model parameters were esƟmated on data for individuals aged 25 to 45 in
2007/08, on the assumpƟons that observed households behaved as though they
19 See, for example, Gourinchas & Parker (2002), Cageƫ (2003), French (2005), ChaƩerjee et al. (2007), Nardi
et al. (2009).
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would be subject to the 2007 policy environment for the remainder of their lives;
that they expected labour incomes to increase at a constant rate based on the
observed growth between 1990 and 2007; that expectaƟons regarding cohabitaƟon
reﬂected transiƟons observed between 1991 and 2007; and that expected mortality
rates reﬂected oﬃcial projecƟons for the cohort aged 35 in 2007. Furthermore, the
micro-data upon which the esƟmaƟon is based were screened to omit public sector
employees who are eligible to non-contributory pensions10, and the self-employed
whose circumstances upon reaching reƟrement oŌen depend crucially upon the sale
of their respecƟve businesses. The omiƩed populaƟon subgroups accounted for just
under 20 per cent of the total work force in the UK in 2007/08.11
These assumpƟons represent a balance between the prevailing computaƟonal
limitaƟons, and the objecƟve to obtain a faithful reﬂecƟon of the household
decision making context. The principal simpliﬁcaƟon of the esƟmaƟon is that it
limits variaƟon of the policy environment. The importance of this consideraƟon is
exaggerated by the focus on endogenous labour supply, which requires the model
to take explicit account of tax and beneﬁts policy. The alternaƟve aspects of the
esƟmaƟon are designed to militate against the distorƟons that are consequent upon
this simpliﬁcaƟon. Financial staƟsƟcs were adjusted to reﬂect real wage growth
to capture expectaƟons that individuals may reasonably have had over how their
circumstances were likely to evolve with age. The dynamic model of cohabitaƟon
was esƟmated on data for a Ɵme period that forms a reasonable basis for the
speciﬁcaƟon of agent speciﬁc expectaƟons.Mortality rates reﬂect oﬃcial projecƟons
for improvements in longevity. The generaƟonal age band considered for esƟmaƟon
controls for the heterogeneous circumstances of diﬀerent birth cohorts. This last
consideraƟon is parƟcularly relevant in the current context, as recent reforms to the
UK pensions system substanƟally alter the circumstances of workers disƟnguished
by year of birth. The age band was selected to focus upon the period in life when
the illiquidity of pension wealth is likely to have the most pronounced inﬂuence on
behaviour in the context of Ɵme inconsistent preferences.
Individual data sources are reported alongside the parameter esƟmates throughout
the discussion that follows.
C. First stage parameter esƟmates
The structural model is based upon a total of 395 parameters. Of these, 3
describe interest rates on liquid net worth; 13 parameters describe the evoluƟon
10 These include employees of the armed forces, naƟonal government, local government services, jusƟce, police,
ﬁre, and social security departments.
11 Calculated on 2007/08 FRS data, which indicates 12 per cent of all workers self employed, and 7.6 per cent
employed in public sector (SIC code 75).
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of household demographics (relaƟonship status and dependent children); 101
parameters describe age speciﬁc probabiliƟes of mortality; 50 parameters describe
the earnings processes for singles and couples; 210 parameters describe the tax
and beneﬁts system; 13 parameters describe the nature of personal pensions; and 5
parameters describe household preferences. All but the ﬁve preference parameters
were esƟmated exogenous of the structural model.
The 390 parameters esƟmated in the ﬁrst stage are reported in Tables 7 to 10 of
Appendix A.
Credit constraints, real interest rates, and growth rates Households cannot
borrow in excess of £2,000 at any age, subject to the condiƟon that all debts be
repaid by age 65, as reported in Table 7. Real interest and growth rates are reported
in the top panel of Table 8. The lower limit cost of debt
 
rDl

was set to 11.5 per
cent per annum, and the upper limit
 
rDu

to 19.8 per cent, which reﬂects the range
of average real interest charges applied between January 1996 and January 2008
to credit card loans and overdraŌs in the UK. PosiƟve balances of liquid net worth
were assumed to earn a return
 
rI

of 2.7 per cent per annum, equal to the average
real return on ﬁxed rate bond deposits held with banks and building socieƟes during
the period between January 1996 and January 2008. The return to pension wealth 
rpt = r p

was set equal to 4.1 per cent per annum based on the average return to
capital described in the UK NaƟonal Accounts between 1988 and 2006, as reported
by Khoman&Weale (2008). The real rate of wage growth, used to adjustmoments of
ﬁnancial characterisƟcs in the second stage of the model esƟmaƟon, was set to 1.3
per cent per annum, equal to the real growth observed for the average earnings index
between 1990 and 2007. Welfare beneﬁts were assumed to fall very marginally with
Ɵme (annual rate of 0.1%), to reﬂect historical data over the period 1978 to 2008 on
the value of unemployment beneﬁts and the basic state pension. Similarly, real tax
thresholds were assumed to rise by 0.3 per cent per annum, based on growth of the
income threshold for the highest rate of income tax over the period 1997 to 2007.
Household demographics It was assumed that a household can be comprised of
one or two adults to age 99, and of a single adult from age 100. The logit funcƟon
that governs relaƟonship transiƟons in the model was selected aŌer considering
various alternaƟves, and is described by equaƟon (13). This equaƟon was esƟmated
on pooled data from waves 1 (1991) to 17 (2007) of the BriƟsh Household Panel
Survey (BHPS), which were reorganised by family unit, and screened to omit any
unit by year that had missing data, or that had adult members who were either
self employed or employees in public sector organisaƟons with access to non-
contributory occupaƟonal pensions.12 Throughout the analysis, household age for
12 Public sector employees omiƩed from analysis were idenƟﬁed under Standard Industrial ClassiﬁcaƟon codes
9100-9199 (1980) / 75 (1992).
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adult couples reported in survey data was set equal to the age of the eldest spouse.
Parameter esƟmates are reported on the leŌhand side of themiddle panel of Table 8.
The numbers of children by age and relaƟonship status were described by equaƟon
(14) (the density funcƟon of the normal distribuƟon), which provides a close
reﬂecƟon of the average numbers of children by parental age described by
survey data. EquaƟon (14) was esƟmated separately for singles and couples on
data from the 2007/08 Family Resources Survey (FRS). As for the BHPS data
referred to above, the FRS data were organised at the level of the family (beneﬁt)
unit, and screened to omit observaƟons with inconsistent data. EsƟmates for
equaƟon (14) are reported on the right hand side of the middle panel of Table 8,
si;t+1 = αA0 + αA1t+ αA2t2 + αA3t3 + αA4si;t (13)
nci;t = αC0 exp
n
αC1
 
t  αC2
2o (14)
Mortality probabiliƟes by age The survival probabiliƟes assumed for esƟmaƟng
the model are based upon the cohort expectaƟons of life published by the Oﬃce
for NaƟonal StaƟsƟcs (ONS). These data were used to calculate the age speciﬁc
probabiliƟes of survival for a same-aged couple, where both members of the couple
were aged 35 in 2007 (the middle of the target age band for esƟmaƟon). The life
expectancies are based on historical survival rates from 1981 to 2006, and calendar
year survival rates from the 2006-based principal projecƟons.
The oﬃcial data permit survival rates to be calculated to age 94, whereas amaximum
age of 120 was assumed in the model. Age speciﬁc survival probabiliƟes between
95 and 120 were exogenously adjusted to describe a smooth sigmoidal progression
from the oﬃcial esƟmate at age 94 to a 0 per cent survival probability at age 120.
The mortality rates used are reported at the boƩom of Table 8.
The probability of a low wage oﬀer Previous experience in use of the structural
model revealed that wages tend to be suﬃcient to moƟvate some labour supply
by almost all households during the prime working years spanning ages 25 to 45.
The probability of a low wage oﬀer (see SecƟon 2.E) was consequently set to the
proporƟon of single adults and couples that were idenƟﬁed as not working within
this age band, as described by data reported by the 2007/08 wave of the Family
Resources Survey (FRS) (described in SecƟon 2.C). The associated sample staƟsƟcs
are reported in the top panel of Table 9.
DisƟnguishing the implicaƟons of alternaƟve labour supply decisions Single
adults were considered to choose between full-Ɵme employment, part-Ɵme
employment, and not employed. Couples choose between 2 full-Ɵme employed,
1 full-Ɵme and 1 part-Ɵme employed, 1 full-Ɵme employed and 1 not employed,
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1 part-Ɵme employed and 1 not employed, and 2 not employed; the opƟon to
allow for 2 part-Ɵme employed adults in a household was omiƩed because very
few households take up this opƟon in pracƟce. The inﬂuence of alternaƟve labour
supply decisions on leisure and income from employment were deﬁned as non-
stochasƟc and age invariant proporƟons of the respecƟve staƟsƟcs associated with
the maximum employment decision (full-Ɵme employment of all adult household
members). These proporƟons were esƟmated using data for households aged
between 20 and 59 from the 2007/08 FRS, organised and screened as described in
SecƟon C.2. Weighted averages were calculated for the number of hours worked
and log wages, disƟnguishing populaƟon sub-samples by the number of adults in a
household and labour market status.13 These staƟsƟcs are reported toward the top
of Table 9.
The distribuƟon of wages at age 20 Each simulated household that is generated
by the model (discussed in SecƟon 2.G) was allocated a latent wage at age 20 by
taking a random draw from a log normal distribuƟon. The mean and variance of the
distribuƟon for singles and couples of log latent wages at age 20 were esƟmated on
the same FRS data that were used to esƟmate the implicaƟons of alternaƟve labour
supply decisions (described above). A sample selecƟon model that describes log
wages as a cubic funcƟon of age was esƟmated separately for singles and couples.14
These esƟmates were used to calculate the means for singles and couples of log
full-Ɵme wages at age 20 that were assumed in the second stage esƟmaƟon. The
standard deviaƟons of the log-normal distribuƟons were set equal to the FRS sample
staƟsƟcs observed for the respecƟve populaƟon subgroups at age 20. These staƟsƟcs
are reported in the middle panel of Table 9.
Labour income dynamics An experience eﬀect was only taken into consideraƟon
where relaƟonship status remained unchanged between adjacent periods. To
esƟmate an experience eﬀect over the extensive labour margin, recursive
subsƟtuƟon was used to restate equaƟon (7a) as:
ln (gi;t+2)  ln (gi;t) = ln (μ (empi;t+2))  ln (μ (empi;t)) + ::
+fh
 
nai;t; t

+ fh
 
nai;t+1; t+ 1

+ ::
+
t+1X
k=t
nX
j=1
κj

empji;k

+ ωi;t+1 + ωi;t (15)
13 The InternaƟonal Labour OrganizaƟon (ILO) deﬁniƟon of labour market status was used for the esƟmaƟons.
Age invariant staƟsƟcs were applied aŌer observing liƩle systemaƟc variaƟon by age.
14 The sample selecƟon model controlled only for the incidence of non-employment. Households with adults
who were less than full-Ɵme employed had their aggregate wage adjusted up on the basis of the respecƟve
staƟsƟcs discussed in SecƟon C.5.
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where n is the number of potenƟal labour states, empji;t is a dummy variable that is
equal to 1 if household i engages in employment state j at age t and zero otherwise,
and κj denotes the respecƟve experience eﬀect; all other variables are as deﬁned
previously.15 Where relaƟonship status was observed to change between adjacent
periods, omission of an experience eﬀect enabled equaƟon (7a) to be esƟmated
directly.
The Ɵme dimension that is embedded in the speciﬁcaƟon of the equaƟons that
govern intertemporal wage dynamics made the FRS an unsuitable data source for
esƟmaƟon. Data from waves 1 to 17 of the BHPS for households aged between 20
and 64 were consequently used for esƟmaƟon, organised and screened as described
in SecƟon C.2. The sample for esƟmaƟon was extended beyond the 25 to 45 year
old age band to limit the inﬂuence of boundary eﬀects in relaƟon to esƟmated
polynomials by age, and to provide a plausible descripƟon for agent expectaƟons
regarding later ages.
The pooled BHPS data were divided into four populaƟon sub-groups disƟnguished
by the marital transiƟons observed in adjacent years. Each sub-sample was then
censored to omit extreme observaƟons on the respecƟve dependent variable
(ln (gi;t+2)  ln (gi;t) or ln (gi;t+1)  ln (gi;t)), resulƟng in sample sizes for esƟmaƟon
of 18,631 for conƟnuously single adults, 27,831 for conƟnuously married families,
3,850 newly married families, and 3,705 newly single families. Separate esƟmates
were calculated on the data for each of these populaƟon subgroups, correcƟng for
sample selecƟon and heteroscedasƟcity of error terms.16
The results of unrestricted esƟmaƟons are reported for newly married and newly
single households in Table 9. In the case of conƟnuously single /married households,
unrestricted esƟmates indicate that the eﬀects of experience on prospecƟve wages
were esƟmated with relaƟvely high standard errors. These were amended to the
extent permiƩed by the data, to ensure that experience was a monotonically
increasing funcƟon of employment. The regression parameters obtained aŌer
restricƟng the eﬀects of experience are reported in Table 10.
Taxes and beneﬁts As discussed in SecƟon 2.3, the wedge between gross private
income and disposable income was calculated by dividing the life course into two
periods. Taxes and beneﬁts during the working lifeƟme, t < tSPA, were structured
to reﬂect the schedules by household demographic category that are reported
15 EsƟmates were also obtained for two recursive subsƟtuƟons (a dependent variable of ln (gi;t+3)  ln (gi;t)), which
were found to be qualitaƟvely the same as those reported here.
16 Full maximum likelihood esƟmaƟon was undertaken using the “heckman” command in STATA 10, adjusƟng for
enumeraƟon weights, and allowing for clustering by enumerated individual in the error terms.
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in the April 2007 ediƟon of the Tax Beneﬁt Model Tables (TBMT), issued by the
Department for Work and Pensions (see hƩp://www.dwp.gov.uk/asd/tbmt.asp).
During the period of pension receipt, tSPA  t, the model was designed to reﬂect
income taxes in 2007, and was loosely deﬁned around the system of reƟrement
beneﬁts set out in the 2006 PensionsWhite Paper (DWP, 2006b). This last assumpƟon
was made because the White Paper was both freely available and widely publicised
during the period covered by the esƟmaƟon, and is a sensible data source for the
speciﬁcaƟon of agent expectaƟons. In line with the pensionsWhite Paper, themodel
assumes a state pension age of 68. At this age, all individuals were assumed to
be eligible to a full ﬂat-rate state pension, which reﬂects the expanded coverage
of state pensions implemented by the reforms described in the 2006 White Paper,
and the coincident amendments to make state pensions a ﬂat-rate beneﬁt worth
around £135 per week to a single pensioner in 2006 earnings terms. Means-tested
beneﬁts subject to a 100% clawback rate were assumed to keep pace with the
increased generosity of the ﬂat-rate state pension, so that they could be ignored.
The (real) value of means tested beneﬁts subject to a 40% clawback rate are set
out by the 2006 White Paper to grow with wages between 2008 and 2015, and
to be frozen in real terms thereaŌer. The model assumed a 10% discount to the
value of these state reƟrement beneﬁts, to reﬂect on-going concerns over their
sustainability.17
Private pensions There is a great deal of diversity in private pension arrangements
in the UK, and in the details of occupaƟonal pensions in parƟcular. This aspect of
the model speciﬁcaƟon was further complicated by a lack of data at the household
level regarding the magnitude of pension contribuƟons, and the contribuƟons
of employers in parƟcular. The endogenous pension decision was consequently
restricted for the esƟmaƟon to focus upon the issue of pension parƟcipaƟon. Any
household with a wage in excess of πpl = $317 per week – 75% of the median
household wage in 2007 – was considered eligible to parƟcipate in the pension
during the given year. The pension contribuƟon rate for employees who choose to
parƟcipate in a private pension was set to πpc = 8% of employee earnings, which is
the ‘normal’ contribuƟon rate stated in the guidance to interviewers for the FRS.
The rate of matching employer contribuƟons (paid into pensions of parƟcipaƟng
employees) was set to πpec = 11% of employee earnings, which is the average
contribuƟon rate to employer sponsored pensions that is reported in Forth & Stokes
(2008).
17 The beneﬁts adopted for analysis applied a discount relaƟve to the following: a state pension of £135 per week
per adult in current earnings terms, a means tested beneﬁt subject to a claw back rate of 40% that is worth up
to £35.29 per week for singles and £46.54 per week for couples. The upper bounds of means tested beneﬁts
were obtained by adjusƟng the maximum value of the savings credit payable in 2006 by a real growth rate of
1% per annum for 17 years (between 2008 and 2015).
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The annuity rate, χ, was speciﬁed as actuarially fair, given the assumed mortality
rates, the return on pension wealth, and subject to a one-Ɵme capital charge of
4.7 per cent to reﬂect administraƟon expenses and uncertainty over mortality rate
projecƟons.18 The proporƟon of pensionwealth used to purchase an annuity at state
pension age was set to 75%, based on the maximum pension wealth that could be
taken as a tax free lump-sum at reƟrement in 2006.
D. Second stage preference parameter esƟmates
Moments for the second stage esƟmaƟon The staƟsƟcal analysis that is reported
here is structured around the observaƟon that, relaƟve to Ɵme-consistent
agents, sophisƟcatedly myopic consumers will perceive as valuable commitment
mechanisms that resolve conﬂict between the preferences of diﬀerent intertemporal
selves in favour of the present self. The unobserved preference parameters of the
model were consequently esƟmated by minimising the disparity – as measured by
a weighted loss funcƟon – between simulated and sample moments over four sets
of populaƟon characterisƟcs. A set of age and relaƟonship speciﬁc rates of pension
schememembershipwere included on the hypothesis that thesemight be important
in idenƟfying the short-run discount factor, in common with Laibson et al. (2007).
Age and relaƟonship speciﬁc means of log household consumpƟon are important
in determining discount factors and the isoelasƟc parameter γ, given the ﬁrst-stage
esƟmates for rates of investment return. Moments of employment status by age and
relaƟonship status relate closely to the uƟlity price of leisure, andmay also bear upon
the short-run discount factor due to the commitment mechanism oﬀered by wages
that respond to an experience eﬀect, in common with Fang & Silverman (2007).
Rates of employment parƟcipaƟon by wealth quinƟle observed late in the working
lifeƟme were considered to improve idenƟﬁcaƟon over the intratemporal elasƟcity
ϵ, following SeŌon et al. (2008). All but the last set of moments condiƟons describe
circumstances over the target age band 25 to 45, with the last focusing on the age
band 50 to 59 to capture reƟrement behaviour.
The moments considered for esƟmaƟng the model preference parameters are
reported in Table 11 of Appendix B.
Parameter esƟmates Table 1 reports regression staƟsƟcs over the full set of
preference parameters. StarƟngwith the results reported for themodel speciﬁcaƟon
based on the assumpƟon of exponenƟal discounƟng, the point esƟmate of the
discount factor implies a discount rate of 3.2 per cent per annum, which is
insigniﬁcantly diﬀerent from the esƟmated rate of return to posiƟve balances of
18 This resulted in an annuity rate of 6.06% for esƟmaƟon. The 4.7% capital charge is based on “typical” pricing
margins reported in the pension buy-outs market in the UK. See Lane et al. (2008), p. 22.
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liquid net worth described in SecƟon C. The relaƟve values of the point esƟmates
obtained for the isoelasƟc parameter γ and the intratemporal elasƟcity ϵ imply that
leisure and consumpƟon are direct complements in uƟlity.19 But the large standard
errors obtained for these parameter esƟmates imply that this relaƟonship between
consumpƟon and leisure is not staƟsƟcally signiﬁcant. The esƟmatedparameters also
imply an intertemporal elasƟcity of subsƟtuƟon in consumpƟon of 0.13 measured at
the populaƟon means. This lies within the (admiƩedly wide) range of values that
have been reported in the associated empirical literature.
Relaxing the speciﬁcaƟon to allow for quasi-hyperbolic discounƟng obtains an
esƟmate for the excess short-run discount factor of 0.846, which is signiﬁcantly less
than one. The fall in the short-run discount factor is partly oﬀ-set by a coincident
rise in the esƟmate obtained for the long-run discount factor from 0.969 to 0.976.
Hence the regression results provide empirical support for the proposiƟon that the
discount rate associatedwith the ﬁrst prospecƟve year – at 21 per cent – exceeds the
long-run discount rate – at 2.5 per cent per annum. Comparing the target moments
that are reported in the boƩom half of the panel reveals that allowing for quasi-
hyperbolic discounƟng improves thematch obtained between themodel and sample
moments over pension parƟcipaƟon and labour supply; the match to moments for
consumpƟon, by contrast, deteriorate very slightly. These results are consistent with
the set of hypotheses upon which the empirical study is based; that an allowance
for sophisƟcated myopia might help to beƩer explain observed behaviour over
margins that have the potenƟal to serve as commitment mechanisms, non-durable
consumpƟon obviously not being one of these.
The current results reﬂect less pronounced myopia than is implied by the esƟmated
discount rates reported in the small number of studies that exist. Laibson et al.
(2007), for example report esƟmates for the short-run discount factor of 0.674/0.687
compared with 0.958/0.960 for the long-run discount factor, and Fang & Silverman
(2007) report 0.296/0.308 compared with 0.875/0.868. This disparity with the
results that are reported here is aƩributable to the broader subgroup of the
populaƟon that is considered for esƟmaƟon, relaƟve to Laibson et al. and Fang and
Silverman.
The analyses reported in SecƟon 4 are principally based upon the parameter
esƟmates reported in Table 1. To facilitate sensiƟvity analysis of the results obtained
to the degree of myopia, δ was re-esƟmated for a given set of parameter values
(γ; ϵ; α; β). StarƟng from the esƟmates set out in Table 1, the isoelasƟc parameter
γ was restricted to 1.4, the intratemporal elasƟcity ϵ to 0.55, and the uƟlity price
19 The assumed preference relaƟon implies that the sign of the parƟal derivaƟve of uƟlity with respect to both
consumpƟon and leisure is given by (1=ϵ   γ), so that it is posiƟve based on the point esƟmates reported here.
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of leisure to 1.3983.20 Seven alternaƟve values for the short-run excess discount
factor β are considered, centered over 0.85, and spaced evenly over the domain
[0:70; 1:00]. δ was re-esƟmated for each of these alternaƟve values of β to focus the
analysis upon the inﬂuence of myopia, by (imperfectly) controlling for impaƟence.
The esƟmates obtained for δ, given the parameter restricƟons set out above, are
reported in Table 2.
Measures reported for the loss funcƟon in Table 2 indicate that the best overall ﬁt
to the sample moments was obtained for β = 0:85, consistent with the results
reported in Table 1. As anƟcipated, esƟmates for δmonotonically rise as the assumed
value for β falls, oﬀseƫng the impact that a fall in β has on impaƟence over all
prospecƟve Ɵme horizons. The “term to equivalence” that is reported in the boƩom
row of Table 2 provides a measure of the extent to which the rise in the esƟmated
δ oﬀ-sets the associated fall in β. Deﬁne δ0 as the exponenƟal discount factor
associated with β = 1, and δ1 as the exponenƟal discount factor with β = β1. Then
the term to equivalence is the Ɵme horizon at which the discount factors under each
formof discounƟng are equivalent, t^ = ln (β1) = [ln (δ0)  ln (δ1)]. For Ɵme periods
less than the term-to-equivalence, quasi-hyperbolic discounƟng applies a lower
discount factor (higher annualised discount rate), relaƟve to exponenƟal discounƟng,
and vice versa for periods in excess of the term-to-equivalence. The staƟsƟcs that
are reported at the boƩom of Table 2 all imply a term-to-equivalence of around 20
years, indicaƟng that lower values of β imply greater disparity between short-run
and long-run discount rates – and therefore more pronounced Ɵme-inconsistency
of preferences – while maintaining the period over which the myopic speciﬁcaƟons
imply greater impaƟence, relaƟve to exponenƟal discounƟng.
Table 1: Structural esƟmaƟon of full set of preference parameters
exponenƟal quasi-hyperbolic
parameter esƟmate std error esƟmate std error
short-run excess discount factor 1.0000 0.8458 0.0401
long-run (exponenƟal) discount factor 0.9693 0.0053 0.9760 0.0041
intertemporal isoelasƟc parameter 1.4380 0.5212 1.3760 0.2964
intra-temporal elasƟcity 0.5485 0.0909 0.5500 0.0453
uƟlity price of leisure 1.4003 0.0940 1.3900 0.0336
target moments
consumpƟon 1.270E-02 1.305E-02
pension parƟcipaƟon 8.308E-03 7.762E-03
part-Ɵme employment 3.675E-03 3.471 E-03
full-Ɵme employment 7.313E-03 6.678E-03
non-emp of 1st to 5th wealth quinƟles 4.407E-02 1.583E-02
Loss funcƟon 5.5339 5.0291
J staƟsƟc 866.37 775.86
Test of over-idenƟfying restricƟons* 0.0000 0.0000
Notes: *p-values
20 In the case of the uƟlity price of leisure, the parameter valuewas set to the average between the point esƟmates
obtained for the exponenƟal and quasi-hyperbolic models, imposing the addiƟonal restricƟons γ = 1:4 and
ϵ = 0:55. These supplementary regression staƟsƟcs are available from the author upon request.
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Table 2: Structural esƟmates of the exponenƟal discount factor, for restricted values of the excess short-run
discount factor
parameter
long-run (exponenƟal) discount factor 0.9690 0.9717 0.9737 0.9767 0.9782 0.9818 0.9824
(0.0044) (0.0058) (0.0033) (0.0032) (0.0014) (0.0026) (0.0022)
restricted preference parameters
short-run excess discount factor 1.00 0.95 0.90 0.85 0.80 0.75 0.70
intertemporal isoelasƟc parameter 1.40 1.40 1.40 1.40 1.40 1.40 1.40
intra-temporal elasƟcity 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.55
uƟlity price of leisure 1.3983 1.3983 1.3983 1.3983 1.3983 1.3983 1.3983
Loss funcƟon 5.6246 5.4859 5.4844 5.3038 5.6171 6.8948 7.3733
J staƟsƟc 882.47 851.60 839.30 806.98 868.76 1049.01 1157.77
Term to equivalence* 18.10 21.65 20.34 23.56 21.81 25.92
Notes: standard errors reported in parentheses
* deﬁnes the Ɵme horizon at which the implied discount factor is equivalent to the exponenƟal discount factor
* (the leŌ-most column)
4. THE EFFECTS OF INTRODUCING A DEFINED CONTRIBUTION (DC) PENSION SCHEME
A. Policy counterfactuals
The analysis is based upon repeated simulaƟons for a cohort of 10,000 households,
where each simulaƟon assumes that households (accurately) expect that they will
be subject to a single policy environment throughout the course of their lives. Long-
run behavioural responses to policy are idenƟﬁed by comparing household decisions
made under one policy environmentwith thosemade under another, where the only
variable between compared simulaƟons is the considered policy environment.21 A
small open economy is assumed, so that there are no feed-back eﬀects of aggregate
savings and labour supply on interest rates or wages.
The analysis was conducted by comparing behaviour andwelfare under two principal
policy environments, which are disƟnguished from one another by the existence
of a DC pension scheme structured around the NaƟonal Employment Savings
Trust (NEST). This central policy counterfactual is consistent with the moƟvaƟon
underlying the introducƟon of the NEST, which is to extend pension eligibility to
people who are not currently served by the exisƟng system of private pensions in the
UK. The terms of the DC pension that is considered here are also speciﬁed to reﬂect
the broad strokes of the NEST. Where the DC pension exists, then all employees
under age 68 are eligible to choose to parƟcipate in the scheme. If they do choose to
parƟcipate, then they must also specify the proporƟon of their gross labour income
to contribute to the scheme during the given year, subject to a lower bound of 5%.
Any employee who chooses to parƟcipate in the DC pension receives a matching
21 Note that each simulated household is subject to the same age speciﬁc innovaƟons between alternaƟve policy
simulaƟons.
Do Deﬁned ContribuƟon Pensions Correct for Short-Sighted Savings Decisions? Evidence from the UK j 23
employer contribuƟon worth 3% of gross earnings, and all contribuƟons are exempt
from income tax. At age 68, 25% of each individual’s pension fund is returned as a
tax free lump sum, with the remainder used to purchase a life annuity, paying an
actuarially fair dividend subject to a capital charge of 4.7% (as set out in SecƟons C
and D).
The terms of the DC pension that are set out above diﬀer from the NEST in four
respects. First, the assumpƟon that the pension fund is illiquid unƟl age 68 contrasts
with the minimum pensionable age of 55 that is currently imposed in the UK. The
pension age assumed for the DC pension was aligned with state pension age in
the absence of a clear view about how the minimum pensionable age is likely
to evolve during the next few decades. The uncertainty is highlighted by policy
changes implemented in 2006 that required all pension schemes in the UK to raise
their minimum age of reƟrement from 50 to 55 by 2010. The inﬂuence that this
assumpƟon has on the analysis will depend upon how it aﬀects the value of the DC
pension as a commitment mechanism to myopic agents.
Second, auto-enrolment is an aspect of the design of the NEST that is omiƩed from
the current analysis. There is extensive empirical evidence to suggest that auto-
enrolment has an important bearing on rates of pension scheme parƟcipaƟon. In the
current context, however –where decisions are the product ofmaximising behaviour
subject to raƟonal expectaƟons and in the absence of decision making costs – auto-
enrolment has no role to play. I return to this issue in the concluding remarks.
Third, to limit compeƟƟon between the NEST and the exisƟng market of private
pension providers in the UK, NEST accounts will be subject to a series of constraints
on the band of income from which contribuƟons can be made, the aggregate value
that can be contributed in any one year, and the transfers that can be made into the
scheme from alternaƟve pension plans. These issues are omiƩed from the analysis
because they are orthogonal to our subject of interest.
Finally, the NEST is designed to provide low cost access to professional funds
management, and will allow a degree of ﬂexibility over the assets into which
contribuƟons can be invested. The current analysis abstracts from the detailed asset
allocaƟon problem, by focusing only upon ﬁxed rates of investment return. To the
extent that investment ﬂexibility is an important factor determining savings held in
pensions, the model will tend to understate contribuƟon rates, and ulƟmately rates
of parƟcipaƟon.
Introducing the DC pension scheme described above acts to raise the eﬀecƟve
return to labour supply, directly through the employer contribuƟon, and indirectly
through the preferenƟal tax treatment of pension contribuƟons. Adjustments to
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oﬀset the pecuniary impact of the DC pension scheme consequently have an
important bearing upon the results obtained. These adjustments were administered
through the government budget constraint on the assumpƟon that the matching
(employer) pension contribuƟons were paid for by the government. Two forms of
tax adjustment to maintain neutrality of the aggregate government budget were
explored: a ﬁxed proporƟonal tax on all labour income; and adjustment of the upper
two rates of income tax of the four rate schedule that was applied in the UK in
2007. The second of these two alternaƟves leaves lower rate tax payers unaﬀected,
and was selected to oﬀ-set the regressivity that is otherwise consequent on the
introducƟon of a DC pension (returned to below). As similar results were obtained
under both methods of tax adjustment, results assuming the ﬁxed proporƟonal tax
on labour income are reported in the following subsecƟons, and those obtained
under the alternaƟve tax adjustment can be obtained from the author upon request.
I begin by discussing eﬀects of the DC pension simulated under the preference
parameters reported in Table 1. SecƟon 4.B reports responses on the assumpƟon
of exponenƟal discounƟng, and SecƟon 4.C explores the eﬀects of myopia on the
assumpƟon of quasi-hyperbolic discounƟng. SensiƟvity of the analysis to the extent
of myopia is then explored with reference to the preference parameters that are
reported in Table 2.
B. Behavioural responses in the context of Ɵme-consistent preferences
Table 3 reports the long-run behavioural and welfare eﬀects of introducing the DC
pension set out in SecƟon A, given the model parameters reported for exponenƟal
discounƟng in Table 1, and on the assumpƟon that the pension fund earns the same
real rate of return as posiƟve balances on liquid net worth (2.7 per cent per annum). I
report the eﬀects of the DC pension in per-capita terms because the NEST is explicitly
designed to address the needs of individual employees in the UK, rather than an
economy-wide reform.
Table 3 divides the populaƟon into quinƟle groups based upon average disposable
household income earned between ages 20 and 67, so that each quinƟle follows the
same group of households through their respecƟve lives. Working down from the
top of Table 3, the reported staƟsƟcs indicate that the tax advantages of the pension
asset and the 3%matching employer pension contribuƟon are suﬃcient incenƟves to
generate widespread parƟcipaƟon in the pension scheme. It is of liƩle surprise that
the highest rates of pension scheme parƟcipaƟon toward the end of the working
life are observed amongst households at the top of the income distribuƟon. Less
intuiƟve, however, is the observaƟon that the reverse is true at the beginning of
the working life, when rates of pension parƟcipaƟon are parƟcularly high among
households in the boƩom two income quinƟles. This second observaƟon is of note,
given that the NEST is explicitly designed for employees on low to modest incomes.
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Table 3: Long-run eﬀects of introducing a deﬁned contribuƟon pension where a pension
asset did not previously exist and preferences are Ɵme consistent
lowest highest
age group income 2nd quinƟle 3rd quinƟle 4th quinƟle income average
quinƟle quinƟle
proporƟon of decile contribuƟng to private pension (%*)
20 to 34 31 21 13 10 14 18
35 to 49 62 52 45 54 74 57
50 to 67 37 40 62 80 86 61
change in employment (%*)
45 to 54  0.4 0.1 0.4 0.8 0.7 0.3
55 to 64  0.6 1.1 1.5 0.4  0.7 0.3
65 to 74  5.0  2.2  3.7  14.8  29.8  11.1
average pension wealth (%**)
20 to 34 6 5 3 3 5 4
35 to 49 82 86 79 100 162 102
50 to 67 192 225 291 513 957 436
change in total net worth (%**)
20 to 34 5 3 1 0 2 2
35 to 49 81 82 72 90 157 96
50 to 67 189 210 242 404 707 350
compensaƟng variaƟon of pension introducƟon (%**)
20 10 15 16 17 16 15
68  43  61  98  182  383  154
Responses to aDCpension paying a real return to invested funds of 2.7%per annum.QuinƟle groups
disƟnguished by household disposable income between ages 20 and 67. Table reports staƟsƟcs
simulated with a DC pension, less staƟsƟcs simulated without a pension asset. SimulaƟons with a
DC pension also apply a tax adjustment to ensure government budget neutrality. Tax adjustment
applied as a ﬁxed rate on all wage income, equal to 5.9%
** denotes % of populaƟon subgroup
** denotes % of median annual household disposable income between ages 20 and 67 in the
simulaƟon where a DC pension does not exist, equal to £52,548 in 2007 prices
The relaƟvely high rates of pension scheme parƟcipaƟon that are observed early
in life among households in the boƩom two income quinƟles are aƩributable to the
forward looking nature of the decision framework. Households toward the top of the
lifeƟme income distribuƟon anƟcipate stronger wage growth early in the life course
than those toward the boƩom, due to the speciﬁcaƟon that is assumed to govern
the intertemporal development of human capital (see SecƟon E). Furthermore,
households toward the boƩom of the lifeƟme income distribuƟon that expect weak
wage growth, also anƟcipate to reƟre sooner – households in the boƩom quinƟle
work for 38 years on average under the policy counterfactual without pensions,
which is 10 years less than households in the top quinƟle. These factors moƟvate
high income households to consumemore early in life and delay their saving to later
ages, relaƟve to households with lower wage expectaƟons.
The staƟsƟcs that are reported for employment in Table 3 indicate that labour
supply rises very marginally on average prior to pension age in response to the DC
pension, but falls substanƟally following pension age. These shiŌs reﬂect two factors.
First, and most important, the DC pension encourages increased reƟrement saving,
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which allows households to enter reƟrement on preferable terms from pension age.
Second, it is driven by the Ɵming of the inﬂuence of the DC pension – and the
compensaƟng tax adjustments – on the returns to labour. Prior to pension age, the
DC pension tends to raise the return to labour supply, which is partly oﬀ-set by the
coincident 5.9 per cent ﬁxed tax rate applied to all wage income. In contrast, only
the eﬀect of the ﬁxed tax on wage income applies from pension age, which tends to
dampen the incenƟve to supply labour. The most pronounced eﬀects are observed
among households with the highest incomes, for whom the pension asset is most
important.
The staƟsƟcs reported for pension wealth and total net worth indicate that most
pension saving represents new saving in the model, rather than a transfer of saving
from liquid assets. This is parƟcularly true for households in the lowest two lifeƟme
income quinƟles, for whom the NEST is designed, but it also applies to households
throughout the income distribuƟon. Unsurprisingly, the largest degree of oﬀ-seƫng
is generated by the model for households at the top of the income distribuƟon and
late in the working lifeƟme. But even among these households, average oﬀ-seƫng
between ages 50 and 67 does not exceed 30 per cent, well below the 40 per cent
average oﬀ-set currently projected for the NEST by the government.
There is extensive uncertainty in the empirical literature regarding the impact of
pensions on aggregate household saving, and theory provides liƩle guidance about
what we should expect. One of the ﬁrst studies to consider the eﬀects of reƟrement
pensions on private saving is by Feldstein (1974), who used US macro-data to ﬁnd
that social security depresses personal saving by 30-50 per cent. During the 1980s a
number of papers reported econometric esƟmates based upon micro-data, which
generally suggest that reƟrement pensions have a small eﬀect on private saving
(see, for example, King & Dicks-Mireaux (1982), and Diamond & Hausman (1984)),
with the implicaƟon that reserves built up under reƟrement pensions generally
represent an net addiƟon to naƟonal wealth. More recently, however, Gale (1998)
and AƩanasio & Rohwedder (2003) have reported much larger oﬀsets – between 70
and 80 per cent – depending upon the focus of the analysis and the speciﬁcaƟon
adopted. Like the studies undertaken in the 1980s, these more recent papers
are based upon econometric esƟmates from micro-data, but they diﬀer from the
earlier studies in that the speciﬁcaƟons considered for analysis are based upon
inferences drawn from the life-cycle model, adjusƟng for age and Ɵme eﬀects on
the relaƟonship between private saving and pension wealth.
The inconclusive nature of the econometric evidence has been aƩributed to a
number of factors. These include lags in the adjustment of saving behaviour to
policy reforms (see, for example, Börsch-Supan & Brugiavini (2001) for discussion);
heterogeneity of agent behaviour with regard to individual circumstances
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(eg. Gale (1998) and AƩanasio & Rohwedder (2003)); and the availability of suitable
data (eg. Miles (1999)).
The low rates of pension oﬀ-seƫng that are reported here are aƩributable to
dispariƟes between the policy environment assumed for esƟmaƟng the model, and
the policy counterfactuals considered for analysis. The esƟmaƟons assume a pension
scheme that oﬀers generous terms, relaƟve to either saving in liquid wealth or the
pension asset that is considered here. SimulaƟons based on the esƟmated model
parameters and in the absence of any pension asset consequently tend to result in
small measures of household wealth, which limits the extent to which saving in a
pension can be oﬀ-set when this asset is included for analysis. The results that are
reported here highlight the need to take account of agent speciﬁc circumstances
when considering how far pension saving is likely to subsƟtute for other forms of
saving, parƟcularly when the target populaƟon possesses modest ﬁnancial means
as is the case for the NEST.
Welfare eﬀects in the form of compensaƟng variaƟons are reported at the boƩom
of Table 3. These staƟsƟcs indicate that the DC pensions tend to depress welfare
at the beginning of the simulated lifeƟme for households throughout the earnings
distribuƟon, with the most pronounced eﬀects reported toward the top of the
distribuƟon. This is an intuiƟve and important result: in the context of the decision
environment and Ɵme-consistent preference structure that are assumed here, there
is no welfare jusƟﬁcaƟon for the pension scheme. In this case, the illiquidity of the
DC pension reduces decision making ﬂexibility, and only survives in the context of
voluntary parƟcipaƟon to the extent that parƟcipants are subsidised through tax
advantages andmatching employer contribuƟons. In a closed ﬁnancial systemwhere
the cost of any subsidy must be met without recourse to borrowing (as is the case
here), the DC pension will be regressive to the extent that it transfers resources
from (poorer) non-savers to (richer) savers. As such, the DC pension requires a
consideraƟon beyond the scope of the current analysis to merit its introducƟon.
The welfare eﬀects of a DC pension become posiƟve (negaƟve compensaƟng
variaƟons) as age increases, reﬂecƟng the increase in saving that is moƟvated by
the DC pension scheme. Furthermore, the proﬁle of the welfare eﬀect is reasonably
ﬂat through the income distribuƟon at age 20, which reﬂects the uncertainty that is
associated with how lifeƟme prospects will evolve. This disparity widens with age,
as the magnitude and inequality of the distribuƟon of wealth rises, as the period of
illiquidity of pension wealth reduces, and as lifeƟme uncertainty declines.
The ﬁnding that DC pensions depress welfare measured from the start of the
simulated lifeƟme is in direct contrast with Laibson et al. (1998), who report strictly
posiƟve welfare gains to the introducƟon of a DC pension throughout the life course.
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The diﬀerence between the two studies in this respect is primarily aƩributable to
diﬀerences in the proporƟonal adjustments to employment income that aremade to
ensure budget balance, and indirectly to the allowance for endogenous labour supply
in the current analysis. The proporƟonal tax on labour earnings that is required
to maintain budget balance here is equal to 5.9 per cent. This is almost twice the
value of the matching employer contribuƟon of 3 per cent that is received by the
populaƟon subgroup who choose to parƟcipate in the DC pension. As Laibson et al.
(1998) adjust only for the matching employer pension contribuƟon, they apply a
smaller proporƟonal adjustment to wages relaƟve to the current analysis, which is
suﬃcient to result in a net welfare surplus to employees.
Although some of the diﬀerence between the rates of the matching employer
pension contribuƟon and the tax adjustment that is required to maintain budget
neutrality is accounted for by the ﬁscal burden of tax incenƟves to pension saving,
this is a relaƟvely minor consideraƟon. Furthermore, the size of the proporƟonal tax
adjustment is not exaggerated by behavioural responses to the tax adjustment. The
wealth eﬀect of the proporƟonal tax on earnings is suﬃcient to increase rates of
employment, relaƟve to a counterfactual where no proporƟonal tax is applied (not
reported). The principal reason that larger compensaƟng adjustments are imposed
in the current study, relaƟve to Laibson et al. (1998), is the reducƟon in labour supply
that is generated in the context of the DC pension from state pension age. The earlier
reƟrement ages simulated in the context of the DC pension reduce tax receipts levied
on the foregone labour income, and increase the ﬁscal burden of welfare payments
to reƟrees, which are all oﬀ-set by the tax adjustment to wages.
C. Responses when preferences are myopic
The policy counterfactual that is considered here is idenƟcal to that of the preceding
subsecƟon, with the excepƟon that behavioural responses are generated assuming
the esƟmated model parameters that describe quasi-hyperbolic discounƟng
reported in Table 1.
Comparing the top panel of Tables 3 and 4 reveals that the allowance made for
myopia tends to exaggerate rates of parƟcipaƟon in the DC pension scheme, which
increase by 2.5 percentage points on average between ages 20 and 49. The largest
increases in parƟcipaƟon are generated for households in the third and fourth
populaƟon quinƟles between ages 35 and 49, which possess both reasonably strong
saving incenƟves, and addiƟonal capacity for pension parƟcipaƟon under Ɵme-
consistent preferences (reported in Table 3). That these same households also tend
to reduce their pension parƟcipaƟon later in life if they have myopic preferences,
reﬂect the fact that savings accrued early in life are most at risk of premature
consumpƟon in the context of present biased preferences.
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Table 4: Long-run eﬀects of introducing a deﬁned contribuƟon pension where a pension
asset did not previously exist and preferences are myopic
lowest highest
age group income 2nd quinƟle 3rd quinƟle 4th quinƟle income average
quinƟle quinƟle
proporƟon of decile contribuƟng to private pension (%*)
20 to 34 35 23 14 11 13 19
35 to 49 64 54 51 61 77 61
50 to 67 38 38 60 79 86 60
change in employment (%*)
45 to 54  0.1 0.1 0.5 0.8 1.0 0.5
55 to 64  0.5 1.1 2.8 2.1  0.3 1.0
65 to 74  9.4  10.3  10.3  18.0  33.8  16.4
average pension wealth (%**)
20 to 34 8 6 4 3 5 5
35 to 49 102 102 87 106 162 112
50 to 67 232 264 311 502 883 438
change in total net worth (%**)
20 to 34 8 5 4 3 5 5
35 to 49 102 101 87 108 163 112
50 to 67 231 260 287 436 748 393
compensaƟng variaƟon of pension introducƟon (%**)
20 3 4 5 5 4 4
68  51  64  92  167  349  145
Responses to aDCpension paying a real return to invested funds of 2.7%per annum.QuinƟle groups
disƟnguished by household disposable income between ages 20 and 67. Table reports staƟsƟcs
simulated with a DC pension, less staƟsƟcs simulated without a pension asset. SimulaƟons with a
DC pension also apply a tax adjustment to ensure government budget neutrality. Tax adjustment
applied as a ﬁxed rate on all wage income, equal to 5.9%
** denotes % of populaƟon subgroup
** denotes % of median annual household disposable income between ages 20 and 67 in the
simulaƟon where a DC pension does not exist, equal to £52,548 in 2007 prices
Employment prior to reƟrement (not reported in Tables 3 or 4) is not much
aﬀected by the allowance made for quasi-hyperbolic discounƟng; average rates of
employment between ages 20 and 55 (not reported) increase by 0.2 per cent in
response to the DC pension under quasi-hyperbolic discounƟng, and by 0.3 per
cent under exponenƟal discounƟng. Hence the alternaƟve commitment mechanism
considered by themodel (labour supply in the context of a posiƟve experience eﬀect
on prospecƟve wages) does not appear to inﬂuence responses to the DC pension in
this case. The employment staƟsƟcs that are reported in the Tables 3 and 4 indicate
that employment parƟcipaƟon between ages 45 and 64 increases by 0.75 percentage
points on average in response to the DC pensions when preferences are myopic, as
compared with 0.3 percentage points in the context of Ɵme consistent preferences.
AŌer households gain access to their pension wealth (age 68 in the analysis),
however, employment rates fall fairly sharply – by 11 percentage points on average
under the assumpƟon of exponenƟal discounƟng, and by over 16 percentage points
under quasi-hyperbolic discounƟng. Themore pronounced reducƟon in employment
from pension age that is generated under quasi-hyperbolic discounƟng is consistent
with the dampened saving incenƟves due to the Ɵme inconsistency of myopic
preferences, so that myopic individuals without access to an illiquid pension ﬁnd
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that they are less well placed to aﬀord reƟrement later in life – DC pensions help to
miƟgate this eﬀect.
The staƟsƟcs reported for pension wealth in Tables 3 and 4 indicate that savings
in pensions are brought forward when preferences are myopic. This is consistent
with the rates of pension parƟcipaƟon that are discussed above, and highlights the
relaƟve importance of the commitment mechanism provided by the pension asset
early in the working lifeƟme.
The staƟsƟcs for total net worth reveal that aggregate saving rises in response to
a DC pension by almost 10 per cent more on average between ages 50 and 67
when preferences are myopic, relaƟve to the case of exponenƟal discounƟng22.
The distribuƟonal staƟsƟcs that are reported in the respecƟve tables indicate
that this excess savings response in the context of myopic preferences is spread
reasonably evenly across all households when measured in absolute (per capita)
terms. Myopia consequently has a more pronounced inﬂuence on the saving
responses of households on low to modest incomes when measured relaƟve to a
priori savings, which is of note as it is this populaƟon subgroup for whom the NEST is
designed. The exaggerated savings responses of lower income households, relaƟve
to those on higher incomes, is aƩributable to theweaker life-cycle savingsmoƟves of
low income households relaƟve to those on higher incomes, which are more easily
overwhelmed by the distorƟons of present biassed preferences.
Furthermore, the staƟsƟcs for pension wealth and total net worth taken together
reveal that there is a reduced tendency for households to oﬀ-set pension saving
against other liquid assets when preferences are myopic. This is because the
imperfect subsƟtutability between pension wealth and liquid wealth is exaggerated
in the context of myopic preferences by the commitment mechanism oﬀered by the
illiquidity of pension wealth.
Finally, welfare staƟsƟcs are reported at the boƩom of Tables 3 and 4. These indicate
that myopia tends to improve the welfare eﬀect of the DC pension scheme at
the beginning of the simulated lifeƟme among households throughout the income
distribuƟon. Nevertheless, the inﬂuence of myopia is insuﬃcient to imply that the
DC scheme is welfare improving at age 20: households in the boƩom lifeƟme income
quinƟlewould sƟll require a lump-sum payment equivalent to 2.7 per cent ofmedian
annual household disposable income at age 20 in the context of the DC pension
to be as well oﬀ as in the absence of the scheme, and this payment increases to
22 An increase of 42% of average lifeƟme earnings over and above the 350% increase observed for exponenƟal
discounƟng.
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between 4 and 5 per cent for households on higher lifeƟme incomes. Furthermore,
between ages 20 and 49, the welfare eﬀect of a DC pension switches from being
more preferable under myopic preferences, to more preferable under exponenƟal
preferences. This bias toward younger ages under quasi-hyperbolic discounƟng
reﬂects the importance of the commitment mechanism that is oﬀered by pensions,
which diminishes with the Ɵme horizon to pension receipt.
D. SensiƟvity to the extent of quasi-hyperbolic discounƟng
Amore general appreciaƟon of the implicaƟons of myopia for behavioural responses
to a DC pension is made possible by considering the sensiƟvity of responses over the
short-run excess discount factor, β, and the rate of return to the pension asset r p. The
current secƟon focuses upon the eﬀects of the pension asset on populaƟon average
staƟsƟcs, based upon the alternaƟve preference parameters that are reported in
Table 2. All aspects of the policy environment other than β, r p, and the exponenƟal
discount factor δ, were held ﬁxed between the simulated policy counterfactuals.
Table 5: Savings responses to the introducƟon of a pension asset, by short-run excess
discount factor and the return to pension wealth
short-run excess discount 0.7 0.75 0.8 0.85 0.9 0.95 1
pension wealth between ages 35 and 49*
pension return 2.0 0.638 0.744 0.625 0.663 0.598 0.639 0.578
(% p.a.) 2.5 0.864 1.078 0.962 1.013 0.927 0.950 0.853
3.0 1.121 1.308 1.227 1.317 1.272 1.299 1.196
3.5 1.308 1.541 1.446 1.556 1.503 1.569 1.504
4.0 1.508 1.671 1.617 1.715 1.709 1.793 1.738
4.5 1.625 1.793 1.757 1.873 1.856 1.959 1.920
5.0 1.735 1.903 1.839 1.961 1.952 2.070 2.036
pension wealth between ages 50 and 67*
pension return 2.0 2.959 3.317 3.087 3.293 3.151 3.269 3.204
(% p.a.) 2.5 3.744 4.196 3.951 4.135 4.008 4.086 3.961
3.0 4.493 4.881 4.673 4.874 4.784 4.856 4.737
3.5 5.082 5.454 5.257 5.448 5.362 5.462 5.377
4.0 5.569 5.888 5.694 5.870 5.828 5.929 5.860
4.5 5.934 6.221 6.075 6.253 6.174 6.296 6.230
5.0 6.246 6.535 6.341 6.519 6.445 6.589 6.503
percentage of pension wealth oﬀ-set against liquid wealth between ages 50 and 67
pension return 2.0 7.63 9.78 11.05 14.93 17.86 21.38 23.80
(% p.a.) 2.5 6.07 8.08 9.16 12.83 14.88 18.20 20.52
3.0 5.29 7.11 7.95 11.22 12.88 15.78 17.65
3.5 4.80 6.49 7.27 10.15 11.58 14.15 15.74
4.0 4.52 6.17 6.85 9.57 10.75 12.91 14.34
4.5 4.38 5.94 6.52 9.03 10.08 12.01 13.28
5.0 4.23 5.75 6.31 8.71 9.67 11.35 12.50
Table reports saving responses to a DC pension, relaƟve to a policy environment with no pension
asset.
* Wealth expressed as raƟo of median annual household disposable income between ages 20 and
67, worth £52,043.
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StaƟsƟcs that describe the eﬀects of the introducƟon of the pension asset on savings
behaviour are reported in Table 5. The top and middle panels of this table reveal a
clear posiƟve relaƟonship between the rate of return assumed for pension wealth
and the scale of pension wealth, for all seven of the alternaƟve values considered
for the short-run excess discount factor β. As the rate of return to pension wealth is
increased from 2 to 5 per cent per annum, the average pension wealth increases
by a factor of 3 between ages 35 and 49, and by a factor of 2 between ages 50
and 67. This intuiƟve response is more than a passive consequence of the higher
investment income that is consequent on an increased rate of return; high rates of
return to pension wealth moƟvate increased involvement in pensions early in the
working lifeƟme. When β = 0:85, a rise in the rate of return to pension wealth from
3 per cent per annum (approximaƟng the rate considered in Table 4) to 4 per cent per
annum (which approximates the target reducƟon inmanagement costs for the NEST)
increases average pension wealth between ages 35 and 49 by approximately 30 per
cent (from 1.32 to 1.72 Ɵmes average annual disposable income), and increases
average rates of pension scheme parƟcipaƟon between ages 20 and 35 by 25 per
cent (from 22.5 to 28.3 per cent, not reported in the table).
The top panel of Table 5 suggests that the extent of myopia tends to have a less
pronounced inﬂuence on pension saving early in theworking lifeƟme than the rate of
return to pension wealth. Nevertheless, a close inspecƟon of the staƟsƟcs reported
in the top panel of the table does reveal some interesƟng variaƟon to the policy
parameters. When the return to pension wealth is low, the top panel of Table 5
indicates that saving in pensions early in the working lifeƟme tends to increase with
the extent of behavioural myopia. As the rate of return to pension wealth increases,
however, this relaƟonship between myopia and pension saving is reversed.
As noted in the introducƟon, the illiquidity of a pension fund in the context ofmyopic
preferences can be welfare improving to the extent that it represents a commitment
mechanism that favours current preferences over future preferences. Importantly,
the potenƟal for a pension fund to be used in this way depends upon the nature of
its illiquidity, and is independent of the rate of return paid to pension savings. Hence,
the observaƟon that pension savings early in the working lifeƟme tend to respond
posiƟvely to the extent of myopia when the return to pension wealth is low suggests
that the DC pension does help to resolve the intra-personal conﬂict that arises in the
context of Ɵme-inconsistent preferences in favour of the present self. The addiƟonal
observaƟon that pension savings tend to respond negaƟvely to the extent of myopia
when the return to pension wealth is high then indicates that the parametrisaƟon
of myopia is relaƟvely inelasƟc to the return on pension wealth. Put another way,
relaƟve to Ɵme-consistent exponenƟal discounƟng, the myopic agents represented
by themodel favour the illiquidity of the DC pension for the commitmentmechanism
that it represents. But at the same Ɵme, the present bias of their preferences makes
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them less inclined to respond posiƟvely to an increase in the return paid to pension
wealth.
The middle panel of Table 5 indicates that average pension wealth between ages 50
and 67 tends to fall at a fairly stable rate as β is reduced below 1.0, for all ﬁve rates
of return to pension wealth reported in the table. This is consistent with the present
bias in consumpƟon that is associated with a lower β, and with the declining role of
the pension asset as a commitment mechanism as the pension age draws near.
Discussion in SecƟon C suggests that myopia tends to dampen the extent to which
pension saving is oﬀ-set against saving in other forms. This impression is reinforced
by the staƟsƟcs reported in the boƩom panel of Table 5, which indicate that the
oﬀ-set of pension saving late in the working lifeƟme falls monotonically with both
the extent of myopia and the return to pension wealth, with myopia having the
most pronounced inﬂuence over the range of policy parameters reported in the
table. As noted in SecƟon C, the scope for myopic households to oﬀ-set pension
saving is limited by the small balances of liquid wealth that such households accrue
in the absence of a pension asset, and by the desire to maintain precauƟonary
balances. The ﬁrst of these consideraƟons becomes more acute as the extent of
myopia increases, which is the driving factor behind the fall in the pension oﬀ-set
generated at lower values of β.
The reported decline of the savings oﬀ-set to the pension asset as the return to
pension wealth rises is aƩributable to four factors. First, high returns to the pension
asset moƟvate stronger pension parƟcipaƟon early in life (as discussed above) when
liquid savings are relaƟvely thin. Second, the wealth eﬀect associated with a rise
in the return to pension wealth moƟvates higher consumpƟon during the working
lifeƟme. Third, the higher consumpƟon during the working lifeƟme moƟvates larger
precauƟonary balances to insure against an adverse shock. And fourth, themeasures
of average pension wealth increase with the return to the pension asset, so that the
oﬀ-set actually increases in absolute terms.
An important conclusion of the discussion reported in SecƟon B is that the DC
pension is associated with a net welfare loss equivalent to 15 per cent of average
annual household disposable income at the beginning of the simulated lifeƟme.
Although this loss is reduced to 4 per cent under themyopic speciﬁcaƟon considered
in SecƟon C, it is nevertheless reported for households throughout the earnings
distribuƟon. Table 6 reports how these welfare eﬀects vary by the interest rate on
pension wealth and the degree of myopia. The table indicates that the average
eﬀect of the DC pension on the welfare of households at age 20 improves with
both the return to the pension asset, and with the extent of behavioural myopia.
The former of these responses is of liƩle surprise, but the laƩer indicates that the
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Table 6: Average compensaƟng variaƟons at age 20 to the introducƟon of a pension asset,
by short-run excess discount factor and the return to pension wealth (negaƟve values
indicate posiƟve eﬀects)
short-run excess discount 0.7 0.75 0.8 0.85 0.9 0.95 1
pension return 2.0 -2.08 0.28 4.89 6.85 10.18 13.69 15.48
(% p.a.) 2.5 -2.88 -2.34 1.37 6.12 9.01 13.13 14.28
3.0 -3.10 -2.96 -1.20 2.76 6.92 11.28 13.18
3.5 -3.19 -3.12 -2.83 -1.81 2.50 7.27 10.54
4.0 -3.19 -3.15 -3.07 -2.91 -1.59 2.36 6.34
4.5 -3.19 -3.15 -3.13 -3.07 -2.85 -1.92 1.74
5.0 -3.19 -3.15 -3.14 -3.12 -3.05 -2.89 -2.17
7.0 -3.19 -3.15 -3.14 -3.12 -3.11 -3.09 -3.06
Table reports CompensaƟng VariaƟons at age 20 under a DC pension, relaƟve to a policy
environment with no pension asset CompensaƟng VariaƟons reported as % of median annual
household disposable income between ages 20 and 67, worth £52,535.
structure of the pension asset does help to miƟgate the welfare costs associated
with the Ɵme-inconsistency of a myopic preference structure as is posited above.
Hence,myopia provides a plausible jusƟﬁcaƟon for the DC pension considered here,
consistent with one of the jusƟﬁcaƟons raised for the introducƟon of the NEST.
Indeed, if the NEST achieves its target economies on management costs, then the
analysis that is reported here suggests that the scheme may be welfare improving
(β = 0:85; and pension return of 3.5-4.0 % p.a.).
Table 6 reveals that the welfare eﬀect of a rise in the return to the pension asset
trails oﬀ at higher rates of return. This is due to the diminishing marginal uƟlity
of consumpƟon, and because, at high interest rates, the wealth eﬀect dominates
leading to a fall in pension scheme parƟcipaƟon. The largest diﬀerences for the
welfare eﬀects of the DC pension between alternaƟve speciﬁcaƟons for myopia are
observedwhen the return to the pension asset is low. The 7 per cent rate of return to
pensionwealth is included in the table to consider thewelfare response in the region
of the apparent asymptote for the reported preference speciﬁcaƟons. At this rate of
return, there remains only a very slight improvement in the welfare eﬀect of the DC
pension as the extent of myopia is increased. This is explained by the observaƟon
that decisions over pension involvement – parƟcularly early in life – are strongly
inﬂuenced by myopia at low rates of pension return, but are largely independent
of myopia when the return to the pension asset is very high.
5. CONCLUSIONS
This study explores how myopic preferences inﬂuence behavioural and welfare
responses to a DC pension scheme in a realisƟc policy context that reﬂects
the income and demographic uncertainƟes that households face. The analysis is
structured around the NaƟonal Employment Savings Trust that will be introduced
in the UK in 2012, and the parameters of the structural model used to conduct the
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analysis were esƟmated on survey data for a broad subgroup of the UK populaƟon.
ParƟcular aƩenƟon is paid to the inﬂuence on the analysis of allowing for joint
decisions of labour supply and saving, which are crucial to understanding reƟrement
behaviour.
The parameter esƟmates that are reported for the structural model support the
hypothesis of quasi-hyperbolic discounƟng, indicaƟng an esƟmate of the excess
short-run discount factor equal to 0.845 with a standard deviaƟon of 0.040. The
allowance for myopia is idenƟﬁed as improving the model’s match to survey data
regarding pension scheme parƟcipaƟon and labour supply, consistent with the
potenƟal role of these factors in providing commitment mechanisms within the
model. The esƟmate for the excess short-run discount factor exceeds those reported
in previous studies (implying less pronounced myopia), which may be due to the
relaƟvely broad populaƟon subgroup upon which the current econometric analysis
is based.
The introducƟon of a DC pension scheme is found to encourage deferment of
consumpƟon to later periods in life in all of the policy counterfactuals that are
reported here.Myopic preferences are found to exaggerate this response, increasing
average total net worth between ages 50 and 67 by between 6 and 22 per cent
depending upon the household income quinƟle, when measured under the central
policy scenario. Associated sensiƟvity analysis, however, indicates that the impact
of myopia on aggregate savings depends upon the return to pension wealth. At
low rates of return to pension wealth, myopia tends to increase savings held in
the pension asset, but at high rates of return myopia tends to reduce saving in the
pension asset. These results reﬂect the role of the pension scheme as a commitment
mechanism, relaƟve to its role as an eﬃcient vehicle for saving.
Labour supply is increased very slightly prior to pension age by the DC pension
scheme throughout the analysis, but falls substanƟally aŌer households gain access
to their pension wealth. Labour supply falls by an average of 11 percentage points
between ages 65 and 74 under the central policy scenario and on the assumpƟon
of exponenƟal discounƟng, and by 16 percentage points under quasi-hyperbolic
discounƟng. The fall in labour supply from pension age has an important bearing
upon the compensaƟng adjustments that are applied in the analysis to oﬀ-set the
eﬀect that the DC pension has on the average returns to labour supply. Under the
central policy scenario, this results in the ﬁnding that introducƟon of the DC pension
would reduce welfare at the beginning of the life, by an average amount worth 15
per cent of average annual disposable income under exponenƟal discounƟng, and by
4 per cent of average annual disposable income under quasi-hyperbolic discounƟng.
Notably, however, the welfare eﬀect of the DC pension at the beginning of life is
found to respond posiƟvely to the rate of return to the pension asset, and to the
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disparity between the short-run and long-run discount rates. In the region of the
unrestricted parameter esƟmates for the structural model, the analysis suggests
that the DC pension would improve welfare if the NEST’s target of reducing annual
management charges by 1 per cent of capital is achieved.
The current analysis is limited to considering the implicaƟons for responses to a
DC pension of sophisƟcated myopia, so that agents are assumed to be fully aware
of their propensity to over-consume. However, it is quite likely that at least some
people are naïvely unaware of theirmyopia,whichwould negate thewelfare beneﬁts
of the commitment mechanism oﬀered by pension fund illiquidity. Furthermore,
even if the idea that some people are naïvely myopic is rejected, accommodaƟng
such behaviour could facilitate a more nuanced interpretaƟon of the results that are
reported here.
More substanƟvely, an important aspect of the design of the NEST is the allowance
that is made for behavioural inerƟa through the adopƟon of an auto-enrolment
mechanism. This aspect of the scheme reﬂects extensive empirical evidence that
default opƟons for pensions – regarding the decision to parƟcipate, rates of
contribuƟons, and investment strategies – tend to have an important bearing
on outcomes in pracƟce (see, for example, Madrian & Shea (2001)). It would
consequently be of interest to extend the current analysis to allow for decision
making inerƟa: this is an issue that remains for further research.
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A. First Stage Parameter EsƟmates
Table 7: Pension parameters and credit constraints disƟnguished by esƟmaƟon scenario
singles couples
maximum credit £2,000 £2,000
all debts repaid by age 65 65
state pension age* 68 68
value of ﬂat-rate state pension (£2006 per week) 121.50 243.00
means tested reƟrement beneﬁts**
maximum value (£2006 per week) 31.76 41.89
withdrawal rate of beneﬁts on private income 40% 40%
terms of private pensions
employee contribuƟon rate (% of earnings) 8 8
employer contribuƟon rate (% of earnings) 11 11
min earnings threshold for eligibility (% median) 75 75
Source: Terms of state reƟrement beneﬁts based on Pensions White Paper, DWP (2006b)
Notes: ** See DWP (2006 b), paragraph 3.34
Notes: ** paid on top of ﬂat-rate state pension no standard errors obtained
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Table 8: Exogenously esƟmated model parameters -- various characterisƟcs
real interest & growth rates (% p.a.)
credit
cards overdraŌs
ﬁxed rate
deposits
return to
capital wages beneﬁts
tax
threshold
average 15.28 13.92 2.73 4.05 1.27 -0.08 0.33
std deviaƟon 3.15 1.31 1.21 0.79 0.97 1.73 0.84
minimum 12.08 11.52 1.25 2.59 -0.31 -3.79 -0.79
maximum 19.81 15.34 4.66 5.29 2.75 4.40 1.43
sample period '96-'08 '96-'08 '96-'08 '88-'06 '90-'07 '78-'08 '97-'07
household demographics
logit regression for
singles / couples
proporƟon of households single at age 20* 0.45
all households single from age* 100
variable coeﬃcient std. error non-linear regressions for number of children
constant -6.40607 0.34372 singles couples
age 0.17634 0.02226 variable coeﬃcient std. error coeﬃcient std. error
age^2 -3.76E-03 4.47E-04 param0 0.67268 0.00041 1.54100 0.00053
age^3 2.66E-05 2.79E-06 param1 -0.00776 0.00001 -0.00711 0.00001
single 6.89326 0.03963 param2 38.2792 0.0056 39.7949 0.0037
sample 97619 sample 13527 10438
R squared 0.7947 R squared 0.203 0.5258
mortality probabiliƟes from age 40*
age probability age probability age probability age probability
40 0.0001 60 0.0006 80 0.0105 100 0.2964
41 0.0000 61 0.0005 81 0.0116 101 0.3607
42 0.0000 62 0.0007 82 0.0129 102 0.4278
43 0.0001 63 0.0012 83 0.0167 103 0.4951
44 0.0000 64 0.0011 84 0.0176 104 0.5607
45 0.0001 65 0.0014 85 0.0225 105 0.6230
46 0.0001 66 0.0016 86 0.0243 106 0.6810
47 0.0000 67 0.0012 87 0.0262 107 0.7341
48 0.0001 68 0.0023 88 0.0310 108 0.7818
49 0.0002 69 0.0021 89 0.0408 109 0.8237
50 0.0002 70 0.0020 90 0.0503 110 0.8598
51 0.0001 71 0.0025 91 0.0548 111 0.8904
52 0.0002 72 0.0033 92 0.0610 112 0.9157
53 0.0003 73 0.0036 93 0.0632 113 0.9363
54 0.0002 74 0.0051 94 0.0834 114 0.9527
55 0.0003 75 0.0045 95 0.0935 115 0.9654
56 0.0004 76 0.0049 96 0.1139 116 0.9752
57 0.0003 77 0.0068 97 0.1449 117 0.9826
58 0.0005 78 0.0085 98 0.1865 118 0.9879
59 0.0008 79 0.0095 99 0.2375 119 0.9918
Notes: model parameters in bold
* no standard errors obtained beneﬁts growth rate esƟmated on historical rates for unemployment beneﬁts and the basic
state pension relaƟonship status modelled as a logit regression, describing the risk of being single as a funcƟon of age, and
whether single in preceding year number of children by age described by the density funcƟon of the normal distribuƟon -
see equaƟon (16) mortality probabiliƟes calculated on cohort life expectancies for couples where both members aged 35 in
2007.
Source: credit card interest, Bank of England IUMCCTL; overdraŌ interest, Bank of England IUMODTL ﬁxed deposit interest,
Bank of England, IUMWTFA; wages growth, Oﬃce NaƟonal StaƟsƟcs, LNMQ return to capital derived from Khoman and
Weale (2008), based on NaƟonal Accounts data income ﬂows historical data on value of unemployment beneﬁts, basic
state pension, and tax thresholds obtained from the InsƟtute for Fiscal Studies logit for relaƟonship status esƟmated on
weighted pooled data from waves 1 to 17 of the BHPS equaƟon for the number of children by age esƟmated on weighted
data from the 2007/08 FRSmortality rates based on historical survival rates to 2006 andONS principal projecƟons thereaŌer.
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Table 9: Exogenously esƟmated model parameters -- earnings process
probability of low wage oﬀer^
mean std dev sample
singles 0.29382 0.45551 3939
couples 0.06523 0.24694 3531
weekly wages and working hours by relaƟonship and employment status^
relaƟonship status couple couple couple couple single single
adults full-Ɵme emp 2 1 1 0 1 0
adults part-Ɵme emp 0 1 0 1 0 1
working hours
mean 85.10 67.09 44.73 19.03 42.40 20.07
std. deviaƟon 12.54 13.08 10.49 8.55 8.50 9.28
log wages
mean 6.822 6.612 6.175 4.841 5.924 4.707
std. deviaƟon 0.475 0.511 0.724 0.756 0.569 0.722
sample 2530 1814 1840 509 4352 1360
distribuƟon of wages at age 20^
mean of (log) full-Ɵme wage, age 20 5.74605 0.00043 6.29821 0.00161
standard deviaƟon of full-Ɵme wage, age 20 0.39571 0.10445
wage dynamics for households changing marrital status*
newly weds newly single
coeﬃcient std. error coeﬃcient std. error
target equaƟon
constant 0.06442 0.06714 0.02537 0.08270
age -0.00797 0.00198 0.00016 0.00180
employment (single) / employment (couple)
part Ɵme / 1 part Ɵme -0.14154 0.06627 -0.02215 0.12454
part Ɵme / 1 full Ɵme 0.47775 0.29080 -1.55863 0.21295
part Ɵme / 1 part Ɵme & 1 full Ɵme 1.44259 0.13195 -1.50337 0.06714
part Ɵme / 2 full Ɵme 1.87653 0.19665 -1.65264 0.21921
full Ɵme / 1 part Ɵme -1.61412 0.42382 0.65706 0.04307
full Ɵme / 1 part Ɵme & 1 full Ɵme 0.29650 0.06387 -0.34763 0.04923
full Ɵme / 2 full Ɵme 0.64900 0.03275 -0.63573 0.03626
selecƟon equaƟon
age 0.04772 0.02525 0.12171 0.02444
age squared -0.00085 0.00032 -0.00156 0.00030
degree -1.08084 0.12228 1.24433 0.11370
other further educaƟon -1.07942 0.11253 1.15538 0.09038
higher school qualiﬁcaƟon (A level) -1.07025 0.11781 1.10500 0.10204
lower school qualiﬁcaƟon (O level) -1.12394 0.11623 1.01499 0.09083
other educaƟon -1.61396 0.15082 0.82185 0.10304
poor health -0.27916 0.11064 -0.30229 0.10154
accident -0.17709 0.09139 0.45756 0.08773
childcare -0.37326 0.09748 -0.27075 0.07306
care (other) -0.10474 0.10116 0.00110 0.08468
woman -0.80629 0.07546 1.51969 0.18730
constant 0.68686 0.46202 -5.81684 0.50812
summary staƟsƟcs
correlaƟon 0.69441 0.07586 -0.09977 0.102915
standard error 0.40089 0.02385 0.36413 0.015331
Number of (weighted) observaƟons 2742 2517
Censored observaƟons 2163 2012
Uncensored observaƟons 579 505
Log pseudolikelihood -1194.495 959.637
Wald test of independent equaƟons
Chi squared staƟsƟc 34.17 0.93
p value 0.00 0.34
Notes: model parameters in bold prob of low wage oﬀer= proporƟon of households aged 25-45 with no adult
employment mean log income at age 20 esƟmated using sample selecƟon model - reported in Appendix std of
log income at age 20 calculated from raw survey data, no std errors obtained dependent variables in equaƟons
for wage dynamics= (ln(observed wage(t+1)) - ln(observed wage(t))).
Source: ^author's calculaƟons on data from 2007/08wave of the FRS * author's calculaƟons on data fromwaves
1 to 17 of the BHPS.
Do Deﬁned ContribuƟon Pensions Correct for Short-Sighted Savings Decisions? Evidence from the UK j 41
Table 10: EsƟmated wage dynamics for households not changing marital status
singles couples
coeﬃcient std. error coeﬃcient std. error
target equaƟon
age* -0.0018 0.0001 -0.0012 0.0001
experience eﬀect
1 full-Ɵme & 1 part-Ɵme emp -0.0101
1 ful-Ɵme employed -0.0120
1 part-Ɵme employed -0.0170 -0.0144
not employed -0.0350 -0.0200
constant 0.1047 0.0054 0.0777 0.0043
selecƟon equaƟon
age* 0.0911 0.0072 0.1013 0.0061
age squared* -0.0012 0.0001 -0.0012 0.0001
highest educaƟon qualiﬁcaƟon
no educaƟon qual recorded -0.1467 0.0889 -0.1303 0.0537
lower school (O-level D-E) 0.0494 0.1266 -0.0055 0.0664
mid school (O-level A-C) 0.1763 0.0726 0.0228 0.0445
higher school (A-level) 0.1360 0.0809 0.0520 0.0561
post-school qualiﬁcaƟon -0.0795 0.0646 -0.0748 0.0528
poor health -0.6752 0.0701 -0.3693 0.0407
accident -0.0173 0.0527 -0.0581 0.0295
childcare -0.8101 0.0737 -0.2820 0.0369
care (other) -0.0636 0.0675 -0.1411 0.0323
woman -0.0709 0.0615
Standard OccupaƟonal ClassiﬁcaƟon
manager, admin, prof 1.9272 0.0783 0.7528 0.0509
assoc prof, technical, clerical 1.4495 0.0727 0.6791 0.0481
craŌ, personal protecƟve 1.6056 0.0720 0.6975 0.0464
sales, plant, machinery 1.6544 0.0793 0.7077 0.0497
constant -3.9136 0.2534 -3.7755 0.2456
summary staƟsƟc
correlaƟon* 0.0706 0.0336 0.1078 0.0312
standard error* 0.1153 0.0023 0.0928 0.0013
Number of (weighted) obs 12671 20682
Censored observaƟons 6346 8385
Uncensored observaƟons 6325 12297
Log pseudolikelihood -5471.04 -8021.352
Wald test of independent equaƟons
Chi squared staƟsƟc 4.38 11.75
p value 0.0364 0.0006
Wald test of linear constraints
Chi squared staƟsƟc 2.42 2.87
p value 0.2979 0.5791
Source: Wage dynamics esƟmated on data from waves 1 to 17 of the BHPS
Notes: model parameters in bold
EsƟmates using a sample selecƟon model with robust standard errors. Endogenous variable= (log
emp inc in period (t+2) - log emp inc in period (t)) Experience eﬀect calculated on observed labour
market status in periods t and (t+1). Wage dynamics equaƟon based on dummy variables, except
those denoted by *
42 j Analysing Pensions: Modelling and Policy Issues
B. Moments for Second Stage EsƟmaƟon
Table 11: Moments considered for second stage esƟmaƟon
esƟmate variance sample
males aged 50 to 59 not economically acƟve: lowest wealth quinƟle / highest wealth quinƟle 2.2429 0.00650 379
proporƟon parƟcipaƟng in employer sponsored pensions mean ln(consumpƟon)
singles couples singles couples
age esƟmate variance sample esƟmate variance sample esƟmate variance sample esƟmate variance sample
25 0.1483 0.1263 262 0.4071 0.2414 78 5.2273 0.7022 61 6.1993 0.4252 16
26 0.1980 0.1588 287 0.4012 0.2402 95 5.2845 0.8906 58 5.9442 0.4234 21
27 0.1988 0.1593 224 0.4294 0.2450 135 5.2998 0.9692 61 6.1538 0.5407 35
28 0.2464 0.1857 192 0.4934 0.2500 147 5.5013 0.6704 62 6.1765 0.5091 43
29 0.3242 0.2191 195 0.5494 0.2476 105 5.3634 0.9119 58 6.3905 0.4750 45
30 0.2247 0.1742 178 0.5770 0.2441 146 5.6775 0.8520 44 6.2908 0.4693 46
31 0.3536 0.2286 163 0.5428 0.2482 127 5.6052 0.7938 42 6.3497 0.5038 49
32 0.2827 0.2028 156 0.5325 0.2489 156 5.5502 0.7894 38 6.5598 0.3619 49
33 0.3203 0.2177 161 0.5174 0.2497 162 5.5827 0.7678 44 6.4610 0.4157 43
34 0.3336 0.2223 171 0.6308 0.2329 174 5.8206 0.6098 25 6.3963 0.5789 54
35 0.2910 0.2063 180 0.5582 0.2466 191 5.7254 0.9171 51 6.3657 0.5303 58
36 0.2907 0.2062 196 0.6112 0.2376 201 5.5911 0.8021 50 6.5152 0.5086 67
37 0.2581 0.1915 171 0.5291 0.2492 230 5.4818 0.8427 34 6.5286 0.4897 57
38 0.2924 0.2069 193 0.5885 0.2422 206 5.7905 0.6925 48 6.5678 0.4835 61
39 0.2521 0.1886 163 0.5664 0.2456 234 5.6120 0.8574 51 6.6305 0.4655 50
40 0.3029 0.2112 170 0.5840 0.2429 205 5.7306 0.7470 44 6.6838 0.5741 58
41 0.2951 0.2080 178 0.6234 0.2348 214 5.7790 0.6744 48 6.5583 0.4752 77
42 0.3581 0.2299 215 0.5788 0.2438 252 5.9342 0.7383 52 6.5614 0.6287 59
43 0.3268 0.2200 210 0.6386 0.2308 220 5.8971 0.8861 48 6.4836 0.4362 51
44 0.3986 0.2397 171 0.6795 0.2178 171 5.7790 0.8138 54 6.6471 0.5647 61
45 0.3434 0.2255 185 0.6209 0.2354 207 5.5147 0.7423 48 6.6077 0.5090 69
proporƟon employed full-Ɵme proporƟon employed part-Ɵme
singles couples singles couples
age esƟmate variance sample esƟmate variance sample esƟmate variance sample esƟmate variance sample
25 0.6649 0.2228 262 0.7202 0.2015 78 0.1059 0.0947 262 0.1088 0.0969 78
26 0.6063 0.2387 287 0.7057 0.2077 95 0.1199 0.1055 287 0.1051 0.0941 95
27 0.6131 0.2372 224 0.7097 0.2060 135 0.1059 0.0947 224 0.1170 0.1033 135
28 0.6737 0.2198 192 0.7731 0.1754 147 0.0949 0.0859 192 0.0757 0.0700 147
29 0.6018 0.2396 195 0.7002 0.2099 105 0.1056 0.0944 195 0.1105 0.0983 105
30 0.6259 0.2341 178 0.7345 0.1950 146 0.0758 0.0700 178 0.1044 0.0935 146
31 0.6936 0.2125 163 0.7148 0.2039 127 0.0618 0.0580 163 0.1305 0.1134 127
32 0.6559 0.2257 156 0.7366 0.1940 156 0.0858 0.0784 156 0.0930 0.0844 156
33 0.6240 0.2346 161 0.6490 0.2278 162 0.0834 0.0765 161 0.1324 0.1149 162
34 0.6573 0.2253 171 0.7117 0.2052 174 0.0820 0.0753 171 0.1347 0.1165 174
35 0.6089 0.2381 180 0.6710 0.2208 191 0.0926 0.0840 180 0.1062 0.0949 191
36 0.5826 0.2432 196 0.6611 0.2240 201 0.1022 0.0918 196 0.1456 0.1244 201
37 0.5726 0.2447 171 0.6512 0.2271 230 0.1144 0.1013 171 0.1553 0.1312 230
38 0.5400 0.2484 193 0.6304 0.2330 206 0.1644 0.1374 193 0.1525 0.1292 206
39 0.4748 0.2494 163 0.6334 0.2322 234 0.1688 0.1403 163 0.1776 0.1461 234
40 0.5264 0.2493 170 0.6080 0.2383 205 0.1480 0.1261 170 0.1802 0.1477 205
41 0.5029 0.2500 178 0.6114 0.2376 214 0.1569 0.1323 178 0.1753 0.1445 214
42 0.5444 0.2480 215 0.6503 0.2274 252 0.1484 0.1264 215 0.1808 0.1481 252
43 0.5759 0.2442 210 0.6494 0.2277 220 0.1720 0.1424 210 0.1947 0.1568 220
44 0.5404 0.2484 171 0.6232 0.2348 171 0.1477 0.1259 171 0.1811 0.1483 171
45 0.5009 0.2500 185 0.6398 0.2304 207 0.1448 0.1239 185 0.1881 0.1527 207
Source: employment and pension staƟsƟcs esƟmated on FRS data, 2007/08 all consumpƟon moments esƟmated on 2007 EFS data, for
households aged 25 to 45 economic acƟvity by wealth quinƟle derived from Marmot, et al. (2003, p. 156).
A Framework for Pension Policy Analysis in Ireland: PENMOD, a Dynamic SimulaƟon Model j 43
A Framework for Pension
Policy Analysis in Ireland:
PENMOD, a Dynamic
SimulaƟon Model*
Tim Callany, JusƟn van de Venz & Claire Keanex
1. INTRODUCTION
Public policy towards both private pensions and state-provided pensions must be
framed in a long-term context. Decisions regarding parƟcipaƟon in private schemes,
and the extent of contribuƟons thereto, have implicaƟons which unfold over Ɵme.
In deﬁned contribuƟon (DC) schemes, an individual’s pension fund is built up over
the working lifeƟme, and then drawn down in reƟrement. Government’s budget
constraint also leads to trade-oﬀs between the level of the state pension, the age
at which it becomes payable, and the taxes required to ﬁnance it. Because of the
essenƟal dynamic elements in pension contribuƟons and payments, the impact of
policy changes is not well captured by staƟc models, which take a “snapshot” of the
impact at a point in Ɵme. While such models (including SWITCH, the ESRI tax-beneﬁt
model) can provide some insights into the impact of pension-related policies, a fuller
analysis must take account of the complex interplay of forces over Ɵme.
The approach taken here is well established in the economic literature on pensions.
EssenƟally, our model (PENMOD) takes a representaƟve cohort of individuals and
simulates key elements of their lifeƟme experience. This includes both economic
elements such as labour market parƟcipaƟon and wages as they age as well
as demographic elements (marriage, divorce, children, death). Crucially, decisions
* The model described here is based upon the NIBAX model architecture, as described in van de Ven (2011).
We are grateful to Gerry Hughes and to Pete Lunn for helping to plug gaps in our knowledge. We are also
indebted to several members of CSO staﬀ for assistance: Tom McMahon, Pamela Laﬀerty, Marion McCann,
Deirdre Cullen, and Shaun McLaughlin. Responsibility for any errors or obscuriƟes rests with the authors.
† Economic and Social Research InsƟtute, Dublin. Email: Ɵm.callan@esri.ie
‡ NaƟonal InsƟtute of Economic and Social Research, London. Email: jvandeven@niesr.ac.uk
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regarding savings and pensions are also taken into account. Policy instruments in
terms of income tax and social welfare are also included.
The need to take into account a sequence of decisions over each individual’s full
lifeƟme (up to the age of 120) imposes a very strict discipline on the degree of
detail that can be incorporated into the model. StaƟc models (such as SWITCH) can
include a very high degree of detail in their descripƟon of the tax andwelfare system.
Dynamic models (such as PENMOD) must use a broader brush, in order to be able
to provide greater depth in terms of the analysis over Ɵme. Thus, it is not a case of
one class of model being “beƩer” than another; rather it is a quesƟon of diﬀerent
classes of model being more suitable for diﬀerent purposes.
A number of strategic simpliﬁcaƟons are needed to ensure that the dynamic
microsimulaƟonmodel captures key features of the tax/welfare and pension systems
while remaining tractable. One major simpliﬁcaƟon is that the model does not
aƩempt to deal with public sector pensions, where the issues which arise are of a
diﬀerent type. We focus instead on the private sector, where decisions regarding
the balance between contribuƟons towards pension savings and the income in
reƟrement are more subject to the inﬂuence of economic and policy variables.
Second, we focus on private sector employees rather than the self-employed. This
is because the terms of reƟrement for the self-employed oŌen depend upon the
envisaged income arising from ownership of a family business, or revenues arising
from its sale that are disƟnct from the pension systemwithwhichwe are immediately
concerned. Third, we do not aƩempt to deal with issues of illness and longer-term
incapacity to work. There are both state schemes (Illness Beneﬁt, Invalidity Pension,
Disability Allowance) and private schemes (permanent health insurance) which are
geared towards dealing with income support for those unable to work. The issues
arising are, however, too complex to includewhenmodelling the long-termevoluƟon
of incomes and pensions and are, therefore, outside the scope of the present model.
SimpliﬁcaƟons of this type are common in the internaƟonal literature in this area.
As regards the pension regime itself, this is characterised by up to ﬁve diﬀerent types
of pension scheme running in parallel. Each scheme takes a deﬁned contribuƟon
form, where the approach adopted is to allow for schemes of diﬀering “quality”, with
the probability of obtaining higher quality pensions rising with income – details of
the approach are set out in SecƟon 2.3.
The remainder of the paper is set out in 7 secƟons as follows. First, a full descripƟon
of the characterisƟcs that are reﬂected by themodel, and the behavioural framework
upon which it is based, are provided in SecƟon 2. SecƟon 3 provides technical details
of how the model generates behavioural responses to policy change. The approach
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taken to calibrate the model against Irish survey data is described in SecƟon 4, and
calibratedmodel parameters are reported in SecƟons 5 and 6. A brief example of the
type of policy analysis that can be conducted using the model is reported in SecƟon
7, and a summary and direcƟons for further research are provided in the conclusion.
2. MODEL SPECIFICS
The decision unit in the model is the nuclear family unit, deﬁned as a single
adult or partner couple and their dependent children.1 The model divides the life
course into annual increments, and can be used to consider household decisions
regarding: consumpƟon, labour supply, the porƞolio allocaƟon of liquid wealth
between safe and risky assets, and private pension contribuƟons. These decisions
are simulated on the assumpƟon that households maximise expected lifeƟme
uƟlity, given their prevailing circumstances, preferences, and beliefs regarding the
future. A household’s circumstances are described by their age, number of adults,
number of children, wage rate, liquid wealth, pension opportuniƟes, private sector
pension rights, and Ɵme of death. The belief structure is raƟonal, in the sense that
expectaƟons are calculated on probability distribuƟons that are consistent with the
intertemporal decision making environment.
Of the eight characterisƟcs that deﬁne the circumstances of a household, seven
can be considered stochasƟc (relaƟonship status, number of children, private sector
pension scheme eligibility, private sector pension rights, wage rates, liquid wealth,
and Ɵme of death), and only age is forced to be determinisƟc.
As a brief overview, the model permits:
 the adjustment of preferences over consumpƟon, leisure, and bequests
 adjustment of the imposed liquidity constraints,which are deﬁnedboth in termsof
hard credit limits and variable interest charges that depend on the debt to income
raƟos
 inclusion of uncertainty over relaƟonship status (single or couple)
  provided that relaƟonship status is considered to be uncertain, the number
of children in a household can also be modelled stochasƟcally
 alternaƟve opƟons in regard to the nature of uncertainty associated with labour
incomes, including the possibility of receiving a low (zero) wage oﬀer
 households to invest some of their liquid wealth in a risky asset
11 For convenience, we use the term “household” interchangeably with “narrow nuclear family unit”, which has
the advantage of brevity at the cost of a slight abuse of language. It should nevertheless be understood that
adult children are treated as independent units in our analysis.
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  the nature of the uncertainty associated with returns to the risky asset can
also be altered
 households to choose their labour supply between discrete alternaƟves
 adjustment of a detailed tax and beneﬁts structure
 private sector pensions
  contribuƟon rates (and ulƟmately membership) can also be made a decision
variable
  contribuƟon rates (employee and employer) can be made stochasƟc
  the stochasƟc nature of the return to private pension wealth can be adjusted
This secƟon begins by deﬁning the assumed preference relaƟon, before describing
the wealth constraint, the simulaƟon of pensions, and the processes assumed for
the evoluƟon of income and household size.
2.1. The uƟlity funcƟon
Expected lifeƟme uƟlity of household i at age t is described by the Ɵme separable
funcƟon:
Ui; t =
1
1  1=γ
(
u
 ci; t
θi; t
; li; t
1 1=γ
+
+ Et
"
β1δ
 
φ1; tu
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1 1=γ
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1 1=γ!359=;
(1)
where 1=γ > 0 is the (constant) coeﬃcient of relaƟve risk aversion; Et is the
expectaƟons operator; T is the maximum potenƟal age; β1; β2, and δ are discount
factors (assumed to be the same for all households);φj t; t is the probability of living
to age j, given survival to age t; ci; t 2 R+ is discreƟonary composite consumpƟon;
li; t 2 [0; 1] is the proporƟon of household Ɵme spent in leisure; θi; t 2 R+ is adult
equivalent size based on the “revised” or “modiﬁed” OECD scale; the parameters
ζa and ζb reﬂect the “warm-glow” model of bequests; and w+i; t 2 R+ is net liquid
wealth when this is posiƟve and zero otherwise.
The labour supply decision (if it is included in the model) is considered to be made
between discrete alternaƟves, which reﬂects the view that this provides a closer
approximaƟon to reality than if it is deﬁned as a conƟnuous decision variable for
given wage rates. When adults are modelled explicitly, then households with one
adult can choose from up to three labour opƟons; full-Ɵme

lFTi; t

, part-Ɵme

lPTi; t

,
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and not employed (li; t = 1). Similarly, couples can choose from up to ﬁve labour
opƟons; both full-Ɵme employed

l2FTi; t

, one full-Ɵme and one part-Ɵme employed
lFtPti; t

, one full-Ɵme and the other not employed

lFtNei; t

, one part-Ɵme and the
other not employed

lPtNei; t

, and both not employed (li; t = 1). When adults are not
modelled explicitly, then labour supply is restricted to one of two opƟons: employed
or not employed.
To the extent that the focus on discrete labour opƟons limits employment decisions
relaƟve to the pracƟcal reality, it will dampen the responsiveness of labour supply
behaviour implied by the simulaƟon model, and dampen variaƟon in employment
incomes. The former of these eﬀects implies that the parametrisaƟon of the model
may require a labour elasƟcity that overstates the pracƟcal reality, while the laƩer
suggests that excessive variaƟon in labour incomes may be required to reﬂect the
wage dispersion described by survey data.
The modiﬁed OECD scale assigns a value of 1.0 to the household reference person,
0.5 to each addiƟonal adult member and 0.3 to each child, and is currently the
standard scale for adjusƟng incomes before housing costs in European countries.
Its inclusion in the preference relaƟon reﬂects the fact that household size has been
found to have an important inﬂuence on the Ɵming of consumpƟon (e.g. AƩanasio
& Weber (1995) and Blundell et al. (1994)).2
The model incorporates an allowance for behavioural myopia, through
its assumpƟon of quasi-hyperbolic preferences following Laibson (1997). Such
preferences are interesƟng because they are Ɵme inconsistent, giving rise to
the potenƟal for “conﬂict between the preferences of diﬀerent intertemporal
selves” (Diamond & Köszegi (2003), p. 1840). The current version of the model
focuses exclusively on raƟonal expectaƟons, and consequently does not permit
consideraƟon of decisions by so-called “naïve” consumers, who are unaware of
their self-control problems in the context of quasi-hyperbolic discounƟng. Themodel
assumes that all discount parameters are the same for all individuals, and Ɵme
invariant. This is in contrast to the approach that is adopted byGustman&Steinmeier
(2005), who allow variaƟon in the rate of Ɵme preference to be an important factor
in reﬂecƟng heterogeneity in household reƟrement behaviour. We have chosen not
to do this to ensure that heterogeneity of household behaviour generated by the
model is driven by heterogeneity in observable household characterisƟcs.
12 An empirical study by Fernandez-Villaverde & Krueger (2006) of US data from the Consumer Expenditure
Survey suggests that roughly half of the variaƟon observed for lifeƟme household consumpƟon can be
explained by changes in household size, as described by equivalence scales. See Balcer & Sadka (1986) and
Muellbauer & van de Ven (2004) on the use of this formof adjustment for household size in the uƟlity funcƟon.
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The warm-glow model of bequests simpliﬁes the associated analyƟcal problem,
relaƟve to alternaƟves that have been considered in the literature.3 Including a
bequest moƟve in the model raises the natural counter-party quesƟon of who
receives the legacies that are leŌ. The most accurate approximaƟon to reality would
involve including the possibility that households receive a bequest at any age, and
then to growth adjust the value of bequests received to the value of bequests made.
This would add to the uncertainty associated with the decision problem, and so is
omiƩed from the current version of themodel. Rather, it is assumed that households
leave their legacies to the state (potenƟally in the form of a 100% inheritance tax),
which is a common simplifying assumpƟon.
A Constant ElasƟcity of SubsƟtuƟon funcƟon was selected for within period uƟlity,
u
 ci; j
θi; j
; li; t

=
  ci; j
θi; j
(1 1=ϵ)
+ α1=ϵl(1 1=ϵ)i; t
! 1
1 1=ϵ
(2)
where ϵ > 0 is the (period speciﬁc) elasƟcity of subsƟtuƟon between equivalised
consumpƟon (ci; t=θi; t) and leisure (li; t). The constant α > 0 is referred to as
the uƟlity price of leisure. The speciﬁcaƟon of intertemporal preferences described
by equaƟons (1) and (2) is standard in the literature, despite the contenƟon that
is associated with the assumpƟon of Ɵme separability (see Deaton & Muellbauer
(1980), pp. 124-125, or Hicks (1939), p. 261). This speciﬁcaƟon of preferences
implicitly assumes that characterisƟcs which aﬀect uƟlity, but are not explicitly
stated, enter the uƟlity funcƟon in an addiƟve way.
2.2. The wealth constraint and simulaƟon of disposable income
EquaƟon (1) is considered to be maximised, subject to an age speciﬁc credit
constraint imposed on liquid net worth, wi; t  Dt for household i at age t.4 The age
proﬁle of Dt can either be exogenously deﬁned in the model, or be relaxed subject
to the constraint that all households must have repaid their debts by an exogenously
deﬁned age, tD  T (the maximum terminal age assumed for the model).5 Liquid
net worth is deﬁned as the sum of safe liquid assets, wsi; t 2 [Dt;1), and risky liquid
assets, wri; t 2 [0;1). Intertemporal variaƟon of wi; t is described by:
13 See, for example, Andreoni (1989) for details regarding the warm-glow model.
14 Note that w+i; t referred to above is related to wi; t, with w+i; t = 0 if wi; t < 0, and w+i; t = wi; t otherwise.
15 Note that the structure of the decision problem considered here implies that relaxing the upper limit on debt
does not permit households to consume an inﬁnite amount prior to the age by which all debts are forced
to be repaid. In the context of uncertainty, and when marginal uƟlity approaches inﬁnity as (discreƟonary)
consumpƟon tends toward zero, relaxing the constraint on debt implies an upper bound on consumpƟon that
is deﬁned in terms of theminimum potenƟal income stream that a householdmay receive in all future periods
up to the date by which all debts must be repaid.
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wi; t =
( w^i; t t 6= tSPA
(1  πla)w^i; t + (1  πpa)wpi; t + (1  πoa)woi; t t = tSPA
(3a)
w^i; t =
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where wpi; t denotes wealth held in personal pensions; woi; t is wealth held in
occupaƟonal pensions; πla, πpa, and πoa are, respecƟvely, the proporƟons of liquid
wealth, private pension wealth, and occupaƟonal pension wealth that are used to
purchase a life annuity at state pensionable age, tSPA; πdiv is the proporƟon of liquid
wealth that is assumed to be lost upon marital dissoluƟon prior to tSPA (to capture
the impact of divorce); and τ (:) denotes disposable income net of non-discreƟonary
expenditure.
As the model has been designed explicitly to undertake public policy analysis,
parƟcular care was taken in formulaƟng the module that simulates the eﬀects of
taxes and beneﬁts on household disposable incomes. EquaƟon (3c) indicates that
taxes and beneﬁts are calculated with respect to labour supply, li; t; private non-
property income, xi; t; the numbers of adults, nai; t, and children, nci; t; the return to
safe liquid assets, rsi; twsi; t (which is negaƟve when wsi; t < 0); the return realised on
risky liquid assets, rrtwri; t (possibly negaƟve); contribuƟons to private sector pensions,
pci; t; and age, t.
The form of the budget constraint described by equaƟon (3a) has been selected
to minimise the computaƟonal burden of the uƟlity maximisaƟon problem. For the
purposes of taxaƟon, and in a discrete Ɵme model such as this, investment returns
can be calculated on the basis of wealth held at the beginning of a given period, or
wealth held at the end of the period. CalculaƟng taxes with respect to wealth held
at the beginning of a period (as it is here) implies that disposable income is made
independent of consumpƟon. This is advantageous when consumpƟon is a choice
variable, as it implies that the numerical rouƟnes that search for uƟlity maximising
values of consumpƟon do not require repeated evaluaƟons of disposable income for
each consumpƟon alternaƟve that is tested.
We now describe details of the funcƟon that is used to evaluate disposable income.
The lifeƟme is divided into two periods for the purpose of calculaƟng disposable
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income: the working lifeƟme t < tSPA, and pension receipt tSPA  t. In each of these
periods of life, household disposable income is calculated by:
1. evaluaƟng aggregate take-home pay from the taxable incomes of each adult
member of a household – this reﬂects the taxaƟon of individual incomes in the
Ireland
2. simulaƟng receipt of beneﬁts from aggregate household take-home pay – this
reﬂects the fact that beneﬁts tend to be provided at the level of the family unit
3. household disposable income is then equal to aggregate take-home pay, plus
beneﬁts.
CalculaƟon of taxable income for each adult in a household depends on the
household’s age, with property and non-property income being treated separately.
Prior to state pensionable age, t < tSPA, household non-property income xi; t
considered for tax purposes is equal to labour income gi; t less the proporƟon of
pension contribuƟons that is considered tax exempt, πpe; from state pensionable
age it is equal to labour income plus the proporƟon of pension annuity income that
is considered taxable, πpt:
xi; t =
(
gi; t   πpepci; t
gi; t + πptpi; t
t < tSPA
t  tSPA
(4)
where : pi; t =
8>><>>:
χ(πpawpi; t + πlaw^i; t) t = tSPA 
πs + (1  πs) :(nai; t   1)
πs + (1  πs) :(nai;t 1   1)
!
pi; t 1 t > tSPA
(5)
pi; t denotes pension annuity income, and χ is the annuity rate considered for
analysis. The annuity purchased at age tSPA is assumed to be inﬂaƟon linked, and
to reduce to a fracƟon πs of its (real) value in the preceding year if one member of a
couple departs the household in response to the mortality of a spouse.
Where the household is idenƟﬁed as supplying labour, and is younger than state
pensionable age, then non-property (employment) income is split between spouses
(in the case of married couples) on the basis of their respecƟve labour supplies. A
household that is idenƟﬁed with a single wage earner has all of its non-property
income allocated to that one earner; a household with one full-Ɵme and one part-
Ɵme earner has non-property income allocated on the basis of an exogenously
deﬁned raƟo; and a separate raƟo is used to divide non-property income when both
spouses of a household are full-Ɵme employed. A household without an employed
adult has all of its non-property (pension) income allocated to a single spouse.
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Similarly, property income is only allocated between spouses for households below
state pensionable age, and who supply some labour. In this case, property income is
allocated on the basis of an exogenous raƟo that deﬁnes the proporƟon of wealth
that is assumed to be held in the name of the lowest earning spouse. Property
income, yi; t, is equal to the sum of returns from the safe and risky liquid assets:
yi; t =
8>>>><>>>>:
rrtwri; t + rsi; twsi; t if wsi; t > 0; rrt > 0
rsi; twsi; t if wsi; t > 0; rrt  0
rrtwri; t if wsi; t  0; rrt > 0
0 if wsi; t  0; rrt  0
(6)
Hence, themodel assumes that the interest cost on loans, and losses due to negaƟve
risky asset returns cannot be wriƩen oﬀ against labour income for tax purposes.
The interest rate on safe liquid assets is assumed to depend upon whether wsi; t
indicates net investment assets, or net debts:
rsi; t =
8>><>>:
rI if wsi; t > 0
rDl +
 
rDu   rDl

min
(
 wsi; t
max
h
gi; t;0:7g(hi; t;lfti; t)
i ; 1
)
; rDl < rDu if wsi; t  0
where l fti; t is household leisure when one adult in household i at age t is full-Ɵme
employed. This speciﬁcaƟon for the interest rate implies that the interest charge
on debt increases from a minimum of rDl when the debt to income raƟo is low, up
to a maximum rate of rDu , when the raƟo is high. The speciﬁcaƟon also means that
households that are in debt are treated less puniƟvely if they have at least one adult
earning a full-Ɵme wage than if they do not.
The model is speciﬁed on the assumpƟon that rrt is distributed such that μr < rDl ,
in which case no raƟonal (and risk averse) household will choose to borrow to fund
investment in the risky liquid asset (wri; t > 0 only if wsi; t  0). Disposable income is
consequently given by:
τi; t =
8><>:
τ^i; t if rrt  0;wsi; t  0
τ^i; t + rrtwri; t if rrt < 0;wsi; t  0
τ^i; t + rstwsi; t if wsi; t < 0
(7)
τ^i; t =
(
xi; t + yi; t   taxi; t + benefitsi; t   (1  πpe)

pcoi; t + pc
p
i; t

if t < tSPA
xi; t + yi; t   taxi; t + benefitsi; t   hsgi; t + (1  πpt)pi; t if t  tSPA
(8)
where taxi; t denotes the simulated tax burden, and benefitsi; t welfare beneﬁts
received.
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2.2.1. Intertemporal indexing
It is likely that individuals take some account of wage growth when planning for the
future: a 20 year old today can reasonably expect that labour incomes will be higher
when they reach age 45 than are currently paid to today’s 45 year olds. If this is true,
then it is important that the raƟonal agent model be calibrated against data that
take wage growth into account (discussed at further length in SecƟon 4). This gives
rise to a host of complicaƟons regarding the appropriate intertemporal development
to assume for the tax and beneﬁts system: holding taxes and beneﬁts ﬁxed in the
context of rising wages, for example, will result in widespread tax bracket creep
and marginalisaƟon of the welfare state, with important implicaƟons for simulated
behaviour.
Two parameters of the model control the way in which the tax system evolve with
Ɵme in the model. The ﬁrst controls the rate at which tax thresholds grow with
Ɵme, thereby oﬀseƫng bracket creep, and the second controls the rate of growth
of welfare beneﬁts. These parameters adjust the tax and beneﬁts schedules in a way
that is designed to omit the creaƟon of poverty traps. Nevertheless, rapid temporal
adjustment of the tax system can give rise to analyƟcal problems, and the the model
is programmed in a way that is designed to indicate when excessive variaƟon has
been called for. Separate rouƟnes have been developed that allow the disposable
income schedules that are generated by the model to be viewed directly, and these
are reviewed to verify that a model simulaƟon is sensible.
2.3. Private Sector Pensions
Private sector pensions in the model are modelled at the household level, and are
deﬁned contribuƟon in the sense that every household is assigned an account into
which their respecƟve pension contribuƟons are noƟonally deposited. Although DC
pensions account for less than half of all pensions that currently aƩract contribuƟons
in Ireland, there has been a strong temporal trend toward DC schemes since the
1990s (in common with countries throughout the OECD), which moƟvates our
modelling in this regard. Up to ﬁve private sector pension schemes can be considered
in parallel in the model, where schemes are disƟnguished by their respecƟve rates
of (exogenously deﬁned) employer contribuƟons. Pension contribuƟon rates are
deﬁned as percentages of (total) labour income, implying that pension membership
requires employment parƟcipaƟon. Households are considered to be eligible to
parƟcipate in only one pension scheme in any year, where eligibility to each
scheme is idenƟﬁed stochasƟcally with reference to a set of income dependent
probabiliƟes, and uncertainty between adjacent years can be suppressed in cases of
conƟnuous pension parƟcipaƟon. Membership of a pension to which a household is
eligible can either be exogenously imposed, or modelled as an endogenous decision.
Similarly, the rate of private contribuƟons to a pension scheme, πpi; t, can either
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be exogenously imposed, or considered endogenous in the model. Where private
pension contribuƟons are considered endogenous in the model, then these can be
subject to a series of lower
 
πpl

and upper
 
πpu

bounds on eligible incomes, lower 
πpcl

and upper
 
πpcu

bounds on contribuƟon rates, and a ceiling on the value of
the aggregate pension pot, πpmax.
Accrued rights to a private pension are described by:
wpi; t =
( 
1+ rpt 1

wpi; t 1 +

πpi; t + π
p
ec;j

(gi; t   πpl ) 
1+ rpt 1

wpi; t 1
member of scheme j
otherwise (9a)
ln
 
1+ rpt
  N μp   σ2p2 ; σ2p
!
(9b)
2.4. Labour income dynamics
Up to three household characterisƟcs inﬂuence labour income: the household’s
labour supply decision, the household’s latentwage,hi; t, andwhether the household
receives a wage oﬀer woi; t. Households can be exposed to an exogenous, age and
relaƟonship speciﬁc probability of receiving a wage oﬀer, pwo

nai; t; t

. This facility
is designed to capture the incidence of (involuntary) unemployment. If a household
receives a wage oﬀer, then its labour income is equal to a fracƟon of its latent wage,
with the fracƟon deﬁned as an increasing funcƟon of its labour supply. A household
that receives a wage oﬀer and chooses to supply the maximum amount of labour
receives its full latent wage, in which case gi; t = hi; t. A household that does not
receive a wage oﬀer, in contrast, is assumed to receive gi; t = 0 regardless of its
labour supply decision (implying no labour supplywhere employment incurs a leisure
penalty).
The decision to measure wage potenƟal at the household level rather than at
the level of the individual signiﬁcantly simpliﬁes the analyƟcal problem. Separately
accounƟng for the wages of each adult in a household is properly addressed only
by the addiƟon of a state variable to the model where households are comprised
of an adult couple. Furthermore, there is signiﬁcant empirical evidence to suggest
that men and women have quite diﬀerent labour market opportuniƟes, with those
of women exhibiƟng a relaƟvely high degree of heterogeneity.6 Hence, accounƟng
for the wage potenƟal of individuals could not ignore the sex of adult household
members, thereby introducing an addiƟonal state variable. These issues are further
16 On recent evidence regarding the labour market experience of women see, for example, Connolly & Gregory
(2008).
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complicated by the diﬃculƟes involved in characterising sex-speciﬁcwage generaƟng
processes, imperfect correlaƟon of temporal innovaƟons experienced by spouses,
and so on. The model side-steps these issues, as the current state of compuƟng
technology makes it impracƟcal to address them, and to analyse endogenous
decisions over pension contribuƟons.
In the ﬁrst period of the simulated lifeƟme, t0, each household is allocated a latent
full-Ɵme wage, hi; t0 , via a random draw from a log-normal distribuƟon, log(hi;t0) 
N
 
μna;t0 ; σ2na;t0

, where the parameters of the distribuƟon depend upon the number
of adults in the household, na. ThereaŌer, latent wages follow a random walk with
driŌ described by the equaƟon:
log

hi; t
m(nai; t;t)

= log

hi; t 1
m(nai; t 1;t 1)

+ κ

nai; t 1; t  1

(1 li; t 1)
(1 lW) + ωi; t (10)
where the parameters m (:) account for wage growth (and depend on age, t, and
the number of adults in the household, nai; t), κ (:) is the return to another year of
experience, and ωi; t  N

0; σ2ω;nai; t 1

is a household speciﬁc disturbance term.
A change in the number of adults in a household aﬀects wages through the
experience eﬀect, κ, and the wage growth parameters m. This model is closely
related to alternaƟves that have been developed in the literature (see SeŌon
and van de Ven, 2004, for discussion), and has the pracƟcal advantage that it
depends only upon variables from the current and immediately preceding periods
t  1; nai; t 1; nai; t; hi; t 1; li; t 1

, which limits the number of characterisƟcs that
describe the circumstances of a household (and thereby the number of state
variables in the opƟmisaƟon problem). Furthermore, although the concept of
an experience term in a wage regression is well established7, its inclusion is an
innovaƟon for the related literature (e.g. Low, 2005, and French, 2005). Most related
studies omit an experience term because it complicates the uƟlity maximisaƟon
problem by invalidaƟng two-stage budgeƟng. We have, however, found that its
inclusion enables us to beƩer capture the proﬁle of labour supply during the
lifecourse.
17 With regard to staƟsƟcal evidence of the eﬀect of experience on income, Mincer & Ofek (1982) report that in
the short run, every year out of the labour market can result in a 3.3%-7% fall in wages relaƟve to those
who remain employed. This study also ﬁnds, however, that the restoraƟon of human capital tends to be
faster than the original accumulaƟon, so that the impact of early labour breaks reduce to 1.3%-1.8% in the
long run. Eckstein & Wolpin (1989) do not make a disƟncƟon between the long run and short run impact of
actual experience, but ﬁnd that the ﬁrst year out of the labour market reduces wages by around 2.5%, with
subsequent years having a marginally diminishing eﬀect. See also, Waldfogel (1998) and Myck & Paull (2004)
for the role of experience in explaining the gender wage gap.
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2.4.1. ComplicaƟng the standard decision making problem
The preferences deﬁned by equaƟons (1) and (2) are homotheƟc. Hence, if
consumpƟon and leisure were each deﬁned over a conƟnuous domain, and if the
price of leisure was exogenous, then the preferred consumpƟon to leisure raƟo
would be independent of an agent’s wealth endowment. In this case, within period
uƟlity – equaƟon (2) – at the decision making opƟmum can be expressed in terms
of the period speciﬁc measure of total expenditure (on goods and leisure), and the
maximisaƟon problem can be resolved by two-stage budgeƟng. This decisionmaking
structure is fully consistent with the original analysis of Arrow, so that interpretaƟon
of 1=γ as relaƟve risk aversion (and, similarly, of γ as a measure of the intertemporal
elasƟcity of subsƟtuƟon of total expenditure) carries over.8
However, the focus on discrete labour opƟons, and the inclusion of an experience
eﬀect on wages, complicate the intertemporal decision making problem. The
discrete nature of labour supply implies that it is not possible to restate intratemporal
uƟlity at the decision making opƟmum as a funcƟon of within period total
expenditure. Nevertheless, opƟmised intratemporal uƟlity remains a conƟnuous
funcƟon of total within-period expenditure (albeit one that is subject to kinks at
labour transiƟons) so that it remains sensible to interpret1=γ as relaƟve risk aversion
(and, similarly, γ as a measure of the intertemporal elasƟcity of subsƟtuƟon of total
expenditure). Meanwhile, the experience eﬀect on wages implies that the price of
leisure is endogenous to the decisionmaking problem, thereby invalidaƟng two stage
budgeƟng. Furthermore, a posiƟve experience eﬀect on wages tends to depress
savings rates as wealth rises.9
2.5. Household composiƟon
The model allows for households to form and to split, for the arrival of children, and
for the risk of death at diﬀerent ages. The technical approach in terms of numbers of
adults and children in a household is to allow these to evolve stochasƟcally, following
a “reduced form” nested logitmodel. The ﬁrst (highest) level determines the number
of adults in a household, and the second (“nested” within that) determines the
number of children, given the age and number of adults in the household.
If the number of adults is selected to be uncertain, then a household can be
comprised of either a single adult or adult couple, subject to stochasƟc variaƟon
18 There is the separate issue of disentangling the intertemporal elasƟcity of subsƟtuƟon from relaƟve risk
aversion, which is not addressed here. See Epstein & Zin (1989).
19 To see this, note that an experience eﬀect on wages tends to increase the present-discounted cost of reduced
labour supply, to the extent that an individual expects to want to work in the future. As wealth rises, labour
aƩachment is weakened, which also weakens the experience eﬀect on incenƟves to work in the short run.
Including an experience eﬀect on wages consequently tends to exaggerate the negaƟve relaƟonship between
wealth and labour supply, thereby depressing the savings rate as wealth rises.
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between adjacent years. The fact that children typically remain dependants in a
household for a limited number of years implies that it is necessary to record both
their numbers and ages when including them explicitly in the raƟonal agent model.
This substanƟally increases the computaƟonal burden. If, for example, a household
was considered to be able to have children at any age between 20 and 45, with no
more than one birth in any year, and nomore than six dependent children at any one
Ɵme, then this would add an addiƟonal 334,622 state variables to the computaƟon
problem (with a proporƟonal increase in the associated computaƟon Ɵme). In view
of this, the model is currently speciﬁed to permit households to have up to three
children at each of two discrete ages, so that the maximum number of dependent
children in a household at any one Ɵme is limited to six.
This may seem somewhat arƟﬁcial (it is as if larger families must involve mulƟple
births, and births only occur at two speciﬁc ages). The precise Ɵming of births is
not a central focus of interest, however, and the approach taken here means that
the presence and number of children can be taken into account, while abstracƟng
somewhat from the associated detail.
The logit model that is considered to describe the evoluƟon of adults in a household
is given by equaƟon (11):10
si;t+1 = αA0 + αA1t+ αA2t2 + αA3t3 + αA4dki; t + αA5si; t (11)
where si; t is a dummy variable, that takes the value 1 if household i is comprised of a
single adult at age t and zero otherwise, and dki; t is a dummy variable that equals 1
if household i at age t has at least one child. With regard to the simulaƟon of births,
four separate ordered logit equaƟons are applied; one for each of single and couple
households, at each of the speciﬁed childbirth ages. The ordered logit equaƟons
assumed for the ﬁrst childbirth age, for both singles and couples, do not include
any addiƟonal household characterisƟcs. The ordered logit equaƟons for the second
childbirth age includes the number of children born at the ﬁrst childbirth age as an
addiƟonal descripƟve characterisƟc.
3. SOLVING THE LIFE-TIME DECISION PROBLEM
This secƟon begins by discussing the conceptual approach adopted to solve the
lifeƟme decisionmaking problem, before describing details of the analyƟcal rouƟnes
used to implement the numerical soluƟon.
10 When children are not modelled explicitly, then the cubic term in age and the dummy variable for children is
omiƩed from the logit equaƟon.
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3.1. Conceptual approach
The procedures that we adopt use backward inducƟon to solve for decisions that
maximise expected lifeƟme uƟlity. A terminal age T is assumed, following which
death occurs with certainty. UƟlity maximising decisions at this terminal age are
free of temporal dynamics, and are consequently straighƞorward to solve, for given
numbers of adults nat , wealth wT, and annuity income pT, omiƫng the household
index i for brevity. We refer to the uƟlity associated with this soluƟon as the value
funcƟon, VT(naT;wT; pT). Furthermore, we can calculate the intermediate measures
of welfare:
bu(naT;wT; pT) = ubcT (naT;wT; pT)θT ; 1

(12)
bX(naT;wT; pT) = Et 1(1  1=γ)  ζa + ζbbw+T+1 (naT;wT; pT)1 1=γ

(13)
wherebcT and bwT+1 denote the opƟmisedmeasures of consumpƟon and next period
wealth, on the assumpƟon that labour supply at the terminal age is not possible. We
calculate these funcƟons at all nodes of a three dimensional grid in the number of
adults, wealth, and reƟrement annuity.
At age T  1, suppose that households are permiƩed to invest in risky assets and to
supply labour. Here, the problem reduces to solving the Bellman equaƟon:
VT 1(naT 1;wT 1; hT 1;woT 1; pT 1) =
= max
cT 1;νT 1;lT 1
(
1
1  1=γ u
 cT 1
θT 1
; lT 1
1 1=γ
+
+ET 1
 β1δ
1  1=γ

φ1;T 1bu(naT;wT; pT)1 1=γ + (1  φ1;T 1)  ζa + ζbw+T 1 1=γ +
+ β1β2δ2φ1;T 1bX(naT;wT; pT)io (14)
subject to the intertemporal dynamics that are described above, where woT 1 is a
wage oﬀer idenƟﬁer taking the value 1 if a wage oﬀer is received and zero otherwise,
and νT 1 is the proporƟon of liquid wealth invested in the risky asset. We solve
this opƟmisaƟon problem for the T   1 value funcƟon, at each node of the ﬁve
dimensional grid over the permissable state-space. The expectaƟons operator is
evaluated in the context of the log-normal distribuƟons assumed for wages and risky
asset returns, using the Gauss-Hermite quadrature, which permits evaluaƟon at a set
of discrete abscissae. InterpolaƟon methods are used to evaluate the value funcƟon
at points between the assumed grid nodes throughout the simulated lifeƟme.
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SoluƟons for earlier ages then proceed via recursive repeƟƟon of the procedure
outlined for age T  1, given the soluƟons (previously) obtained for later ages. Prior
to tSPA, soluƟonsmay also be required for pension contribuƟons, and the state space
may be expanded to include children and the pension assets permiƩed in themodel.
A more complete descripƟon of the analyƟcal problem, including the treatment of
boundary condiƟons, is reported in the technical appendix.
The above procedure generates a grid that spans all possible combinaƟons of
characterisƟcs that the model considers a household might have (the state space).
The uƟlity maximising decisions idenƟﬁed by the numerical procedure are stored at
each grid intersecƟon, alongside the numerical approximaƟon of expected lifeƟme
uƟlity (the value funcƟon). Although this set of informaƟon can be informaƟve
in its own right, most analyses are based upon panel data for the life-course of
a cohort of households that are generated using the grid deﬁned above. The life
course of a birth cohort is generated by ﬁrst populaƟng a simulated sample by taking
randomdraws from a joint distribuƟon of all potenƟal state variables at the youngest
age considered for analysis. The behaviour of each simulated household, i, at the
youngest age is then idenƟﬁed by reading the decisions stored at their respecƟve
grid co-ordinates. Given household i’s characterisƟcs (state variables) and behaviour,
its characterisƟcs are aged one year following the processes that are considered to
govern their intertemporal variaƟon.Where these processes dependupon stochasƟc
terms, random draws are taken from their deﬁned distribuƟons (commonly referred
to asMonte Carlo simulaƟon). This process is repeated to produce data for the enƟre
life-course.
3.2. Details of soluƟon rouƟnes
The model described here is complex and generates behaviour where no analyƟcal
soluƟon exists. As such, it is reasonable to describe it as a ‘black-box’ rouƟne, which
raises concerns over the accuracy of the behavioural responses that it generates.
These concerns are exaggerated by the fact that the value funcƟon may be both
non-smooth and/or non-concave (although it is designed to be increasing and
conƟnuous), which can complicate the soluƟon due to the existence of mulƟple local
maxima.
It is important to recognise from the outset that any numerical soluƟon is likely
to be associated with a degree of error – the problem is to assess whether the
scale of the inaccuracies generated by the model are qualitaƟvely important for the
purpose to which it is applied. The model includes three principal tools for assessing
the accuracy of the numerical soluƟons that it derives: variaƟon of soluƟon detail,
variaƟon of interpolaƟon methods, and variaƟon of the numerical search rouƟnes
that are used. The ﬁrst is the most simple, and oŌen the most powerful of the three.
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When varying the soluƟon detail, the size and number of grid points adopted for each
of the conƟnuous state variables can be altered, as can the number of abscissae used
in the Gaussian quadrature.11 Increasing the grid points provides a more detailed
soluƟon of the uƟlity maximising problem, though it can also imply a rapid increase
in computaƟonal burden. Increasing the grid points inmulƟple dimensions increases
the computaƟonal burden geometrically rather than arithmeƟcally; a problem that
is commonly referred to as the curse of dimensionality.
The model includes both linear and cubic interpolaƟon methods, for evaluaƟng
behaviour between discrete grid points.12 RelaƟve to linear interpolaƟon, cubic
interpolaƟon produces a smoother funcƟonal form, and ensures conƟnuous
diﬀerenƟability. Cubic interpolaƟon also requires evaluaƟons at 4n grid points, rather
than 2n points, where n is the number of dimensions over which the interpolaƟon
is being taken. If the user indicates that cubic interpolaƟon is to be used, then the
model performs an internal check to determine whether the surface over which
an interpolaƟon is being conducted is reasonably smooth, before selecƟng the
cubic interpolaƟon for analysis; otherwise, it selects the linear interpolaƟon.13 It
is of note that the cubic interpolaƟon, and linear interpolaƟon rouƟnes have been
programmed separately, and so can be used to validate against one another.
Finally, the model includes three alternaƟve numerical search rouƟnes, which are
used to ﬁnd uƟlity maximising values of consumpƟon. A ‘brute force’ procedure
uses grid search methods to idenƟfy the local opƟmum associated with the highest
numerical approximaƟon of the value funcƟon. The advantage of this approach is
that it makes no assumpƟons regarding the form that the value funcƟon takes. This
advantage is, however, purchased at a very substanƟal increase in the computaƟonal
burden associated with the search rouƟne. AlternaƟvely, Brent’s method can be
used to search over the consumpƟon domain, based upon parabolic interpolaƟon
with a golden secƟon search of repeated evaluaƟons of the value funcƟon. This
approach has been found to be eﬃcient, parƟcularly where the surface over which
the search is conducted is reasonably well behaved, but is not designed to take
account of mulƟple local opƟma. The third search alternaƟve is based upon the Bus
& Dekker (1975) bisecƟon algorithm, which can be used to idenƟfy the consumpƟon
that evaluates the Euler condiƟon to zero. Like Brent’s method, the Bus & Dekker
(1975) algorithm is recognised as eﬃcient, and is not designed to account for
11 EvaluaƟon of weights and abscissae of the Gauss-Hermite quadrature are based upon a rouƟne reported in
Chapter 4 of Press et al. (1986).
12 The interpolaƟon rouƟnes that are used are based on Keys (1981).
13 This involves disƟnguishing the “inner” 2n points in closest proximity to the co-ordinate to be interpolated,
from the “outer” 4n points considered in evaluaƟng the cubic interpolaƟon. If the smallest diﬀerence between
any of the outer points and any of the inner points is more than 5 Ɵmes the maximum diﬀerence between the
inner points, then the model reverts to linear interpolaƟon.
60 j Analysing Pensions: Modelling and Policy Issues
mulƟple local opƟma. RelaƟve to Brent’smethod, opƟmisaƟon of the Euler condiƟon
can – in some circumstances – result in improved accuracy, but at the cost of
increased computaƟonal burden (as repeated calls to the value funcƟon do not
require the addiƟonal computaƟonal burden involved in evaluaƟng ﬁrst derivaƟves).
Furthermore, some analyƟcal contextsmay argue against the use of Euler condiƟons,
as in the case where non-exponenƟal discounƟng is assumed.
A supplementary search rouƟne is included in the model to miƟgate concerns
regarding idenƟﬁcaƟon of mulƟple local opƟma where Brent’s method or the Bus &
Dekker algorithm are applied. Here the model can be directed to explore a localised
grid above and below an idenƟﬁed opƟmum for a preferred level of consumpƟon,
based upon value funcƟon calls. If an alternaƟve value of consumpƟon is idenƟﬁed
by this supplementary rouƟne as strictly preferred to the original local maximum,
then the rouƟne will search recursively for any further soluƟons above and below.
This process is repeated unƟl no further soluƟons are found. Of all feasible soluƟons,
the one that maximises the value funcƟon is selected.
4. DATA AND CALIBRATION METHODOLOGY
4.1. Data considered for calibraƟng the model
Cross-secƟonal data for Ireland observed in 2005 were primarily considered for
calibraƟng the model. This focus on cross-secƟonal data was adopted aŌer careful
consideraƟon, taking into account the limitaƟons of the structural model and the
primary purpose for which the model has been devised. The model is limited in the
sense that it does not capture real-world uncertainty over a range of characterisƟcs,
including the evolving tax and beneﬁts system, condiƟons of the macro-economy,
household demographics, and so on. As such, calibraƟng the model to survey data
reported for a populaƟon birth cohort requires the implicit assumpƟon that either
changes in the policy environment have an incidental impact on behaviour, or are
perfectly foreseen. The former of these assumpƟons is diﬃcult tomaintain when the
primary purpose of the model is to explore behavioural responses to policy reform,
and the laƩer is patently inaccurate. Cross-secƟonal data avoid these problems
because they describe behaviour observed under a single policy environment.
The assumpƟons implicit in the calibraƟon are then that: a) individuals base their
decisions on the belief that the exisƟng policy environment will be maintained into
the indeﬁnite future; and14 b) that expectaƟons regarding the future evoluƟon of
individual speciﬁc characterisƟcs – including demographics, wages, employment
opportuniƟes, and so on – can be based upon age proﬁles exhibited by contemporary
14 This assumpƟon is not uncommon in the associated literature.
A Framework for Pension Policy Analysis in Ireland: PENMOD, a Dynamic SimulaƟon Model j 61
survey data. The former of these assumpƟons appears to us to be plausible (if
not necessarily accurate), as does the laƩer aŌer an allowance is made for trend
improvements in wages and survival probabiliƟes. These underlying assumpƟons
should be borne in mind when interpreƟng the discussion that follows.15
4.2. CalibraƟon approach
Models of the type referred to above are parameterised against observed data via
a two-stage process that adapts to the large number of parameters involved and
the computaƟon Ɵmes required to determine the implicaƟons of a given parameter
combinaƟon. In the ﬁrst stage, observable model parameters – including those
governing inter-temporal wage dynamics and transiƟons in relaƟonship status – are
each esƟmated separately on available survey data. Given the parameter esƟmates
obtained in the ﬁrst stage, the second stage involves adjusƟng the (unobserved)
model parameters to match simulated moments implied by the structural model to
sample moments esƟmated from survey data.
The second stage of the model parameterisaƟon is usually conducted either by
manual calibraƟon or opƟmisaƟon of a loss funcƟon using an econometric
criterion.16 Various methods exist, each with their own advantages and
disadvantages. We chose to manually adjust unobserved model parameters in
the second stage of the parameterisaƟon, based upon the sum of squared errors
for each age speciﬁc model characterisƟc and graphical representaƟons of the
respecƟve characterisƟcs, following the approach by SeŌon et al. (2008). Although
this approach sacriﬁces some objecƟvity in the method by which the parameter
esƟmates are obtained, it also facilitates a detailed understanding of the behavioural
implicaƟons of alternaƟve parameter combinaƟons, relaƟve to an automated
econometric “black-box”.
4.2.1. SpeciﬁcaƟon of the model considered for calibraƟon
As the second stage of the calibraƟon requires tesƟng over a very large
number of parameter combinaƟons, the model was limited to the following eight
characterisƟcs:
15 A third possibility, which has been considered in the associated literature, is to calibrate the model to
populaƟon characterisƟcs that control for Ɵme and cohort eﬀects (e.g. (SeŌon et al. 2008)). This opƟon has
the problem that the details of the policy environment implicit in such proﬁles represent an average of the
policy environments that applied during the period considered for esƟmaƟon, and as a consequence are not
well deﬁned.
16 Econometric methods include Simulated Minimum Distance (Lee and Ingram, 1991), Method of Simulated
Moments (Stern, 1997), Indirect EsƟmaƟon (Gourieroux et al., 1993) and Eﬃcient Method of Moments
(Gallant and Tauchen, 1996).
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- age - number of adults - wage oﬀers - wage rates
- net liquid assets - pension eligibility - pension rights - Ɵme of death
This restricted model focuses on decisions over labour supply (including the
possibility of part-Ɵme employment), consumpƟon, and pension parƟcipaƟon, given
a household’s age, its number of adults, liquid assets, wage oﬀer, wage rate,
pension scheme eligibility, pension wealth, and survival. Household decisions were
considered at annual intervals between ages t0 = 20 and T = 120, with labour
supply possible to age 75. State Pensionable Age was set to tSPA = 65, the
pensionable age that prevailed in 2005. Uncertainty was taken into consideraƟon for
the intertemporal development of the number of adults in a household, wage oﬀers,
wage rates, private pension eligibility, and the Ɵme of death – age, liquid wealth, and
pension wealth were all considered to evolve determinisƟcally.
As noted above, the model solves decision making problems by dividing the
permissable state space (the range of characterisƟcs that any household might
conceivably have) into a series of grids. The domains of wages and wealth between
ages 20 to 69 were each divided into 34 points using a log scale. The domain of
pension wealth between ages 20 to 64 was divided into 16 points using a log scale. It
was assumed that 25% of pension wealth at age t = tSPA is taken as a tax free lump,
with the remainder taken as a reƟrement annuity. The domain of the reƟrement
annuity was divided into 16 points using a log scale between ages 65 and 75. From
age 76 to age 120, the wealth and reƟrement annuity domains were each divided
into 151 points using a log scale.
Three addiƟonal dimensions – reﬂecƟng the number of adults in a household, wage
oﬀers, and pension scheme eligibility – complete the grids that were considered
for the calibraƟon. These grid dimensions diﬀer from those described above in that
they refer to characterisƟcs that take discrete values. From age 20 to 95 (inclusive),
soluƟons were required for single adults and couples; from age 96 all households
were considered to be comprised of a single adult. Between ages 20 and 75, soluƟons
were required for households with and without a wage oﬀer. Furthermore, 3 private
sector pension schemes were considered for analysis.
This speciﬁcaƟon of the model required uƟlity maximising decisions to be
numerically evaluated for 12,283,729 diﬀerent combinaƟons of household
characterisƟcs, for each alternaƟve parameter combinaƟon tested as part of the
calibraƟon process.17 For reference, this speciﬁcaƟon of the model takes 25 minutes
to run on a computer with an Dell T5500 workstaƟon with dual Xeon X5650
processors and 6Gb of RAM.
17 =(64-19).34.34.16.3.2.2 +(75-64).34.34.16.2.2 + (95-75).151.151.2 + (120-95).151.151
A Framework for Pension Policy Analysis in Ireland: PENMOD, a Dynamic SimulaƟon Model j 63
4.2.2. CalibraƟon strategy
The parameters of the model that were not esƟmated on observable data (or
otherwise exogenously assumed) were calibrated by comparing age proﬁles at the
household level for both singles and couples of:
1. the geometric mean of household employment income
2. the variance of household log employment income
3. the proporƟon of adult household members employed full-Ɵme, part-Ɵme and
not at all
4. the geometric mean of household consumpƟon
5. the variance of household log consumpƟon
StaƟsƟcs for calibraƟon were drawn mainly from 3 surveys by the Irish Central
StaƟsƟcs Oﬃce. StaƟsƟcs on employment were derived from SILC 2005. ProporƟons
employed full-Ɵme, part-Ɵme or not in work were derived from the Quarterly
NaƟonal Household Survey (April 2005), while staƟsƟcs on consumpƟon expenditure
were derived from the Household Budget Survey, again for 2004/2005.
Age speciﬁc geometric means of household employment income were matched
by altering the distribuƟon mean of the simulated cohort at entry to the model
(age 20), μna;t0 , and by adjusƟng the age and relaƟonship speciﬁc trend parameters
of human capital described by m

nai; t; t

in equaƟon (10). The variance of log
employment income by age and relaƟonship status was matched by adjusƟng the
variance of the distribuƟon at entry to the model, σ2na;t0 , and the variance of age
speciﬁc innovaƟons, σ2ω;nai; t 1 . Age and relaƟonship speciﬁc rates of employment
parƟcipaƟon were matched by adjusƟng the uƟlity price of leisure, α, the learning
by doing eﬀects, κ

nai; t 1; t  1

. Learning by doing eﬀects, κ

nai; t 1; t  1

were
also adjusted to match the model to the split between full-Ɵme and part-Ɵme
employment described by survey data, as were the raƟos of part-Ɵme to full-Ɵme
wages. Finally, the Ɵming of consumpƟon was adjusted by altering the exponenƟal
discount rate δ, and the parameter of relaƟve risk aversion 1=γ. The variance of
consumpƟon by agewas a residual that depends heavily upon the associated income
parameters
n
σ2na;t0 ; σ2ω;nai; t 1
o
.
It was necessary to select a set of starƟng values for the model from which to
commence the calibraƟon process. StarƟng with the wage parameters, we began
with a ﬂat wage proﬁle over the life course, assuming zero experience eﬀects,
κ = 0, and no risk of a low wage oﬀer. The leisure cost of full-Ɵme and part-
Ɵme employment were deﬁned as non-stochasƟc and age invariant proporƟons of
the total Ɵme available to an adult, assuming 18 ‘viable’ hours per day. Similarly,
the raƟo of the part-Ɵme to full-Ɵme wage was assumed to be independent of
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age and relaƟonship status. The iniƟal raƟos considered for the calibraƟon were
calculated using data from the 2005 wave of the SILC; associated staƟsƟcs are
reported in Table 1. Finally, the preference parameters of themodel were taken from
UK econometric regressions (see (van de Ven 2010)), but the search rouƟne meant
that parameters were free to vary in response to characterisƟcs in the Irish data. The
excepƟon is the uƟlity price of leisure, which was set deliberately low to ensure an
adequate sample for calculaƟng moments of employment income.
The model calibraƟon was conducted using a cascading procedure designed to
subject the most ﬂexible aspects of the model to the most frequent instances
of re-adjustment. From the list of moments referred to above, the model
exhibits the greatest degree of ﬂexibility in relaƟon to the geometric means of
household employment income, where the number of associatedmodel parametersn
μna;t0 ;m

nai; t; t
o
is idenƟcal to the number of moments considered for the
calibraƟon. The calibraƟon consequently focused in the ﬁrst instance upon adjusƟng
the parameters
n
μna;t0 ;m

nai; t; t
o
unƟl a close match was obtained between the
simulated and sample esƟmates for the geometric means of employment income.
Given the calibrated parameters for employment income, the calibraƟon focused
next upon matching the incidence of employment parƟcipaƟon/non-employment.
Here, the uƟlity price of leisure α serves to reduce the preference for employment
in general, and the learning-by-doing eﬀects κ increase employment early in the
working lifeƟme, relaƟve to later life. The parameter adjustments necessary tomatch
the model to employment parƟcipaƟon, also serve to distort the match obtained to
labour income, both through the direct eﬀect that varying the parameters κ have
on the intertemporal development of latent full-Ɵme wages, and indirectly through
distribuƟonal heterogeneity in labour supply responses to employment incenƟves.
Hence, the calibraƟon process proceeded in an iteraƟve loop to match the model to
both the geometric mean of employment income and employment parƟcipaƟon at
the same Ɵme.
The calibraƟon procedure focused next upon matching the model to rates of full-
Ɵme and part-Ɵme employment. This aspect of the calibraƟon proceeded in a very
Table 1: Model Parameters to DisƟnguish the Eﬀects on Leisure and Labour income of
AlternaƟve Labour Supply Decisions
employment opƟon leisure cost proporƟon of full-Ɵme wage
not employed 0.00 0.00
part-Ɵme employed 0.145 0.188
full-Ɵme employed 0.322 1.000
Source: authors' calculaƟons on data from SILC 2005
Notes: based on populaƟon average staƟsƟcs for full-Ɵme and part-Ɵme employed leisure cost
assumes 18 allocatable hours per day and 7 days per week
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similar fashion to that set out for employment parƟcipaƟon, with the raƟo of part-
Ɵme to full-Ɵme wages replacing the uƟlity price of leisure in the adjustment of
parameters. It is important to note that this adjustment procedure has the very
signiﬁcant advantage that the wage parameters derived via the calibraƟon take
full account of the endogeneity of labour supply decisions, with which so much
of the associated econometric literature has been concerned following the seminal
contribuƟon by James Heckman.
Having obtained a close match to moments of both employment income and labour
supply, the calibraƟon then focused upon matching the model to sample moments
of household consumpƟon. The model oﬀers relaƟvely blunt tools with which to
achieve this match, and the associated calibraƟon is somewhat more approximate
as a result – in parƟcular, we focused upon achieving a match between the peaks
in consumpƟon described by the simulated and sample data, and the general trend
of age speciﬁc variances in consumpƟon. In this regard, the discount rate δ tends
to shiŌ consumpƟon into later periods of life, increasing the slope of the lifeƟme
consumpƟonproﬁle. The parameter of relaƟve risk aversion1=γmoƟvates increased
precauƟonary saving early in the working lifeƟme, which diminishes as the working
lifeƟme proceeds. An alternaƟve aspect that has been recognised as important
here is the bearing that demographic needs have on consumpƟon preferences;
this aspect of the model was omiƩed from the calibraƟon, due to the exogenous
assumpƟon of age speciﬁc demographics (reported in SecƟon 5.4), and the revised
OECD equivalence scale upon which the preference relaƟon is based.
To summarise, the model parameters
n
μna;t0 ;m

nai; t; t
o
were then adjusted unƟl
a close match was obtained to the age and relaƟonship speciﬁc geometric means
for employment income. Given the parameters
n
μna;t0 ;m

nai; t; t
o
, the model
parameters
n
α; κ

nai; t 1; t  1
o
and the raƟo of part-Ɵme to full-Ɵmewageswere
adjusted to match the simulated to sample rates of employment. This process was
then repeated a number of Ɵmes unƟl the model obtained a reasonable match to
both geometricmeans for employment incomeand rates of employment at the same
Ɵme. The parameters fδ; 1=γg were then adjusted to to obtain a beƩer match to
age speciﬁc geometric means for consumpƟon described by survey data, and the
parameters
n
σ2na;t0 ; σ2ω;nai; t 1
o
were adjusted to obtain an improved match to the
age speciﬁc moments of both consumpƟon and labour income. The enƟre process
was then repeated to obtain the calibrated results that are reported in SecƟon 6.
5. ESTIMATES FOR OBSERVABLE PARAMETERS
The model parameters for which exogenous esƟmates were obtained are principally
concerned with four key issues: life expectancy, the terms of the available pension
schemes, taxaƟon, and household demographics. A conspicuous omission from this
66 j Analysing Pensions: Modelling and Policy Issues
list is the treatment of wages, the parameters for which were addressed as part of
the second stage calibraƟon to ensure the approach taken to account for sample
selecƟon is consistentwith thewider analyƟcal framework. The speciﬁcaƟonof these
ﬁve aspects of the model are described in turn below.
5.1. Life expectancy
The survival probabiliƟes assumed for calibraƟng the model are based upon
CSO PopulaƟon and Labour Force ProjecƟons, 2006-2036. These data are based
upon observed survival rates between 2006 and 2007, and Oﬃcial projecƟons for
improved longevity thereaŌer. The Oﬃcial data permit survival rates to be calculated
to age 99. Age speciﬁc survival probabiliƟes between 100 and 120 were exogenously
speciﬁed to obtain a smooth sigmoidal progression from the oﬃcial esƟmate at age
99 to a 0 per cent survival probability at age 120. These probabiliƟes are reported in
Table 2.
Table 2: Exogenously esƟmated model parameters
rates of return / growth (% per annum)
pension wealth: 4.1% min. cost of debt: 6.0% wage growth: 1.6%
posiƟve liquid wealth: 4.1% max. cost of debt: 19.0%
children probability of mortality
age singles couples age singles couples age prob. age prob.
20 0.054 0.000 40 0.656 1.952 81 0.007 101 0.415
21 0.049 0.336 41 0.706 2.006 82 0.008 102 0.486
22 0.078 0.355 42 0.724 2.044 83 0.009 103 0.555
23 0.110 0.428 43 0.752 1.984 84 0.010 104 0.619
24 0.120 0.569 44 0.634 1.843 85 0.012 105 0.679
25 0.156 0.572 45 0.595 1.683 86 0.014 106 0.733
26 0.188 0.728 46 0.503 1.604 87 0.017 107 0.781
27 0.238 0.822 47 0.407 1.389 88 0.020 108 0.823
28 0.283 1.004 48 0.390 1.244 89 0.022 109 0.860
29 0.360 1.069 49 0.360 1.174 90 0.025 110 0.890
30 0.380 1.161 50 0.328 1.074 91 0.028 111 0.916
31 0.402 1.363 51 0.310 0.934 92 0.034 112 0.936
32 0.422 1.419 52 0.242 0.773 93 0.041 113 0.953
33 0.466 1.453 53 0.147 0.715 94 0.050 114 0.966
34 0.550 1.615 54 0.133 0.595 95 0.063 115 0.975
35 0.587 1.721 55 0.087 0.515 96 0.075 116 0.983
36 0.593 1.708 56 0.071 0.418 97 0.120 117 0.988
37 0.671 1.790 57 0.058 0.418 98 0.197 118 0.992
38 0.631 1.892 58 0.057 0.357 99 0.273 119 0.995
39 0.638 1.944 59 0.029 0.336 100 0.343 120 1.000
Source: age proﬁles for children equal to arithmeƟc averages calculated from ** survey data
mortality probabiliƟes calculated for couples where both members are aged 20 in 2005 on life-
tables published *** return to pension wealth and posiƟve balances of liquid wealth set equal to
real growth observed for Irish GNP between 1970 and 2005 cost of debt exogenously assumed real
wage growth calculated on data for workers in all industries between 1985 to 2006
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5.2. The terms of private sector pension schemes
The terms of private sector pensions in Ireland are complex and diverse (see, for
example, the Pension Market Survey 2007, IAPF). Deﬁned beneﬁt schemes remain
important, but in the private sector, and especially for younger workers, deﬁned
contribuƟon schemes have become much more common. In order to summarise
Irish private sector pensions in a tractable fashion, we have opted to characterise the
system in terms of a set of pension opƟons which a worker may face. We represent
DB schemes in terms of a DC scheme with a higher employer contribuƟon – this
helps to capture a key feature of DB schemes, while at the same Ɵme keeping the
complexity of the problem to a manageable level.18
Three schemes are considered for the calibraƟon, designed to reﬂect low, middle,
and high pension contribuƟon rates by employees and their employers. Employees
are considered to be able to decide overwhether to parƟcipate in these schemes, but
not their respecƟve rates of pension contribuƟons, as is common for occupaƟonal
pensions. The terms applied to each of the representaƟve pension schemes are
summarised in Table 3.
The top panel of Table 3 reports the rates of employee and employer pension
contribuƟons assumed for each alternaƟve pension scheme. In each year between
ages 20 and 64, households are allocated a pension scheme that they may choose to
parƟcipate in during the respecƟve year. The pension scheme to which a household
is eligible in any given year is either carried over from the scheme that they chose
to parƟcipate in during the preceding year, or – if they chose not to parƟcipate
in a pension during the preceding year – then it is taken as a random draw with
reference to the income speciﬁc probability distribuƟons reported at the boƩom
panel of Table 3.
The staƟsƟcs that are reported in Table 3 reﬂect the stylised observaƟon that
employer pension provisions tend to improve with employee wages, where pension
support is virtually non-existent for employees on lowwages – deﬁned here as those
with full-Ɵme wages worth less that e 16,000. In contrast, many employees toward
the top of the wage distribuƟon tend to enjoy relaƟvely generous pension support
from their employers, while themajority of workers lie between these two extremes.
Furthermore, we ignore associated decisions regarding the porƞolio allocaƟon, and
assume that all returns to investment are risk free. The rate of return to pension
18 Note that in our context, where there is no investment uncertainty and mortality rates are know, a career
average DB scheme can be equivalently restated in terms of a DC scheme without loss of generality.
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wealth is set to 4.1% per annum, equal to the average real growth of Gross NaƟonal
Product in Ireland during the period 1970 to 2005 (reported in the top panel of
Table 2). Pension wealth is converted into an actuarially fair annuity at age 65 based
on the assumed rate of return to pension wealth and the mortality rates discussed
in SecƟon 5.1. The value of this annuity is assumed to fall by 50% upon the death of
a spouse.
Table 3: Terms Assumed for Private Sector Pensions: contribuƟon rates and probabiliƟes
of eligibility
scheme 1 scheme 2 scheme 3
contribuƟon rates (% of labour income)
employee 3% 4% 7%
employer 0% 7% 11%
eligibility probabiliƟes by annual income band
toe 16,000 90% 10% 0%
toe 38,400 10% 70% 20%
e 38,400 and over 0% 40% 60%
Notes: authors' assumpƟons for terms of private sector pensions real return to pension wealth set
to 4.1% p.a . income thresholds for probability distribuƟons indexed to real wage growth of 1.6 %
p.a .
5.3. Taxes and beneﬁts
We adopt a simpliﬁed representaƟon of the tax/welfare system, which nevertheless
captures some of the key features of interest. For the cohorts now entering the
labour market, coverage of the State Contributory Pension scheme will be much
higher than heretofore. We consequently adopt the simplifying assumpƟon that,
in future, all those aged above State Pension Age will be eligible for the State
Contributory Pension. Themodel allows for both the State Pension Age and the level
of payment to be varied.
For those of working age, we take account of the following schemes:
 Jobseekers’ Allowance
 One Parent Family Payment
 Child income support via child beneﬁt, qualiﬁed child increase and Family Income
Supplement
On the income tax side, we allow for the basics of personal and PAYE tax credits,
tax bands and rates, and for PRSI and levies (which may be structured along the
lines of the Universal Social Charge). Special aƩenƟon is given to alternaƟve possible
tax treatments of pensions, varying from the EET (exempt, exempt, taxed) structure
which approximates that in place unƟl recent years to a potenƟal new system with
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tax relief at a single hybrid rate, as per the recommendaƟons of the NaƟonal Pension
Framework.
An addiƟonal issue of concern in relaƟon to the simulated tax and beneﬁts system is
the way that it is assumed to evolve with Ɵme. Given the wage growth that is used
to adjust the ﬁnancial staƟsƟcs against which the model is calibrated (reported in
SecƟon 4), ignoring indexaƟonwould result in “ﬁscal drag” (or tax bracket creep) and
a decline in the relaƟve value of beneﬁts. Three main approaches to this issue can
be disƟnguished. One is to allow for full indexaƟon of tax parameters and welfare
payment levels with respect to wage growth. This has the merit of ensuring that
the raƟo of tax to income remains constant, and that welfare incomes rise in line
with general wage growth. This approach is in line with the distribuƟonally neutral
benchmark adopted in analysis of budgetary impact.
An alternaƟve approach would be to project indexaƟon of tax parameters and of
welfare rates in line with past experience; the indexaƟon parameters applying to tax
and welfare might then diﬀer from each other, and from wage indexaƟon. Data for
the period 1987 to 2005 indicate beneﬁt parameters, and especially tax parameters,
were adjusted by more than the growth in wages. ProjecƟng forward on the basis of
this experience does not seem advisable. It must be remembered that the public
ﬁnance situaƟon in 2005 was boosted by revenues arising from the house price
bubble. When projecƟng forward on a very long term basis, it would be desirable to
incorporate the adjustment currently under way to bring a sustainable ﬁscal balance.
Part of the challenge, therefore, is to construct a scenario which takes account of
the required adjustment, while not imposing an excessive adjustment over the very
long term. We have consequently adopted the former approach here, adjusƟng tax
thresholds and beneﬁts in line with wage growth of 1.6% per annum.
5.4. Household demographics
The calibraƟon that is reported here assumes that a household can be comprised of
one or two adults between ages 20 and 95, where the number of adults is considered
to be uncertain between adjacent years. From age 96, all households are comprised
of a single adult. The logit model considered to describe the evoluƟon of adults in a
household is described by equaƟon (15):
si;t+1 = αA0 + αA1t+ αA2t2 + αA3t3 + αA5si; t (15)
where si; t is a dummy variable, that takes the value 1 if household i is comprised of
a single adult at age t and zero otherwise. This logit equaƟon was esƟmated using
data derived from waves 7 and 8 of the Living in Ireland survey. Regression staƟsƟcs
are reported in Table 4.
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Table 4: Regression StaƟsƟcs for Logit Model of RelaƟonship Status
variable coeﬃcient std. error
single(t-1) 9.031 0.371
age -0.679 0.138
age_2 1.34E-02 2.96E-03
age_3 -7.53E-05 1.94E-05
Constant 4.450 1.933
sample size 6137
proporƟon single 0.418
correct predicƟons 0.985
Source: authors' calculaƟons on data from waves 7 and 8 of the Living in Ireland survey
Dependant children were modelled determinisƟcally when calibraƟng the model,
based on age and relaƟonship speciﬁc averages reported in Living in Ireland survey
data. These age speciﬁc averages are reported in Table 2.
6. CALIBRATED MODEL PARAMETERS
Our calibrated model parameters are reported in Table 5, and the associated ﬁt
between the simulated and sample moments is reported in Figures 1 to 4. We
begin by interpreƟng the calibrated model parameters, and the key consideraƟons
underlying the parameter values that we seƩled upon. We then discuss the ways in
which our calibraƟon could be improved, which remain for further research.
6.1. InterpreƟng the calibrated parameters
StarƟngwith the parameter of relaƟve risk version, the calibrated value of 3.1 implies
an intertemporal elasƟcity of subsƟtuƟon for consumpƟon calculated at populaƟon
averages of 0.16, which lies ﬁrmly within the range of esƟmates reported in the
associated empirical literature. Grossman & Shiller (1981), Mankiw (1985) and Hall
(1988), for example, report econometric esƟmates for the intertemporal elasƟcity
between 0 and 0.4, Blundell et al. (1994) report an esƟmate of 0.75, while Hansen &
Singleton (1983) and Mankiw et al. (1985) report esƟmates just over 1. Although
values of the coeﬃcient of risk aversion required to explain the equity premium
puzzle (Mehra & PrescoƩ (1985)) are large by comparison, evidence from aƫtudinal
surveys suggest that the value is unlikely to larger than 5 (Barsky et al. (1997)).
The relaƟve values of the intra-temporal elasƟcity (ϵ) and relaƟve risk aversion
(1=γ) imply that consumpƟon and leisure are direct subsƟtutes, which has been
suggested as a potenƟal explanaƟon for the fall in consumpƟon that is commonly
observed about reƟrement (e.g. Heckman (1974)). The discount factor indicates
more impaƟence than the assumed real rate of return (5.0% c.f. 4.1% per annum),
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and the uƟlity price of leisure for singles and couples is in the region of 1.0 by
construcƟon.19 The probability of a low wage oﬀer is 20% at any age between 20
and 75 for single adults, and 1% for couples. These parameters appear to display a
passable level of internal consistency, given the imperfect correlaƟon associatedwith
the likelihood of involuntary unemployment for a husband and wife.20 The raƟo of
part-Ɵme to full-Ɵme hours of employment was set equal to the associated sample
averages reported in SILC data, as deﬁned in Table 1. In contrast, the raƟo of part-
Ɵme to full-Ɵme wages was reduced by one third, relaƟve to the associated survey
data, to dampen incenƟves to take up part-Ɵme employment.
Turning to the age speciﬁc model parameters reported in Table 5, the calibraƟon
produced experience eﬀects that tend to decline with age, where the experience
eﬀects idenƟﬁed for singles exceed those for couples throughout the simulated
working lifeƟme. This diﬀerence is most pronounced early in the simulated lifeƟme,
where the populaƟon tends to be primarily comprised of singles adults: at age 20,
a single adult who chooses to work full-Ɵme can expect to earn 25% more by age
21 than they would have done had they chosen not to work at all at age 20. This
compares with a 2.5% expected wage premium for couples at age 20. This focus
of experience eﬀects early in the working lifeƟme is consistent with the use of an
experience eﬀect as a tool for moƟvaƟng employment parƟcipaƟon early in the
simulated lifeƟme.
The parameters that describe the age dependent component of the intertemporal
evoluƟon of latent full-Ɵme wages are best interpreted taking account of the
experience eﬀects that are described in the preceding paragraph. For singles, these
parameters imply posiƟve wage growth of 6% per annum on average for individuals
who work full-Ɵme between ages 20 and 40, relaƟve to wage decline of 12% per
annum for individuals who do not work – part-Ɵme employment falls between these
two extremes. In contrast, full-Ɵme employment implies an approximately ﬂat wage
proﬁle (in real terms) between ages 40 and 65, relaƟve to real wage decline of 6% per
annum in respect of non-employment. A similar proﬁle is described for adult couples,
subject to smaller experience eﬀects. In the case of full-Ɵme employed couples, for
example, average wage growth between ages 20 and 40 is 1% per annum, relaƟve
to an average wage decline of 1% where employment is not supplied. From age 65,
wages tend to fall quite sharply for both singles and couples, even where full-Ɵme
employment is maintained.
19 This is achieved by mulƟplying the equivalence scale by 550, to normalise equivalised consumpƟon (c=θ).
20 If there is a 20% probability of any adult being unemployed, and the probability of employment is independent
of spouse labour status, then there would be a 4% probability of both members of a couple being
unemployment at the same Ɵme. The calibraƟon is not suﬃciently precise to disƟnguish between a 1% and
4% probability of unemployment.
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Table 5: Model Parameters Calibrated to Match Simulated to Sample Moments
Preference Parameters
relaƟve risk aversion (1/gamma) 3.10 elasƟcity of subsƟtuƟon (epsilon) 0.55
discount factor (delta) 0.95 uƟlity price of leisure (alpha) 0.55* 1.7**
Wage Parameters
prob of low wage oﬀer - singles 0.20 part-Ɵme to full-Ɵme leisure cost 0.463
prob of low wage oﬀer - couples 0.01 part-Ɵme to full-Ɵme wage raƟo 0.400
Age Speciﬁc Parameters
trend income experience eﬀect trend income experience eﬀect
age singles couples singles couples age singles couples singles couples
20 1000.000 1000.000 0.250 0.025 48 34.514 662.168 0.082 0.015
21 857.021 1333.375 0.244 0.025 49 33.264 664.906 0.076 0.014
22 781.609 1547.855 0.238 0.024 50 32.015 685.152 0.070 0.014
23 770.084 1653.848 0.232 0.024 51 30.765 683.423 0.064 0.013
24 729.782 1603.066 0.226 0.024 52 29.515 687.220 0.058 0.013
25 684.510 1601.240 0.220 0.023 53 28.266 703.668 0.052 0.013
26 628.312 1590.876 0.214 0.023 54 27.016 681.389 0.046 0.012
27 565.330 1594.449 0.208 0.022 55 25.767 650.762 0.040 0.012
28 494.661 1650.370 0.202 0.022 56 24.517 636.596 0.034 0.012
29 417.112 1539.240 0.196 0.022 57 23.268 614.606 0.028 0.011
30 358.136 1446.184 0.190 0.021 58 22.018 581.439 0.022 0.011
31 287.453 1390.094 0.184 0.021 59 20.768 548.271 0.016 0.010
32 240.418 1298.615 0.178 0.021 60 19.519 515.103 0.010 0.010
33 183.914 1212.764 0.172 0.020 61 18.269 481.935 0.010 0.010
34 147.897 1142.045 0.166 0.020 62 17.020 448.767 0.010 0.010
35 138.391 1051.007 0.160 0.019 63 15.770 415.599 0.010 0.010
36 117.694 976.720 0.154 0.019 64 14.521 382.431 0.010 0.010
37 104.831 889.670 0.148 0.019 65 13.271 349.263 0.010 0.010
38 93.217 839.271 0.142 0.018 66 12.022 316.096 0.010 0.010
39 78.333 768.300 0.136 0.018 67 10.772 282.928 0.010 0.010
40 67.889 749.428 0.130 0.018 68 9.522 249.760 0.010 0.010
41 62.398 723.956 0.124 0.017 69 8.273 216.592 0.010 0.010
42 54.896 709.681 0.118 0.017 70 7.023 183.424 0.010 0.010
43 51.315 676.203 0.112 0.016 71 5.774 150.256 0.010 0.010
44 50.139 654.010 0.106 0.016 72 4.524 117.088 0.010 0.010
45 44.813 641.729 0.100 0.016 73 3.275 83.920 0.010 0.010
46 37.013 652.456 0.094 0.015 74 2.025 50.752 0.010 0.010
47 35.763 652.747 0.088 0.015 75 0.776 17.585 0.010 0.010
* singles; ** couples
6.2. The match between simulated and sample moments
We discuss the match obtained between the simulated and sample moments in the
sameorder inwhichwe conducted themodel calibraƟon, as described in SecƟon 4.2.
The top two panels of Figure 1 indicate that the model obtains a close match to the
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age proﬁles described by survey data for the geometricmean of private non-property
(employment) income, for both single adults and couples. Given the discussion
provided in SecƟon 4.2, it is reasonable to expect that this aspect of the calibraƟon
should obtain a closematch to survey data, because the number of associatedmodel
parameters is exactly equal to the number of calibraƟonmoments. Themost obvious
anomaly is the jump up in the geometricmean of employment income that is evident
for couples at age 65, which is the pensionable age considered for the calibraƟon.
This jump up is not generated for any household taken in isolaƟon – indeed, as
noted above, household full-Ɵme potenƟal wages tend to fall late in the working
lifeƟme – rather, the increase in the geometric mean of employment income later
in the working lifeƟme reﬂects a mass departure from employment of lower wage
households aŌer they gain access to their accrued pension wealth. Although this
jump up in the geometric mean of non-property income is not evident in the survey
data, it is important not to overstate the importance of this disparity, as relaƟvely
few adults choose to be employed aŌer pension age.
Figure 1: Private Non-Property Income Proﬁles by Age  simulated versus sample moments
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Notes: Sample statistics ― age profiles calculated from SILC data from 2005
Simulated statistics ― age profiles generated from model, using calibrated parameters reported in Table 5
This brings us neatly to the proﬁles for employment that are displayed in Figure 2,
delaying for a moment discussion of the variances of employment income that
are reported in the lower panels of Figure 1. The two panels of Figure 2 indicate
that the model does a very good job of capturing observed rates of employment
parƟcipaƟon for both singles and couples, with the most substanƟal disparity
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between the simulated and sample staƟsƟcs being the relaƟvely high rates of full-
Ɵme employment observed among single adults between ages 35 and 45. This
disparity is aƩributable to the applicaƟon of taxes and beneﬁts, as the simulaƟon
model assumes that single adults without children receive no beneﬁts if they are
in full-Ɵme employment, but can receive Jobseeker’s Allowance if they work part-
Ɵme. Single adults with no children and low full-Ɵme wage potenƟals can therefore
signiﬁcantly increase their disposable income by elecƟng to work part-Ɵme. Single
adults with children, however, are eligible to OPFP and Child Beneﬁt irrespecƟve of
their employment status, and FIS if theywork full-Ɵme, so that full-Ɵme employment
obtains an unambiguous increase in disposable income when a single adult cares
for at least one child. The balance between these countervailing incenƟves switches
from part-Ɵme to full-Ɵme employment during peak child-rearing years.
Two important factors underly the close match between the simulaƟon model and
the data that is otherwise reported for employment staƟsƟcs. First, it was necessary
to assume that the wage earned from part-Ɵme employment returns a smaller
fracƟon of the full-Ɵme wage that the populaƟon average staƟsƟcs imply; without
this assumpƟon, the model tended to generate too much part-Ɵme employment,
relaƟve to the incidence described by the associated sample staƟsƟcs. A possible
explanaƟon for this is that the sample data are aﬀected by selecƟon eﬀects, so that
those who take up full-Ɵme employment tend to have poorer opƟons if they were
to work part-Ɵme than current part-Ɵme works, and vice versa for current part-Ɵme
employees. Indeed, qualitaƟve data give some credence to this view. Fagan (2003),
for example, reports that approximately 1 in 5 employed people in Europe work full-
Ɵme when they would prefer to work part-Ɵme. The reasons most commonly given
for themis-match include the percepƟon that it would not be possible to do a desired
job part-Ɵme, that part-Ɵme employment is not oﬀered by a desired employer, and
that it would damage career prospects.
The second factor underlying the match obtained between the model and sample
moments of employment is the allowance for an experience eﬀect on future
prospects for the latent full-Ɵme wage. In the absence of this experience eﬀect, the
model tended to generate too liƩle employment parƟcipaƟon at the outset of the
working lifeƟme, as is common in the associated literature. Low (2005) points out
that a casual inspecƟon of the data shows that young workers tend to command a
low wage but have high parƟcipaƟon rates, whereas older workers have a higher
wage but lower parƟcipaƟon rates. It is diﬃcult to reconcile these stylised facts
with an intertemporal model of labour supply in which the age-earnings proﬁle is
determinisƟc. Both Low (2005) and French (2005) suggest that a possible explanaƟon
for the apparent inconsistency is the self-insurance moƟve where incomes are
stochasƟc. Individuals work hard when young to accumulate assets, which insure
them against wage uncertainty in later life. Yet the careful simulaƟons of Low (2005)
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suggest that this moƟve can only parƟally reconcile a life-cycle model with survey
data. We ﬁnd the same applies here.
One other anomaly that does present itself in Figure 2 is the jump up in the
proporƟons of adults choosing not to be employed at age 65 (pension age), which
is parƟcularly evident for couple households, and not as evident in the associated
survey data. In this regard, it is important to note that the model assumes that
all households access their pension wealth at age 65. In pracƟce, however, many
pension schemes make provisions for both early and late reƟrement, so that the
impact of pension eligibility tends to be concentrated in the simulaƟon model in a
way that it is not in the survey data.
As noted in SecƟon 4.2, the age proﬁles for the geometric means of consumpƟon
generated by the model were amended by adjusƟng the discount rate δ and
the parameter of relaƟve risk aversion 1=γ. Increasing the former of these tends
to Ɵlt the consumpƟon proﬁle up with age, and increasing the laƩer depresses
consumpƟon early in the working lifeƟme (when prospecƟve wage uncertainty is
high), and raises consumpƟon toward the end of theworking lifeƟme (as prospecƟve
wage uncertainty declines). The top two panels of Figure 3 indicate that the model
broadly matches the sample moments for geometric mean consumpƟon by age
calculated from survey data. For singles, the sample moments suggest that the age
proﬁle of consumpƟon starts out ﬂat, and then falls away in reƟrement; and for
couples, it rises to a discrete peak about age 50.We focusedmost of our eﬀort here in
trying to capture the peak at age 50 described for couples by the sample moments,
achieved by increasing both δ and 1=γ. Our scope for increasing δ was limited by
our desire not to obtain monotonically increasing consumpƟon proﬁles with age;
in relaƟon to relaƟve risk aversion we were also limited by what is considered
‘reasonable’ by the wider empirical literature. We return to alternaƟves that might
help to improve this aspect of the calibraƟon below.
The ﬁnal set of moments considered for the calibraƟon were the age speciﬁc
measures of the variance of log employment income and log consumpƟon,which are
reported respecƟvely in the lower halves of Figures 1 and 3. Note that the same set
of parameters were adjusted to match the simulaƟon model to these two separate
series of sample staƟsƟcs; the parameters controlling the variance of (log) latent full-
Ɵme wages. The lower panels of Figures 1 and 3 indicate that it was not possible to
match to both the variances described for employment income and the variances
of consumpƟon at the same Ɵme. We consequently opted to focus primarily upon
the variances for consumpƟon, bearing in mind that these have the most important
bearing on household saving and welfare. Hence, while the model substanƟally
overstates age speciﬁc variances of employment income described by survey data,
it broadly matches variances for household consumpƟon.
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Figure 2: Employment Rates  simulated versus sample moments
Notes: Sample statistics ― age profiles calculated using data from the Quarterly National Household Survey (April 2005)
Simulated statistics ― age profiles generated from model, using calibrated parameters reported in Table 5
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Figure 3: ConsumpƟon Proﬁles by Age  simulated versus survey data
0.0
100.0
200.0
300.0
400.0
500.0
600.0
700.0
800.0
900.0 €(2005) per
week
Geometric Mean - Singles
0.0
200.0
400.0
600.0
800.0
1000.0
1200.0
1400.0
1600.0
1800.0 €(2005) per
week
Geometric Mean - Couples
0.000
0.100
0.200
0.300
0.400
0.500
0.600
0.700
0.800
20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
Variance of log income - Singles
0.000
0.100
0.200
0.300
0.400
0.500
0.600
Variance of log income - Couples
20 30 40 50 60 70 80
age
Sample statistics Simulated statistics
age
Sample statistics Simulated statistics
age
Sample statistics Simulated statistics
20 30 40 50 60 70 80
age
Sample statistics Simulated statistics
20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
Notes: Sample statistics ― age profiles calculated using data from the Household Budget Survey (2004/2005)
Simulated statistics ― age profiles generated from model, using calibrated parameters reported in Table 5
A Framework for Pension Policy Analysis in Ireland: PENMOD, a Dynamic SimulaƟon Model j 77
6.3. Improving the model ﬁt
Three aspects of the model calibraƟon that is reported above appear to warrant
further aƩenƟon. First, the model obtains a very approximate ﬁt to the proﬁle of
age speciﬁc geometric means for consumpƟon. Second, the model fails to capture
the variances of employment income and consumpƟon simultaneously – we can
calibrate it only to one or the other of these two sets of staƟsƟcs. And third, the
model generates discrete shocks to labour supply and employment incomeabout the
assumed pension age that are not evident in survey data. The last of these appears
to be the most straighƞorward to address, and least concerning of the three; this
disparity is likely to disappear aŌer allowance is made for the more ﬂexible Ɵming
of pension dispersals that is oŌen possible in pracƟce. We consequently devote the
remainder of this secƟon to discussing the other two concerns that are noted above.
The relaƟonship between employment income and disposable income generated
by the model has a strong bearing upon the mismatch between the simulated and
sample moments for consumpƟon. Consider, for example, the associated staƟsƟcs
for disposable income that are reported in Figure 4. First, it is encouraging to note
that the simulated and sample geometric means are closely aligned to state pension
age, suggesƟng that the way that we have described the tax and beneﬁts funcƟon
during the working lifeƟme provides a decent reﬂecƟon of the pracƟcal reality. Two
key discrepancies do, however, emerge. First, although a close match is obtained to
the geometric means of employment income and disposable income, the variances
associatedwith these twodistribuƟons suggest that themodel tax funcƟon produces
greater redistribuƟon than is achieved in pracƟce. And secondly, there is a substanƟal
jump up in disposable income generated by the simulaƟon model at pension age
that is not displayed by the sample data. These two dispariƟes between the model
and the survey data are clearly consistent with the dispariƟes reported above for
consumpƟon, suggesƟng that a common set of distorƟonal factors is responsible for
both.
Disposable income in the model is comprised of employment income, property
income, and the inﬂuence of taxes and beneﬁts. As the disparity between the
dispersion of employment and disposable income is large throughout the simulated
lifeƟme – irrespecƟve of the temporal aspect of property income accrual – the
associated departure of the model from the staƟsƟcal record is likely aƩributable
to the applicaƟon of taxes and beneﬁts. Indeed, there is good reason to suppose
that this is true, given that the stylised nature of the simulaƟon model is ill-
adapted to providing a comprehensive descripƟon of the Irish tax and beneﬁts
system. At the most basic level, the model does not include a very wide range of
populaƟon characterisƟcs that have an important bearing on the transfer payments
to which individuals are eligible in pracƟce. These characterisƟcs include sickness,
injury, disability, and the number and age of dependant children in a household.
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Furthermore, the focus of the model on annual Ɵme increments means that it
is not possible to capture heterogeneity that depends on shorter Ɵme intervals,
such as part year unemployment and so on. Hence, it is to be expected that this
populaƟon heterogeneity that is unaccounted for in the model should result in
greater homogeneity of disposable income than is observed in pracƟce. Addressing
this disparity in a way that is computaƟonally feasible is an issue that remains for
further research.
In relaƟon to the spike up in disposable income that is generated by the simulaƟon
model at pension age, some progress may be made by allowing for the more ﬂexible
terms of pension fund dispersals, as discussed in the preceding subsecƟon. Yet, the
scale of the jump in disposable income suggests that the model is also generaƟng
excessive saving through pension assets (which produce an annuity income stream
from reƟrement). We intend to explore how the model matches to pension fund
parƟcipaƟon in future work.
Figure 4: Disposable Income Proﬁles by Age  simulated versus sample moments
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7. EXPLORING POLICY ISSUES
The model has been constructed in such a way as to allow a range of pension policy
issues to be analysed. These include the introducƟon of mandatory DC pensions,
changes in the indexaƟon of State pensions, changes in the State pension age,
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and changes in the level of State pension beneﬁts. In this secƟon we illustrate the
applicaƟon of the model by exploring trade-oﬀs between changes in the level of
State pension beneﬁts and changes in the age at which the State pension becomes
payable. Increases in the State pension age are widely viewed as a potenƟal element
of a strategy to cope with the demands of demographic ageing. If State Pension Age
does not rise to some extent in response to longer life expectancies, ﬁscal constraints
will imply that State pension beneﬁts will be lower than if pension ages do adjust to
life expectancy increases.
The model allows this trade oﬀ to be idenƟﬁed more precisely, taking account
of economic responses to the changed incenƟves which arise from diﬀering
combinaƟons of the level of beneﬁt and the age at which the State Pension
becomes payable. Here, we focus on the aggregate impact of a “grid” of policy
choices. It should be emphasised that none of these should be regarded as a policy
proposal or recommendaƟon. The purpose of this approach is to idenƟfy what
implicaƟons diﬀerent combinaƟons of beneﬁt levels and State Pension Age have for
the exchequer and for society. The level of the State pension payment is allowed to
vary between a high of e 230 per week – close to the current, 2011 values – and
a low of about e 170 per week. This “low” ﬁgure is about 5% below the value of
the State Pension in 2005, the data year, which is taken as the “base case” for the
analysis, and about 25% below the “high” value.
UnƟl recently, the State Pension Age had been set at 66 – but with a special
“reƟrement” or “transiƟonal” pension available at age 65, making 65 the eﬀecƟve
age at which a State Pension could be obtained. Under legislaƟon implemenƟng
aspects of the NaƟonal Pensions Framework, the State Pension Age is set to rise
to 66 in 2014, to 67 in 2021 and to 68 in 2028. Given these pending changes in State
Pension Age, we explore combinaƟons of diﬀerent beneﬁt levels with a State Pension
Age between 65 and 68.
The implicaƟons of diﬀering combinaƟons of State PensionAge andpension payment
levels for the government’s budget, for net private saving, for consumpƟon and for
employment are set out in Tables 6 to 9 below. It should be noted that the model
is geared towards generaƟng the long-term implicaƟons of a policy change, and the
staƟsƟcs reported here provide only a qualitaƟve indicaƟon of short run incenƟve
eﬀects.
Looking ﬁrst at the impact on the net budgetary posiƟon of the government (Table 6),
we see that the net tax take increases with state pension age, and decreases with the
generosity the SCP. Increasing state pension age by a year raises the net tax intake
by betweene 180m and e 255m per year. The higher are beneﬁt levels, the greater
the saving from an increase in the State Pension Age.
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Table 6: Impact onNet Government Budget, RelaƟve to Base Policy Scenario (Euromillions,
2005 prices, per annum)
value of State Contributory State Pension Age
Pension (e per week) 65 66 67 68
170 178.4 363.5 559.0 743.8
190 -179.3 33.3 251.8 459.7
210 -389.7 -177.0 59.1 287.6
230 -614.7 -381.3 -127.1 115.8
Note: Base simulaƟon assumes State Pension Age of 65
Note: and value of contributory pension of 180 per week
Table 7: Impact on ConsumpƟon, RelaƟve to Base Policy Scenario (Euro millions, 2005
prices, per annum)
value of State Contributory State Pension Age
Pension (e per week) 65 66 67 68
170 -139.2 -301.2 -457.6 -610.0
190 139.7 -36.8 -208.7 -381.0
210 428.0 216.1 29.7 -155.3
230 686.6 469.0 268.1 68.2
Note: Base simulaƟon assumes State Pension Age of 65
Note: and value of contributory pension of 180 per week
Increasing the payment rate of the SCP by e 10 per week leads to a net increase
in exchequer costs of between e 85m and e 180m per year. The cost increase is
naturally lower when the State Pension Age is higher; an equal-valued increase in
beneﬁt also turns out to be less expensive, in terms of exchequer cost, at higher
levels of beneﬁt.
The broad import of these ﬁndings is that, in a steady state situaƟon, a given
budgetary envelope for pensions can be compaƟble with a high pension age and a
low payment rate, or a higher payment rate with a low pension age.. For example, a
rise from the base case (2005 levels) ofe 180 perweek toe 190 perweek, combined
with an increase in the pension age from 65 to 66, would be broadly neutral for
the Exchequer. Thus, raising the pension age by a single year is compaƟble a higher
payment level in a budgetary neutral policy change – or can allow the maintenance
of exisƟng levels when public ﬁnances are under sustained short and medium term
pressure.
Comparing Tables 6 and 7 reveals that the impact of the considered policy
counterfactuals on aggregate domesƟc consumpƟon is an inverted relaƟon of the
impact on the government budget. Hence, increased government saving can be
interpreted as a form of enforced private saving, and vice versa, an observaƟon that
is parƟcularly evident in wake of the 2008 ﬁnancial crisis.
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The eﬀects on aggregate labour supply of the policy counterfactuals, reported in
Table 8, have the expected signs, indicaƟng increased employment as the generosity
of state pensions is reduced, and as the state pension age is increased. It is
noteworthy that the (long-run) eﬀects on the duraƟon of the working lifeƟme of
increasing state pension age that are projected by the model are much smaller than
is commonly assumed in the policy debate. The duraƟon of the working lifeƟme is
projected to increase by between 0.1 and 0.2 years for each year that state pension
age is increased, with the eﬀect rising with the generosity of state pensions. This is
in contrast to the common assumpƟon that a one year increase in state penion age
will lead to an equivalent shiŌ in labour market exit rates (implying an equivalent
increase in the average duraƟon of the working lifeƟme).21
An important factor underlying this result is that it reﬂects a long-run eﬀect in which
individuals are considered to foresee the higher state pension age from the beginning
of their working lifeƟmes, and adapt their savings behaviour to accommodate the
change (returned to below). This highlights the capacity of a dynamicmodel to reveal
trade-oﬀs in behaviour thatmight not be obvious at ﬁrst glance, and to provide some
quanƟtaƟve detail around those trade-oﬀs.When interpreƟng this interesƟng result,
however, a number of addiƟonal factors should also be borne in mind:
1. Themodel does not account for the “signal” eﬀect that the state pension agemay
have on individual expectaƟons and planning in pracƟce.
2. The model is calibrated to declining wages later in the working lifeƟme, and this
decline is projected on current work proﬁles, so that these proﬁles may feed
indirectly into work incenƟves in the policy counterfactual.We have aƩempted to
control for this type of eﬀect, both in the general approach to calibraƟon (which
is designed to take endogenous account of selecƟon eﬀects), and by imposing
smooth age trends from reasonably early on in the working lifeƟme (age 45 for
singles and 55 for couples).
3. The employment proﬁles of singles, in parƟcular, do not respond very strongly to
the policy environment.
The sensiƟvity of the model-based results shown here needs to be tested using
alternaƟve assumpƟons about the formaƟon of decisions on reƟrement, and how
they may be inﬂuenced by increases in State Pension Age (SPA). There are, however,
a number of consideraƟons that argue against the simple assumpƟon that average
21 In an assessment of the impacts of pension reforms enacted in the UK in 2011, for example, the Department
for Work and Pensions assumed that the announcement of a one year increase in the state pension age of
men would “increase the age at which males would exit the labour market from age 55 onwards; for instance,
a 66 year-old man would adopt the exit rate from the labour market currently adopted by a 65-year old”
Department for Work & Pensions (2011), p. 11, paragraph 28.
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reƟrement ages will increase 1 for 1 with increases in SPA. Such consideraƟons
include:
1. If labour market producƟvity and/or wages tend to decline later in life.
2. If the desire and/or capacity to undertake work tends to decline later in life.
3. If the system of private (personal and occupaƟonal) pensions and alternaƟve
reƟrement saving vehicles provide suﬃcient funds tomeet the expenditure needs
of individuals later in life, and may be drawn upon prior to state pension age.
In the long run, these consideraƟons suggest that the burden of an increase in state
pension age is likely to be shared between lower consumpƟon and decreased leisure.
Table 8: Impact on Employment, RelaƟve to Base Policy Scenario (average years)
value of State Contributory State Pension Age
Pension (e per week) 65 66 67 68
170 0.09 0.22 0.37 0.50
190 -0.09 0.07 0.24 0.40
210 -0.25 -0.06 0.13 0.30
230 -0.35 -0.16 0.05 0.25
Note: Base simulaƟon assumes State Pension Age of 65
Note: and value of contributory pension of 180 per week
Table 9: Impact on Net Private Saving, RelaƟve to Base Policy Scenario (Euro billions, 2005
prices)
value of State Contributory State Pension Age
Pension (e per week) 65 66 67 68
170 3.9 3.1 1.7 1.0
190 -4.2 -4.7 -5.6 -6.9
210 -11.2 -12.4 -13.5 -14.8
230 -18.6 -19.2 -20.4 -22.2
Note: Base simulaƟon assumes State Pension Age of 65
Note: and value of contributory pension of 180 per week
Private savings responses to the policy counterfactuals (Table 9) are the product of
two consideraƟons:
1. The need for private saving is reduced by increases in the generosity of state
reƟrement beneﬁts; in this case state beneﬁts act as a subsƟtute for private
saving.
2. The need for private saving is reduced as the age of reƟrement increases.
These consideraƟons work in opposite direcƟons when increases in state pension
age are coupled with higher beneﬁts. Changes in the State Pension Age operate at
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the margin, while changes in levels of beneﬁt aﬀect all pensioners. As a result, the
laƩer eﬀect tends to dominate.
8. CONCLUSION
In this paper we describe how the NaƟonal InsƟtute’s NIBAX model – a model well
suited to the analysis of issues regarding household savings, including pensions,
labour supply and asset allocaƟon – has been adapted and calibrated to Irish
circumstances. The model is an advanced tool, which has been tried and tested
both in the policy sphere (in work for the UK Revenue authoriƟes) and in top-
level academic journals. Given the large infrastructural investment in building such
models, adaptaƟon via calibraƟon represents a promising way of making this
analyƟcal approach available to a wider policy context.
Dynamic microsimulaƟon models are essenƟal in tracing the impact of changes in
pension policy over the life course. The nature of thesemodels is quite diﬀerent from
the more familiar staƟc tax beneﬁt models. The need to model decisions over an
individual’s lifeƟme means that the characterisaƟon of the policy and labour market
environment needs to be much more streamlined than in simpler “snapshot” or
cross-secƟon analyses.
The data and methods used to calibrate the model to Irish circumstances have been
described, and the strategic simpliﬁcaƟons used in characterising the tax andwelfare
systems, pension regimes and the labour market have been outlined. CalibraƟon
results indicate that the model does now capture many key features of the Irish
system, including the paƩerns of labour market parƟcipaƟon and of wage income
over the life-course.
A brief policy analysis suggests that increasing the state reƟrement age in absence of
other labour market reforms may deliver a smaller improvement in the government
budget than is commonly assumed in the contemporary policy literature. Although
the signiﬁcance of this ﬁnding is diﬃcult to overstate in the current policy
environment, the analysis reported here only touches upon the subjects of study that
are made possible by the model. We look forward to expanding upon this analysis
in future work. One of the prioriƟes for future analysis is the impact of changes
in the tax treatment of superannuaƟon contribuƟons, along the lines proposed in
the NaƟonal Pensions Framework (Department of Social and Family Aﬀairs, 2010).
Analysis using the present model can help to examine the potenƟal impact of such
changes on pension coverage at diﬀerent income levels, taking into account theways
in which both age and income tend to inﬂuence decisions regarding pensions.
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A. List of Variables and Parameters
Preference Parameters
Ui; t expected lifeƟme uƟlity of household i at age t
Et expectaƟons operator evaluated at age t
1=γ coeﬃcient of risk aversion
ϵ elasƟcity of subsƟtuƟon between equivalised consumpƟon and leisure
β1;2 short-run quasi-hyperbolic discount parameters
δ long-run (exponenƟal) discount rate
ζa;b warm-glow bequest parameters
Ages
T maximum possible duraƟon of life
tSPA state pension age
tER early reƟrement age
tD age at which all debts must be repaid
ConsumpƟon and Demographics
ci; t discreƟonary composite consumpƟon of household i at age t
li; t proporƟon of Ɵme spent in leisure of household i at age t
l FTi; t leisure Ɵme of single adult, full-Ɵme employed
lPTi; t leisure Ɵme of single adult, part-Ɵme employed
l2FTi; t leisure Ɵme of adult couple, both full-Ɵme employed
lFtPti; t leisure Ɵme of adult couple, one full-Ɵme and one part-Ɵme employed
lFtNei; t leisure Ɵme of adult couple, one full-Ɵme and one not employed
lPtNei; t leisure Ɵme of adult couple, one part-Ɵme and one not employed
θi; t equivalence scale of household i at age t
nai; t number of adults in household i at age t
nci; t number of children in household i at age t
φj t;t probability of surviving to age j, given survival to age t
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Wealth and Pensions
wi; t net liquid wealth of household i at age t
w+i; t non-negaƟve net liquid wealth balance of household i at age t
wsi; t safe liquid assets of household i at age t
wri; t risky liquid assets of household i at age t
nui; t proporƟon of liquid wealth invested in the risky asset by household i at age t
wp=oi; t wealth held in personal / occupaƟonal pension of household i at age t
rsi; t return on safe liquid assets of household i at age t
rrt return on risky assets at age t
rp=ot return to personal / occupaƟonal pension wealth at age t
πdiv proporƟon of liquid wealth lost upon marital dissoluƟon prior to tSPA
Dt credit constraint on liquid net worth at age t
πpc=oc private contribuƟon rate to personal / occupaƟonal pensions
πp=ol lower bound on labour income to contribute to personal / occupaƟonal pensions
πpu upper bound on labour income to contribute to personal pensions
πp=oec employer (and government) contribuƟon rate to personal / occupaƟonal pensions
πl=p=oa propn of liquid / personal pension / occupaƟonal pension wealth annuiƟsed at tSPA
πpe proporƟon of pension contribuƟons that is tax exempt
πpt proporƟon of pension annuity income that is taxable
πppenalty_a “account opening” cost on ﬁrst contribuƟons to personal pension
πppenalty_b “investment cost” for choosing a contribuƟon rate diﬀerent from π
p
c_default
Income
τi; t net tax and beneﬁt (disposable) income of household i at age t
xi; t non-property income of household i at age t
yi; t property income of household i at age t
pcp=oi; t private contribuƟons to private / occupaƟonal pensions of household i at age t
gi; t labour income of household i at age t
pi; t pension annuity income of household i at age t
hi; t latent wage of household i at age t
mi; t wage growth parameter of household i at age t
ψi; t intertemporal persistence of earnings of household i at age t
κi; t experience eﬀect on earnings of household i at age t
woi; t wage oﬀer idenƟﬁer
pwoi; t probability of household i receiving a wage oﬀer at age t
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B. MaximisaƟon of Expected LifeƟme UƟlity
The intertemporal preference relaƟon, as deﬁned by equaƟon (1), is:
Ut =
1
1  1=γ
n
u1 1=γt + Et
h
β1δ

φtu
1 1=γ
t+1 + (1  φt)
 
ζa + ζbw+t+1
1 1=γ
+
+β1β2
TX
j=t+2
δj t

φj t;tu
1 1=γ
j + (1  φj t;t)

ζa + ζbw+j
1 1=γ359=; (16)
where the individual subscripts i have been suppressed, φt = φ1;t, and ut =
u

ci; t
θi; t ; li; t

. Deﬁne:
Wt =
1
1  1=γ
24u1 1=γt + Et TX
j=t+1
δj t

φj t;tu
1 1=γ
j + (1  φj t;t)

ζa + ζbw+j
1 1=γ35
=
1
1  1=γ u
1 1=γ
t + δEt

φtWt+1 +
(1  φt)
(1  1=γ)
 
ζa + ζbw+t+1
1 1=γ
Then:
Ut =
1
1  1=γ u
1 1=γ
t + Et
 β1δ
(1  1=γ)

φtu
1 1=γ
t+1 + (1  φt)
 
ζa + ζbw+t+1
1 1=γ
+
+ β1β2δ2
 
φ2;tWt+2 +
 
1  φ2;t

(1  1=γ)
 
ζa + ζbw+t+2
1 1=γ!#
and if β1 = β2 = 1, then:
Ut = Wt =
1
1  1=γ u
1 1=γ
t + δEt

φtUt+1 +
(1  φt)
(1  1=γ)
 
ζa + ζbw+t+1
1 1=γ
The value funcƟon describes expected lifeƟme uƟlity as a funcƟon of the state
variables at any given Ɵme, t, on the assumpƟon that opƟmal choices are made and
condiƟonal on being alive at the start of Ɵme t.22 Deﬁne but as the value of intra-
temporal uƟlity at Ɵme t, speciﬁed as a funcƟon of the state variables in Ɵme t, and
condiƟonal on the opƟmising decisions at Ɵme t. Similarly, deﬁne bWt as the value
of Wt, given the state variables at Ɵme t, evaluated at the sequence of opƟmising
decisions for all t  j  T. Then the value funcƟon at Ɵme t is deﬁned by:
22 Hence, the value funcƟon is a funcƟonal of the opƟmised decision stream.
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Vt = maxψ
 1
1  1=γ u
1 1=γ
t + Et
 β1δ
(1  1=γ)

φtbu1 1=γt+1 + (1  φt)  ζa + ζbw+t+11 1=γ +
+ β1β2δ2
 
φ2;t bWt+2 +  1  φ2;t(1  1=γ)  ζa + ζbw+t+21 1=γ
!#)
where ψ is the set of decision alternaƟves available at Ɵme t.
To ensure that the value funcƟon is posiƟve, it is recorded by the model in the form
of the following monotonic transformaƟon of equaƟon (16):
Zt = (1  1=γ)V
1
1 1=γ
t (17)
B.1. Final period of life: t = T
Variables
In the ﬁnal period of life, the household’s decision is limited to their period speciﬁc
consumpƟon. As the opportunity to work or to invest in risky assets is not permiƩed,
and as death in the following period is certain, there is no uncertainty associatedwith
the maximisaƟon problem in this period. Here, we have:
state variables t: wt; pt; nat
control variables t: ct
state variables t+ 1: wt+1
Value funcƟon
The value funcƟon, Vt, is deﬁned by:
Vt = maxct Ut subject to: (18)
wt+1 = wt + τt   ct (19)
ct  cmaxt (20)
cmaxt = wt + τt (21)
where cmaxt enforces the lower limit of zero considered for net liquid wealth where
a household is subject to a certain probability of death.
Euler condiƟon (if β1 = β2 = 1)
Euler condiƟons are only calculated if quasi-hyperbolic discounƟng is suppressed
(β1 = β2 = 1). In this case, the Euler condiƟon associated with the period T
maximisaƟon problem is:
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@Vt
@ct
=
@ut
@ct
u 1=γt   δζb
 
ζa + ζbw+t+1
 1=γ  0 (22)
Backward inducƟon intermediates
If soluƟons are based upon Euler condiƟons, then the following diﬀerenƟal terms
are also calculated for reference by the backward inducƟon procedure that is used
to evaluate soluƟons at t < T:
@Vt
@wt
=
@Vt
@ct
@cmaxt
@wt
+ δζb (ζa + ζbwt+1) 1=γ
@wt+1
@wt
(23)
@cmaxt
@wt
= (1+ ptrt) (24)
@wt+1
@wt
= (1+ ptrt) (25)
@Vt
@pt
=
@Vt
@ct
@cmaxt
@pt
+ δζb (ζa + ζbwt+1) 1=γ
@wt+1
@pt
(26)
@cmaxt
@pt
=
 
1  πpt + πptmpyt

(27)
@wt+1
@pt
=
 
1  πpt + πptmpyt

(28)
where ptrt denotes the post-tax return to savings received by the household in
period t, andmpyt denotes marginal post-tax income (@τ=@x).
If quasi-hyperbolic preferences are considered and β2 6= 1, then bXt =
Et

1
(1 1=γ)
 
ζa + ζbw+t+1
1 1=γ and but are stored separately to permit evaluaƟon
of the value funcƟon in period t = T   1. Otherwise, if β1 6= 1 but β2 = 1, thenbYt = but + δEt  ζa + ζbw+t+11 1=γ is calculated and stored.
B.2. From State Pensionable Age: tSPA  t < T
Variables
During this period, a household can choose their consumpƟon, labour supply, and
the proporƟon of their liquid wealth that is invested in a risky asset, νt. Here, we
have:23
state variables t: wt; pt; ht; nat
control variables t: ct; νt; lt
state variables t+ 1: wt+1; pt+1; ht+1; nat+1
23 In period T, hT is omiƩed from the decision problem.
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Value funcƟon
Vt = maxct;νt;lt
 1
1  1=γ u
1 1=γ
t + Et
 β1δ
(1  1=γ)

φtbu1 1=γt+1 + (1  φt)  ζa + ζbw+t+11 1=γ +
+ β1β2δ2φtbXt+1io (29)
wt+1 = min

wmaxt+1 ;max

wmint+1; w^t+1
		
(30)
pt+1 = min

pmaxt+1 ; p^t+1
	
(31)
ht+1 = min

hmaxt+1 ;max

hmint+1;H
 
t; ht; nat ; nat+1; lt;ωt
		
(32)
nat+1 = Na (t; nat ; ϵat ) (33)
0  ν  1 (34)
ct  cmaxt (35)
w^t+1 = wt + τt   ct (36)
p^t+1 =
πs + (1  πs) (nat+1   1)
πs + (1  πs) (nat   1)

pt (37)
cmaxt = wt + τmint   wmint+1 (38)
where H (:) denotes the intertemporal evoluƟon of a household’s latent wage (as
deﬁned by equaƟon (10)), and Na (:) deﬁnes the intertemporal development of
relaƟonship status (as deﬁned by equaƟon (11)). We do not impose an upper bound
on the loss that may be incurred when invesƟng in the risky asset. Two assumpƟons
ensure that net liquid wealth never falls below themaximum debt that is considered
for analysis. First, we assume that the consumpƟon decision is subject to an upper
bound, cmaxt , to limit the probability that the upper boundondebtwill be breached.24
Second, given the upper limit on consumpƟon, we assume that the government
provides an income top-up to enforce the lower bound on net liquid wealth (as
is implied by the speciﬁcaƟon of the intertemporal evoluƟon of wealth deﬁned by
equaƟon (30)).
EquaƟon (30) alsomakes clear thatwe assume that a 100%wealth tax is levied on any
wealth accrued beyond themaximum thresholdwmaxt+1 . Similar assumpƟons aremade
in relaƟon to the pension annuity and wage state variables, so that the evaluaƟon of
expected uƟlity does not require grid extrapolaƟons. We avoid extrapolaƟng outside
of the state-space deﬁned by the grids considered for analysis, as we have found this
to be an important source of error in previous work. The upper bound on wealth
24 Hence τmint is set so that the probability of τt < τmint is small. In pracƟce, we evaluate τmint on the basis of the
worst case scenario implied by the abscissae of the Gaussian quadrature that is used to evaluate expectaƟons
in the model.
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by age is determined endogenously by the model, based on the grid limits that are
assumed for labour income. The user should consequently specify an upper bound
on labour income that is suﬃciently high to capture extremes observed in pracƟce.
Euler condiƟons (if β1 = β2 = 1)
A local opƟmum over the decision set (ct; νt) is calculated for each discrete labour
opƟon, and the decision set (ct; νt; lt) is then selected to maximise the associated
value funcƟon. SoluƟon for each (ct; νt) combinaƟon is based upon the Euler
condiƟons deﬁned by:
@Vt
@ct
=
@ut
@ct
u 1=γt + δEt

φt
@Vt+1
@wt+1
+ (1  φt) ζb
 
ζa + ζbw+t+1
 1=γ Φt+1 @wt+1
@ct

 0
(39)
@wt+1
@ct
=
( 1 if wmint+1  w^t+1  wmaxt+1
0 otherwise
(40)
@Vt
@νt
=
@Vt
@ct
@cmaxt
@νt
+ δEt

φt
@Vt+1
@wt+1
+ (1  φt) ζb
 
ζa + ζbw+t+1
 1=γ Φt+1 @wt+1
@νt

R 0
(41)
@cmaxt
@νt
= mpymint

rr;mint   rst

wt (42)
@wt+1
@νt
=
(
mpyt (rrt   rst)wt if wmint+1  w^t+1  wmaxt+1
0 otherwise
(43)
where Φt+1 is a dummy variable that is equal to one when wt+1  0, and is zero
otherwise. mpymin and rr;min deﬁne the values of mpy and rr used to calculate
τmin.25 Note that the Euler condiƟons used to idenƟfy the (locally) opƟmal values
of c and ν make reference to @Vt+1=@wt+1; this term is evaluated by interpolaƟon
with reference to the model soluƟons obtained for period t+ 1.
Backward inducƟon intermediates
Where Euler condiƟons are considered then the following terms are calculated and
stored:
@Vt
@wt
=
@Vt
@ct
@cmaxt
@wt
+ δEt

φt
@Vt+1
@wt+1
+ (1  φt) ζb
 
ζa + ζbw+t+1
 1=γ Φt+1 @wt+1
@wt

(44)
25 Where ct is not bound, then the evaluaƟon of @cmax=@ν does not inﬂuence equaƟon (41), as @V=@c = 0.
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@cmaxt
@wt
=
 
1+ ptrmint

(45)
@wt+1
@wt
=
(
(1+ ptrt) if wmint+1  w^t+1  wmaxt+1
0 otherwise
(46)
@Vt
@pt
=
@Vt
@ct
@cmaxt
@pt
+ δEt

φt
@Vt+1
@wt+1
+ (1  φt) ζb
 
ζa + ζbw+t+1
 1=γ Φt+1 @wt+1
@pt
+
+φt
@Vt+1
@pt+1
@pt+1
@pt

(47)
@cmaxt
@pt
=
 
1  πpt + πptmpymint

(48)
@wt+1
@pt
=
(
(1  πpt + πptmpyt) if wmint+1  w^t+1  wmaxt+1
0 otherwise
(49)
@pt+1
@pt
=
8<:
πs+(1 πs)(nat+1 1)
πs+(1 πs)(nat 1)

if p^t+1  pmaxt+1
0 otherwise
(50)
where ptrmin denotes the post-tax rate of return to net liquidwealth used to evaluate
the upper bound imposed on ct.
As above, if quasi-hyperbolic preferences are considered and β2 6= 1, then but and
bXt = Etφt bWt+1 + (1  φt)(1  1=γ)  ζa + ζbw+t+11 1=γ

are stored separately to permit evaluaƟon of the value funcƟon in period t   1.
Otherwise, if β1 6= 1 but β2 = 1, then
bYt = but + δEt (1  1=γ)φt bWt+1 + (1  φt)  ζa + ζbw+t+11 1=γ
is calculated and stored.
B.3. Period prior to State Pensionable Age: t = tSPA   1
Variables
During this period, a household can choose their consumpƟon, labour supply, private
pension contribuƟon, and investment in a risky asset. Here, we have:
state variables t: wt;wot ;wpt ; ht; nat ; nkt
control variables t: ct; νt; πpct ; lt
state variables t+ 1: wt+1; pt+1; ht+1; nat+1
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Value funcƟon
Vt = max
ct;νt;πpct ;lt
 1
1  1=γ u
1 1=γ
t + Et
 β1δ
(1  1=γ)

φtbu1 1=γt+1 + (1  φt)  ζa + ζbw+t+11 1=γ +
+ β1β2δ2φtbXt+1io (51)
wt+1 = min

wmaxt+1 ;max

wmint+1; wt+1
		
(52)
pt+1 = min

pmaxt+1 ; pt+1
	
(53)
ht+1 = min

hmaxt+1 ;max

hmint+1;H
 
t; ht; nat ; lt; nat+1;ωt
		
(54)
nat+1 = Na (t; nat ; ϵat ) (55)
0  νt  1 (56)
πpcl  πpct  πpcu (57)
ct  cmaxt (58)
w^t+1 = wt + τt   ct (59)
wt+1 = min fw^t+1; 0g+ (1  πla)max f0; w^t+1g+ (1  πoa)wot+1 + (1  πpa)wpt+1 (60)
pt+1 = χ(πlamax f0; w^t+1g+ πoawot+1 + πpawpt+1) (61)
wot+1 = (1+ rot )wot + (πoc + πoec) gtΦ00t (62)
wpt+1 =
 
1+ rpt

wpt +
 
πpct + πpec

(gt   πpl )Φ0t (63)
cmaxt = wt + τmint + (1  πoa)wo;mint+1 +
 
1  πpa

wp;mint+1   wmint+1 (64)
where Φ0t is a dummy variable that equals one when πpl  gt  πpu and zero
otherwise, and Φ00t is a dummy variable that equals one when πol  gt and zero
otherwise.
Euler condiƟons (if β1 = β2 = 1)
A local opƟmum is calculated with respect to the decision set
 
ct; νt; πpct

for each
discrete labour opƟon, and the decision set
 
ct; νt; πpct ; lt

is selected to maximise
the associated value funcƟon. SoluƟon for each
 
ct; νt; πpct

combinaƟon is based
upon the Euler condiƟons deﬁned by:
@Vt
@ct
=
@ut
@ct
u 1=γt + δEt

φt
@Vt+1
@wt+1
@wt+1
@ct
+ φt
@Vt+1
@pt+1
@pt+1
@ct
+
+ (1  φt) ζb
 
ζa + ζbw+t+1
 1=γ Φt+1@wt+1
@ct

 0 (65)
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@wt+1
@ct
=
8>>>>>>><>>>>>>>:
0 if wt+1 < wmint+1
 1 if wmint+1  wt+1  wmaxt+1 and w^t+1 < 0
   1  πla if wmint+1  wt+1  wmaxt+1 and w^t+1  0
0 if wmaxt+1 < wt+1
(66)
@pt+1
@ct
=
8>>><>>>:
0 if pt+1  pmaxt+1 and w^t+1 < 0
 χπla if pt+1  pmaxt+1 and w^t+1  0
0 if pmaxt+1 < pt+1
(67)
@Vt
@νt
=
@Vt
@ct
@cmaxt
@νt
+ δEt

φt
@Vt+1
@wt+1
@wt+1
@νt
+ φt
@Vt+1
@pt+1
@pt+1
@νt
+
+ (1  φt) ζb
 
ζa + ζbw+t+1
 1=γ Φt+1@wt+1
@νt

R 0 (68)
@cmaxt
@νt
= mpymint

rr;mint   rst

wt (69)
@wt+1
@νt
=
8>>>>>>><>>>>>>>:
0 if wt+1 < wmint+1
mpyt (rrt   rst)wt if wmint+1  wt+1  wmaxt+1 and w^t+1 < 0 
1  πla

mpyt (rrt   rst)wt if wmint+1  wt+1  wmaxt+1 and w^t+1  0
0 if wmaxt+1 < wt+1
(70)
@pt+1
@νt
=
8>>><>>>:
0 if pt+1  pmaxt+1 and w^t+1 < 0
χπlampyt (rrt   rst)wt if pt+1  pmaxt+1 and w^t+1  0
0 if pmaxt+1 < pt+1
(71)
@Vt
@πpct
=
@Vt
@ct
@cmaxt
@πpct
+ δEt

φt
@Vt+1
@wt+1
@wt+1
@πpct
+ φt
@Vt+1
@pt+1
@pt+1
@πpct
+
+ (1  φt) ζb
 
ζa + ζbw+t+1
 1=γ Φt+1@wt+1
@πpct

R 0 (72)
@cmaxt
@πpct
=
@τmint
@πpct
(73)
@wt+1
@πpct
=
8>>>>>>><>>>>>>>:
0 if wt+1 < wmint+1
@τt
@πpct
+
 
1  πpa
  
gt   πpl

Φ0t if wmint+1  wt+1  wmaxt+1 and w^t+1 < 0 
1  πla

@τt
@πpct
+
 
1  πpa
  
gt   πpl

Φ0t if wmint+1  wt+1  wmaxt+1 and w^t+1  0
0 if wmaxt+1 < wt+1
(74)
@pt+1
@πpct
=
8>>><>>>:
χπpa
 
gt   πpl

Φ0t if pt+1  pmaxt+1 and w^t+1 < 0
χ
h
πla @τt@πpct + π
p
a
 
gt   πpl

Φ0t
i
if pt+1  pmaxt+1 and w^t+1  0
0 if pmaxt+1 < pt+1
(75)
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Backward inducƟon intermediates
Where Euler condiƟons are considered then the following terms are calculated and
stored:
@Vt
@wt
=
@Vt
@ct
@cmaxt
@wt
+ δEt

φt
@Vt+1
@wt+1
@wt+1
@wt
+ φt
@Vt+1
@pt+1
@pt+1
@wt
+
+ (1  φt) ζb
 
ζa + ζbw+t+1
 1=γ Φt+1@wt+1
@wt

(76)
@cmaxt
@wt
= (1+ ptrmint ) (77)
@wt+1
@wt
=
8>>>>>>><>>>>>>>:
0 if wt+1 < wmint+1
(1+ ptrt) if wmint+1  wt+1  wmaxt+1 and w^t+1 < 0 
1  πla

(1+ ptrt) if wmint+1  wt+1  wmaxt+1 and w^t+1  0
0 if wmaxt+1 < wt+1
(78)
@pt+1
@wt
=
8>>><>>>:
0 if pt+1  pmaxt+1 and w^t+1 < 0
χπla (1+ ptrt) if pt+1  pmaxt+1 and w^t+1  0
0 if pmaxt+1 < pt+1
(79)
@Vt
@wpt
=
@Vt
@ct
@cmaxt
@wpt
+ δEt

φt
@Vt+1
@wt+1
@wt+1
@wpt
+ φt
@Vt+1
@pt+1
@pt+1
@wpt
+
+ (1  φt) ζb
 
ζa + ζbw+t+1
 1=γ Φt+1@wt+1
@wpt

(80)
@cmaxt
@wpt
=
 
1  πpa

(1+ rp;mint ) (81)
@wt+1
@wpt
=
( 1  πpa  1+ rpt  if wmint+1  wt+1  wmaxt+1
0 otherwise
(82)
@pt+1
@wpt
=
( χπpa  1+ rpt  if pt+1  pmaxt+1
0 otherwise
(83)
If quasi-hyperbolic preferences are considered and β2 6= 1, then but and
bXt = Etφt bWt+1 + (1  φt)(1  1=γ)  ζa + ζbw+t+11 1=γ

are stored separately to permit evaluaƟon of the value funcƟon in period t   1.
Otherwise, if β1 6= 1 but β2 = 1, then
bYt = but + δEt (1  1=γ)φt bWt+1 + (1  φt)  ζa + ζbw+t+11 1=γ
is calculated and stored.
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B.4. Period t < tSPA   1
Variables
Here, we have:
state variables t: wt;wot ;wpt ; ht; nat ; nkt
control variables t: ct; νt; πpct ; lt
state variables t+ 1: wt+1;wot+1;w
p
t+1; ht+1; nat+1; nkt+1
Value funcƟon
Vt = max
ct;νt;πpct ;lt
 1
1  1=γ u
1 1=γ
t + Et
 β1δ
(1  1=γ)

φtbu1 1=γt+1 + (1  φt)  ζa + ζbw+t+11 1=γ +
+ β1β2δ2φtbXt+1io (84)
wt+1 = min

wmaxt+1 ;max

wmint+1; w^t+1
		
(85)
wot+1 = min

wo;maxt+1 ; w^ot+1
	
(86)
wpt+1 = min

wp;maxt+1 ; w^
p
t+1
	
(87)
ht+1 = min

hmaxt+1 ;max

hmint+1;H
 
t; ht; nat ; lt; nat+1;ωt
		
(88)
nat+1 = Na (t; nat ; ϵat ) (89)
nkt+1 = Nk

t; nat+1; nkt ; ϵkt

(90)
0  νt  1 (91)
πpcl  πpct  πpcu (92)
ct  cmaxt (93)
w^t+1 = wt + τt   ct (94)
w^ot+1 = (1+ rot )wot + (πoc + πoec) gtΦ00t (95)
w^pt+1 =
 
1+ rpt

wpt +
 
πpct + πpec

(gt   πpl )Φ0t (96)
cmaxt = wt + τmint   wmint+1 (97)
Euler condiƟons (if β1 = β2 = 1)
A local opƟmum is calculated with respect to the decision set
 
ct; νt; πpct

for each
discrete labour opƟon, and the decision set
 
ct; νt; πpct ; lt

is selected to maximise
the associated value funcƟon. SoluƟon for each
 
ct; νt; πpct

combinaƟon is based
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upon the Euler condiƟons deﬁned by:
@Vt
@ct
=
@ut
@ct
u 1=γt + δEt

φt
@Vt+1
@wt+1
@wt+1
@ct
+ (1  φt) ζb
 
ζa + ζbw+t+1
 1=γ Φt+1@wt+1
@ct

 0
(98)
@wt+1
@ct
=
( 1 if wmint+1  w^t+1  wmaxt+1
0 otherwise
(99)
@Vt
@νt
=
@Vt
@ct
@cmaxt
@νt
+ δEt

φt
@Vt+1
@wt+1
@wt+1
@νt
+ (1  φt) ζb
 
ζa + ζbw+t+1
 1=γ Φt+1@wt+1
@νt

R 0
(100)
@cmaxt
@νt
= mpymint

rr;mint   rst

wt (101)
@wt+1
@νt
=
(mpyt (rrt   rst)wt if wmint+1  w^t+1  wmaxt+1
0 otherwise
(102)
@Vt
@πpct
=
@Vt
@ct
@cmaxt
@πpct
+ δEt
(
φt
@Vt+1
@wt+1
@wt+1
@πpct
+ φt
@Vt+1
@wpt+1
@wpt+1
@πpct
+
+ (1  φt) ζb
 
ζa + ζbw+t+1
 1=γ Φt+1@wt+1
@πpct

R 0 (103)
@cmaxt
@πpct
=
@τmint
@πpct
(104)
@wt+1
@πpct
=
8<:
@τt
@πpct
if wmint+1  w^t+1  wmaxt+1
0 otherwise
(105)
@wpt+1
@πpct
=
( gt   πpl Φ0t if w^pt+1  wp;maxt+1
0 otherwise
(106)
Backward inducƟon intermediates
Where Euler condiƟons are considered then the following terms are calculated and
stored:
@Vt
@wt
=
@Vt
@ct
@cmaxt
@wt
+ δEt

φt
@Vt+1
@wt+1
@wt+1
@wt
+ (1  φt) ζb
 
ζa + ζbw+t+1
 1=γ Φt+1@wt+1
@wt

(107)
@cmaxt
@wt
= (1+ ptrmint ) (108)
@wt+1
@wt
=
(
(1+ ptrt) if wmint+1  w^t+1  wmaxt+1
0 otherwise
(109)
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@Vt
@wpt
= δEt
(
φt
@Vt+1
@wpt+1
@wpt+1
@wpt
)
(110)
@wpt+1
@wpt
=
( 1+ rpt  if w^pt+1  wp;maxt+1
0 otherwise
(111)
If quasi-hyperbolic preferences are considered and β2 6= 1, then but and
bXt = Etφt bWt+1 + (1  φt)(1  1=γ)  ζa + ζbw+t+11 1=γ

are stored separately to permit evaluaƟon of the value funcƟon in period t   1.
Otherwise, if β1 6= 1 but β2 = 1, then
bYt = but + δEt (1  1=γ)φt bWt+1 + (1  φt)  ζa + ζbw+t+11 1=γ
is calculated and stored.
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C. Data Sources
C.1. Household Budget Survey
The Household Budget Survey of 2004/2005 gathered data on the expenditure
paƩerns, and socio-demographic composiƟon, of just under 6,900 households.
(A household was deﬁned as a single person or group of people who regularly
reside together in the same accommodaƟon and who share the same catering
arrangements.).
For the purposes of our model, the composite consumpƟon good of interest is best
interpreted as expenditure on all goods and services, including rent and mortgage
interest on the family’s residence, but excluding any mortgage capital repayment.
This variable was constructed using the version of the HBS lodged at the ISSDA
archive, and consumpƟon expenditure classiﬁed by age group and partnership status
(single/couple) was derived and used in calibraƟon.
C.2. CSO Survey on Income and Living CondiƟons, 2005
The Survey on Income and Living CondiƟons (SILC) is the Irish element of the EU SILC.
It is used both naƟonally and in an EU context as a tool for monitoring issues related
to poverty and social inclusion. At the ESRI, the SILC data is reshaped into family units
(single persons or married couples together with their dependent children) in order
to provide the database for SWITCH, the ESRI tax-beneﬁtmodel. In this form the data
are well suited to provide a basis for the dynamic microsimulaƟon model. A sub-
populaƟon, excluding the self-employed and public sector employees, is deﬁned, as
explained in SecƟon 1 of the paper. Special analyses of employment and disposable
income are then used as part of the calibraƟon process.
C.3. CSO Quarterly NaƟonal Household Survey, 2005 (Quarter 2)
The QNHS is a very large scale survey (39,000 households) which gathers detailed
informaƟon on employment and labour market parƟcipaƟon. The version lodged at
ISSDAwas used to deﬁne the relevant subpopulaƟon and conduct special analyses of
parƟcipaƟon in full-Ɵme and part-Ɵme employment by age, for use in the calibraƟon
process.
C.4. Living in Ireland Survey, 2000-2001
In order to esƟmate probabiliƟes of transiƟon from single to couple status, it was
necessary to use data from a panel study. We used data from the last two waves of
the Living in Ireland panel study (2000-2001) to esƟmate a logit regression for this
purpose.
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Executive Directors’ and Employees’ 
Pensions: A Level Playing Field?1 
Gerard Hughes 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Following the decision of the Irish government to guarantee the liabilities of the 
banking system in 2008, the Minister for Finance set up a committee to review the 
remuneration packages payable to senior management and directors of the 
institutions covered by the guarantee. The Covered Institution Remuneration 
Oversight Committee reported that “...In general, top management make little or no 
employee contribution for their pensions” (see Department of Finance, 2009, par. 
5.22). This is in sharp contrast to the pension arrangements for other employees of 
financial services companies as they are generally required to make contributions 
towards their pensions throughout their working lives, just as employees in non-
financial companies in the private sector and in the public sector are required to do. 
The Committee went on to recommend that: 
Pension arrangements for senior executives in each institution should, in our 
view, be at least broadly similar to those applicable to the generality of the 
staff of the institution. (See Department of Finance, 2009, par. 5.23) 
 
The Committee’s findings raise the question: do pension arrangements for senior 
executives in non-financial companies differ from those of other employees? The 
purpose of this paper is to try to answer this question by looking at the pension 
arrangements for executive directors of large Irish companies quoted on the Dublin 
and London stock exchanges and comparing them, where possible, with pension 
arrangements for other employees. 
 
The State has a strong interest in this question because it supports occupational 
pension arrangements through generous tax reliefs on employer and employee 
pension contributions, on the investment income of pension funds and on the lump 
sums payable to occupational pensioners on retirement. This favourable tax 
treatment “...is equivalent to an interest-free loan from the Treasury and 
significantly reduces the lifetime taxes of those employees who receive part of their 
 
1  I am grateful to Jim Stewart, Tim Callan and an anonymous referee for comments on an earlier draft. 
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compensation in wages and part in pensions, as opposed to those who receive all of 
their compensation in cash wages” as Munnell (1991, p. 393) points out.   
 
Some public finance specialists, for example those who participated in the Mirrlees 
Review (Mirrlees, 2011), accept that pension saving is subsidised but “...diminish the 
importance of [the] revenue losses” by contending that “the treatment of pensions 
is consistent with that of saving under a consumption tax” (Munnell (1991, p. 394). 
However, a strong preference for a consumption tax is “of little relevance” as 
Munnell (1991, p. 394) points out when a country is committed to an income tax 
rather than a consumption tax and the tax treatment of pension saving is classified 
as a departure from the benchmark tax system, as it has been again recently by 
Ireland’s Commission on Taxation (2009). Moreover, Hashimzade and Myles (2007), 
responding to the Mirrlees review, point out that the literature on the choice 
between income and expenditure as bases for personal taxation focuses on 
efficiency concerns, but is “...almost silent on the relative equity of the two bases”. 
In a stylised model, with inequality in both earned and unearned income, and 
bequests of assets, and a range of possible levels and inter-correlations of inequality 
they find that an income tax performed better from an equity perspective. 
 
The Revenue Commissioners estimate that employer contributions to occupational 
pension schemes amounted to €1.4 billion in 2007. As these contributions are 
deductible as a business expense, the estimated cost of tax relief for firms 
amounted to €150 million. In addition, the estimated cost of the exemption of the 
pension contributions from employee benefit in kind amounted to €540 million. 
 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 notes how 
information on executive directors’ pensions was drawn from company accounts, 
and builds a profile of these pensions in terms of the type of scheme and the size 
and rates of pension contribution made on behalf of executive directors. Executive 
director’s salaries and total remuneration packages are also considered. Section 3 
considers related policy issues, including limits on pension contributions and the 
size of the accumulated pension fund. Section 4 argues for stricter limits on these 
parameters – known technically as the earnings cap and standard fund threshold. 
The main findings and conclusions are drawn together in the final section. 
 
2 A PROFILE OF EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS’ PENSIONS 
2.1  Source of Pensions Information and Selection of Companies 
Information on the pensions of executive directors is available from company 
accounts. The listing rules of the Irish Stock Exchange (2009) specify that companies 
must present information in tabular form on each element of each director’s 
remuneration package by name. For defined benefit schemes the value of the 
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increase in pension during the period under review is supposed to be stated 
together with the accumulated total amount in respect of the accrued benefit to 
which each director would be entitled on leaving service. For defined contribution 
schemes information is supposed to be provided on the contributions paid for each 
director of the company. 
 
As our interest lies in the differences in pension arrangements between senior 
executives and other employees we focus on pension provision for executive 
directors in publicly quoted companies. Ideally, we would like to compare their 
pension arrangements with those for other employees in the same companies. 
Unfortunately, companies’ annual reports do not provide information about the 
pension arrangements for other employees which is comparable to that for 
executive directors. Where it is available, therefore, we will use information on 
occupational pension arrangements for the average employee from a variety of 
sources (e.g., Pensions Board, Revenue Commissioners, Central Statistics Office 
(CSO)) to make our comparisons.   
 
In order to gather information on executive directors’ remuneration The Irish Times 
list of the Top 1,000 Companies in 2009 was examined in conjunction with the 
listings of publicly quoted companies on the Dublin and London stock exchanges to 
find companies with substantial business interests in Ireland whose annual accounts 
for 2009, or in some cases 2008, were available on the internet. Following the policy 
adopted in the preparation of The Irish Times list we omitted companies registered 
in Ireland which barely trade here and whose company accounts are filed in 
jurisdictions outside Ireland or the UK. This search resulted in the identification of 
48 financial and non-financial companies from the lists mentioned. These 
companies had a total of 147 executive directors. All of the companies are listed on 
the Dublin and London stock exchanges. The list of companies included in our 
sample is given in Appendix 1.  
 
2.2  Type of Pension Scheme  
In recent years many companies have closed defined benefit (DB) schemes to new 
employees and replaced them with defined contribution schemes (DC). As the risk 
of underperformance of pension assets is borne by the employer in a DB scheme 
and by the employee in a DC scheme, it is important to establish if executive 
directors and employees have the same exposure to these risks. 
 
Of the 48 companies for which we have pension data: 
• 4 (8 per cent) have only DB schemes for their employees;  
• 33 (69 per cent) have both DB and DC schemes; 
• 11 (23 per cent) have only DC schemes.  
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However, for their executive directors:  
• 21 (45 per cent)  have only DB schemes;  
• 13 (28 per cent) have both DB & DC schemes; 
• 13 (28 per cent) have only DC schemes  
• 1 company (2 per cent) does not state what type of scheme it provides. Publicly 
quoted companies are, therefore, far more likely to provide DB schemes for 
their executive directors than for their other employees.  
 
Nevertheless, the percentage of executive directors covered by a DB scheme is not 
greatly different from the percentage of other private sector employees covered by 
such schemes. There are 147 executive directors in the 47 companies for which we 
have valid data. Of these 54 per cent appear to belong to DB schemes, 44 per cent 
to DC schemes, and for 1 per cent the type of scheme is not specified.2 The Pensions 
Board Annual Report indicates that in 2009 there were 521,234 mainly private 
sector employees covered by funded DB and DC occupational schemes. Of these 
254,325 employees were covered by DB schemes subject to the funding standard 
and 266,909 employees were covered by DC schemes. The percentage of employees 
covered by DB schemes was, therefore, just under 49 per cent or five percentage 
points less than the percentage of executive directors covered by DB schemes.  
 
2.3  Size of Pension Contributions  
The Companies Acts specify that information should be provided on the 
remuneration packages of executive directors. As this information includes annual 
payments of basic salary, fees or other remuneration, bonuses, benefits in kind, 
contributions to pension schemes and supplementary cash payments in lieu of a 
pension contribution, it is possible to identify the level of pension contribution 
made for executive directors and to estimate what proportion of their salary 
companies are contributing to a pension fund on their behalf.  The Finance Act 2006 
put a lifetime cap of €5 million on the size of an individual’s pension fund. By 2009 
this limit had increased to €5.418 million. There were 17 executive directors for 
whom no pension contribution was made but 12 of them received a cash 
contribution instead of a pension contribution ranging from €5,600 to €325,000. 
The average cash payment was €168,633 while the median payment was €179,500. 
Our analysis will, therefore, generally use the information available for the 130 
executive directors who benefited from a pension contribution by their employer.  
 
The average contribution made to a pension scheme by companies for their 
executive directors in 2009 amounted to €100,080 and the median contribution was 
 
2 The phrase “appear to belong” is used as many company accounts do not specify what type of scheme covers their 
executive directors and the type of scheme has to be inferred from other information in the accounts. 
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€68,000. For other private sector employees the average contribution was about 
€2,750 in 2007.3 On average, therefore, executive directors benefited from pension 
contributions by their employers which were 36 times greater than the average 
employer contribution for private sector employees. 
 
If executive directors belonged to a DB scheme it makes a difference to the amount 
which employers contribute on their behalf. The 64 executive directors in DB 
schemes had an average pension contribution of €117,457 while the 65 directors in 
DC schemes had an average contribution of €83,664 or 28 per cent less than those 
in DB schemes.  
 
The size distribution of pension contributions for the 130 executive directors for 
which we have valid data is shown in Table 1. There were 4 executive directors, or 3 
per cent of the total, for which pension contributions of €300,000 or more were 
made. There were 9 executive directors, or about 7 per cent of the total, who had 
pension contributions of €200,000 to €299,999 made on their behalf. Over one-fifth 
of the directors, or 28 out of 130, benefited from pension contributions of €100,000 
to €199,999. Just over a third of the executive directors, or 43, had contributions of 
€50,000 to €99,999 while one-fifth received contributions of €25,000 to €49,999. 
One-seventh of the executive directors had pension contributions of up to €24,999 
made on their behalf.  
 
The cumulative distribution shows that almost two-thirds of executive directors had 
pension contributions of €50,000 or more made on their behalf while approaching 
one-third had contributions amounting to €100,000 or more.  
 
3  The average employer contribution for other employees is derived from total employer contributions in 2007 of €1.423 
billion and membership of funded schemes of 517,684. The figures for executive directors do not include augmented 
pension contributions which may have been paid on termination of service. A CSO (2011b) survey of pension 
contributions in 2007 shows that the average employer contribution was €2,753 or 6 per cent of average gross annual 
earnings. 
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TABLE 1  Pension Contributions for Executive Directors by Size of Contribution, 2009  
 
Size of Contribution (€) No. of Executive 
Directors 
Per Cent Cumulative Per Cent 
0 - 24,999 19 14.6 14.6 
25,000 - 49,999 27 20.8 35.4 
50,000 - 99,999 43 33.1 68.5 
100,000 -149,999 14 10.8 79.2 
150,000 - 199,999 14 10.8 90.0 
200,000 - 299,999 9 6.9 96.9 
300,000 or more 4 3.1 100.0 
Total 130 100.0  
 
Note:  Cases where companies make both a pension contribution and a cash payment in lieu of pension because the pension fund is in 
 excess of Revenue limits are included.  
 
2.4  Pension Contribution Rates  
Table 2 shows the distribution of pension contribution rates for executive directors. 
The average contribution rate for executive directors in 2009 was 25.8 per cent of 
salary while the median was 20.8 per cent. The difference between the average and 
the median is influenced by a small number of contribution rates which exceed 75 
per cent of salary. The average employer contribution rate for other private sector 
employees amounted to 8.5 per cent in 2007 according to a report by Life Strategies 
Ltd. for the Public Service Benchmarking Body (2007). A CSO (2011b) survey reports 
a lower figure for 2007 of 6 per cent of average annual gross earnings for all 
employees excluding those in the public sector. The average contribution rate for 
executive directors who are members of DB schemes is 24 per cent while for 
executive directors who belong to DC schemes the average is 27 per cent. These 
contribution rates for executive directors belonging to DB and DC schemes compare 
with average employer contribution rates for other employees of about 11 per cent 
for DB schemes and 7 per cent for DC schemes according to an IAPF (2003) benefits 
survey and information provided by Kenny (2003).4 The contribution rates for 
executive directors for DB schemes are, therefore, twice as great as for other 
employees in DB schemes. The differential between executive directors and other 
employees is even greater for DC schemes. The contribution rate for executive 
directors’ DC schemes is nearly four times greater than is being paid into DC 
schemes for other employees. 
  
 
4  The year 2003 is the latest one for which information could be found for employees average DB and DC contribution 
rates. The Pension Markets Survey carried out by the IAPF (2007) in 2007 does not provide enough information to 
enable us to estimate what the average employer DB and DC contribution rates are for employees. 
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TABLE 2  Distribution of Pension Contribution Rates as a Percentage of Salary for Executive Directors, 2009 
 
Contribution Rate 
(Per cent) 
Frequency Valid Per Cent Cumulative Per Cent 
0 - 4.99 4 3.1 3.1 
5 - 9.99 14 10.8 13.8 
10 - 14.99 18 13.8 27.7 
15 - 19.99 20 15.4 43.1 
20 - 24.99 23 17.7 60.8 
25 - 29.99 18 13.8 74.6 
30 - 34.99 11 8.5 83.1 
35 or more 22 16.9 100.0 
Total 130 100.0  
 
Employer contributions of up to 9.99 per cent of salary were made on behalf of 
about 14 per cent of the executive directors. The same percentage had contribution 
rates of 10 to 15 per cent while 15 per cent had contribution rates of 15 to 20 per 
cent. Over 31 per cent had contribution rates of 20 to 30 per cent while 25 per cent 
had contribution rates in excess of 30 per cent. 
 
The cumulative percentages in Table 2 indicate that 43 per cent of the executive 
directors benefited from contributions of up to 20 per cent of salary while the 
remaining 57 per cent benefited from contributions of more than 20 per cent. 
 
2.5  Normal Retirement Age  
For the great majority of private sector employees occupational pension schemes 
specify that the retirement age is 65. Unfortunately, only four companies appear to 
report the scheme retirement age for their executive directors. The scheme 
retirement age for the four directors for which information is published is three to 
five years lower than for the average private sector employee. However, more 
information would be required before more definite conclusions could be drawn 
about this aspect of executive directors’ pensions.  
 
2.6  Value of Accrued Pension 
Companies are supposed to provide information in their annual accounts on the 
value of the pension which their executive directors have accrued to date and to 
which they would be entitled if they retired at the end of the reporting year. 
However, this information is provided in company accounts for 2009 for only 58 of 
the executive directors in our sample. It shows that the average company pension 
to which they would have been entitled if they had retired in 2009 was €199,100. 
The average would, therefore, have been nearly 17 times more than the annual 
State social insurance pension of €11,976 per annum in 2009 on which most 
pensioners depend or 11 times more than the average income from all sources of 
single adults aged 65 and over (€17,985 as reported by the Survey on Income and 
Living Conditions 2009 (see CSO, 2010, Table 1.3)).  
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There is information in the company accounts for 2009 on the transfer value of 
pension funds for only twelve executive directors. It indicates that if their accrued 
pension entitlements had to be transferred elsewhere the average value of their 
accrued pension fund would have been €4.1 million. The largest transfer value 
amounted to €11.7 million while the smallest amounted to €117,000. Data on the 
value of funded occupational pension schemes in 2009 and on the number of 
employees covered by those schemes indicate that the average value of the pension 
fund for other employees amounted to €120,000.5 The limited data available on 
pension transfer values, therefore, suggest that executive directors’ pension funds 
were 35 times greater than the average pension fund of other employees who were 
covered by an occupational pension fund.  
 
2.7  Executive Directors’ Salaries 
As already noted company accounts are obliged to provide details of different 
components of compensation for executive directors. These components enable us 
to identify the value of the executive directors’ annual salaries and total 
remuneration packages.6 How then do executive directors’ salaries and total 
remuneration compare with those of other employees?  
 
The average salary for an executive director amounted to €396,100 or more than 
ten times the average earnings of employees of €36,490 in 2009 as shown by the 
CSO (2011a) earnings and labour costs survey. The CSO (2011b) estimates that in 
2007 the average gross annual earnings of employees in pension schemes provided 
by their employer was €43,678 or 16 per cent more than average annual earnings of 
€37,736 for all employees. The average salary for an executive director is influenced 
by a number of very large salaries amounting to almost €1 million or more payable 
to the highest paid chief executives. The salary for the five highest paid chief 
executives ranged from over €900,000 to nearly €1.3 million.  
 
Nevertheless, many executive directors received annual salaries fairly close to the 
average figure as the median salary of executive directors in 2009 was €335,000 or 
about 85 per cent of the average executive’s salary.  
  
 
5  The transfer value is the amount the company would have to pay if the executive director transferred his pension 
elsewhere. The average fund value for other employees is derived by dividing the value of all pension funds in 2009 
(€72 billion, see The Irish Times, 14 April 2010)) by the number of members of funded DB and DC schemes in 2009 
(599,072). 
6  Company accounts provide information on the allocation of company shares and share options to executive directors. 
This component of the total remuneration package amounts to a sizeable part of total compensation for many 
executive directors but it is difficult to estimate its value on an annual basis. Consequently, it is not included in our 
table showing total remuneration.  
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TABLE 3 Distribution of Executive Directors Salaries in 2009 
 
 
Salary Range (€) No. of Executive 
Directors 
Per Cent Cumulative Per Cent 
0 - 99,999 3 2.0 2.0 
100,000 - 249,999 37 25.2 27.2 
250,000 - 499,999 67 45.6 72.8 
500,000 -749,999 29 19.7 92.5 
750,000 - 999,999 7 4.8 97.3 
1,000,000 and over 4 2.7 100.0 
Total 147 100.0  
 
Note: The number of executive directors for which salary information is available is greater than the number for which pension 
information is available because 17 executive directors did not receive a pension contribution although 12 of them 
received a cash contribution in lieu of a pension contribution. 
 
The distribution of executive director salaries by salary range is shown in Table 3. 
Only 2 per cent of executive directors were paid less than €100,000. A quarter of 
them received between €100,000 and €249,999. Nearly 46 per cent of them had 
salaries ranging from €1/2 million to €3/4 million while around 30 per cent received 
more than €1/2 million. The cumulative distribution shows that 72 per cent of 
executive directors received salaries of €250,000 or more per year. 
 
In addition to their basic salary 47 per cent of the executive directors received a 
performance bonus.  Their average bonus was €251,913. As in the case of salaries 
this figure is influenced by several bonus payments ranging from €500,000 to nearly 
€900,000. The median bonus payment was €209,316 or 83 per cent of the average 
bonus. 
 
2.8  Total Remuneration 
Adding the salary, fees, bonus, benefit in kind, pension expense, and cash in lieu of 
pension yields the total remuneration package of each executive director. The 
average total remuneration package for executive directors in 2009 amounted to 
€635,395 while the median package amounted to €555,000, or nearly 90 per cent of 
the average. A variety of payments, therefore, added around 60 per cent to the 
mean and median salaries paid to executive directors in 2009. 
 
The CSO earnings and labour costs survey collects information on employee-related 
payments paid by the employer. It includes statutory employers’ PRSI, other social 
costs (pension fund contributions, life assurance premiums, income continuance 
insurance), benefits in kind, and redundancy payments. In the second quarter of 
2009 these employer payments added nearly 17 per cent to average hourly earnings 
so the total remuneration package of all employees amounted to €42,565. The 
executive directors’ total remuneration package was, therefore, nearly fifteen times 
greater than that of the average employee.   
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Table 4 shows the distribution of total remuneration packages by size category.  
 
TABLE 4 Distribution of Executive Directors Total Remuneration Packages, 2009 
 
Total Remuneration Frequency Per Cent Cumulative Per Cent 
0 -99,999 2 1.4 1.4 
100,000 - 249,999 20 13.6 15.0 
250,000 - 499,999 46 31.3 46.3 
500,000 - 749,999 37 25.2 71.4 
750,000 - 999,999 21 14.3 85.7 
1,000,000 - 1,249,999 7 4.8 90.5 
1,250,000 or more 14 9.5 100.0 
Total 147 100.0  
 
Note: See note to previous table. 
 
 
About 1 in 7 executive directors received total remuneration of more than €1 
million per year, and about 3 out of 10 received more than three-quarters of a 
million euro per year. More than half of the directors received more than half a 
million euro per year.  
 
3 LIMITS ON PENSION CONTRIBUTIONS AND SIZE OF FUND 
As the total remuneration package for the executive directors in our sample 
amounts on average to about €635,000 per year and the lowest paid director 
received €53,000 per year, it is clear that nearly all of them are in a position to make 
their own pension arrangements without any support from the State. Nevertheless, 
they benefit from very generous tax reliefs from the Exchequer on contributions to 
their pension funds, the investment earnings of their funds, and lump sums payable 
on retirement in the same way as other high income earners.   
 
These arrangements confer advantages on executive directors and other high 
earners in at least two ways. First, the overwhelming majority of executive directors 
have earnings which place them in the highest income tax bracket. Consequently, 
they benefit from a subsidy worth twice as much (41 per cent) as the subsidy 
provided for standard rate taxpayers (20 per cent). Second, the generous cap on 
pension contributions qualifying for tax relief, and the associated limit on the size of 
an individual’s pension fund, means that the cost to the Exchequer of pension tax 
reliefs is much greater for high earners than for lower and middle income earners. 
Indeed, Hughes (2005) and Callan, Keane and Walsh  (2009) show that up to 80 per 
cent of pension tax relief accrues to taxpayers in the top 20 per cent of the income 
distribution. 
 
The fairest way to deal with the first advantage which high earners have would be 
to allow pension tax relief only at the standard rate of tax. This policy has been 
advocated by the TCD Pension Policy Research Group (see Hughes and Stewart, 
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2007) and other critics of the private pension system such as Social Justice Ireland 
(2010) and the OECD (2008). Estimates of how much revenue would accrue to the 
Exchequer by standard rating the tax reliefs vary from around  €500 million (see 
Department of Finance, 2010, p. 93) to about €1 billion per year (see Callan, Keane 
and Walsh (2009, p.28). A commitment was given by the Fianna Fáil/Green Party 
coalition government in the EU/IMF programme that standard rating of pension tax 
reliefs  would be phased in by 2013 (see Department of Finance, 2011a) but the 
Minister for Finance in the current Fine Gael/Labour Party coalition government 
announced in his Budget 2012 speech that “Although the EU-IMF programme 
commits us to move to standard rate relief on pension contributions, I do not 
propose to do this or make changes to the existing marginal rate relief at this time” 
(see Department of Finance, 2011b).  
 
The second advantage which high earners have could be addressed by further 
reductions in the caps on the earnings contribution level and the lifetime size of 
individual pension funds. These limits are the main policy instruments used to 
contain the cost of pension tax reliefs and to promote greater equity in pension tax 
relief between high earners and other earners. Are the current limits set at levels 
that are consistent with the objective of achieving greater equity in pension tax 
relief? Before answering this question it is necessary to review the context in which 
caps on earnings contributions and fund sizes were introduced and implemented in 
order to contain the cost of pension tax reliefs for high earners. 
 
For many years the only limit set was that contributions should not exceed 15 per 
cent of pensionable salary. In 1996 age-related limits were introduced to provide 
greater incentives for pension saving by those closer to retirement. They allowed 
individuals aged less than 55 to contribute 15 per cent of pensionable salary and 
individuals aged 55 or over to contribute up to 20 per cent. In 1999 these limits 
were substantially increased in a radical shake up of the pension system by the 
Minister for Finance, Mr McCreevy. He changed the structure of the age-related 
limits to increase the incentive to make pension contributions as age increased by 
retaining the 15 per cent rate for those under 30 and adding five percentage points 
to it for every decade of age thereafter up to age 50 (see Table 5). 
 
TABLE 5  Age-Related Maximum Pension Contribution as a Percentage of Earnings Eligible for Tax Relief, 
1999-2005 and 2006-2009 
 
Age Band 1996-1999 1999-2005 2006-2009 
Under 30 15 15 15 
30-40 15 20 20 
40-50 15 25 25 
50-55 15 30 30 
55-60 20 30 35 
60+ 20 30 40 
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In a departure from the basic principle that a pension fund should be used to buy an 
annuity Mr McCreevy also made provision in the Finance Act 1999 for the self-
employed and directors who owned 20 per cent of the shares in their company to 
continue managing their pension fund after retirement in an Approved Retirement 
Fund (ARF) or in an Approved Minimum Retirement Fund (AMRF). This privilege was 
extended in 2002 to include proprietary directors and company directors owning 5 
per cent of their company shares, and to contributors to Personal Retirement Saving 
Accounts (PRSA) who were not in the labour force or who were not in pensionable 
employment.  
 
He also introduced an earnings contribution cap of £200,000 (= €253,947) for 
contributors to Retirement Annuity Contracts but put no limit on the size of the 
pension fund which could be accumulated (see Table 6). The maximum pension 
contribution on which tax relief could be claimed in 1999, therefore, amounted to 
€76,200 (= €254,000 x 30 per cent). The same limits were applied in 2002 to 
employee contributions and to contributions to Personal Retirement Saving 
Accounts (PRSAs) when they were introduced in 2002. 
 
The Minister underlined that he personally was primarily responsible for these 
changes to the pensions regime when he noted that:  
Some will call these proposals radical. I call them sensible and pro-consumer. I 
have had a considerable input in forming my views from Members of this 
House, pension commentators, the pension industry, the experts in the 
Revenue Commissioners and the advisers in my own Department. In the final 
analysis, these proposals have my stamp on them and the approval of the 
Government. (See Dail Debates, 16 February 1999). 
 
The decision to allow the self-employed, and some company directors, to continue 
managing their pension fund after retirement in an Approved Retirement Fund was 
reviewed some years later by the Department of Finance (2006). It was found that 
from 1999 to 2005, 116 individuals accumulated pension funds in ARFs worth more 
than €5 million each. Two individuals accumulated pension funds worth around 
€100 million and 6,000 individuals accumulated pension funds worth about 
€235,000 on average (see Department of Finance, 2006 and Hughes, 2007). 
 
However, the figure for the average size of fund masked a difference between the 
size of ARFs where the Qualifying Fund Manager was a life office or a 
stockbroker/bank. The average size of the fund managed by life offices was 
€148,000 whereas the average size of 484 funds managed by a stockbroker/bank 
was €661,000. In addition to accumulating large pension funds most of those who 
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owned an ARF did not draw down any income from the fund, The Department of 
Finance (2006, p. G22) report concluded that: 
The analysis does suggest, however, that for those who have the capacity to 
survive in retirement without the need to rely on funds invested in an ARF, our 
‘EET’system of pension taxation is much closer to an ‘EEE’ system where 
effectively no tax is paid, or if it is, it is at a low rate and far into the future.  
 
For less wealthy pensioners unlikely to leave their pension fund in an ARF the 
combination of the tax free lump sum and generous tax emption limits for those 
aged over 65  led the OECD (2008, p. 90) to reach a similar conclusion in relation to 
the pension system as a whole when it said that: 
...few older households will pay any income tax and many of those who do will 
pay less than younger people with the same income. As a result, a tax system 
that aims for pension savings, returns and income to be subject to an ‘exempt-
exempt-tax’ (EET) regime is in effect fairly close to being an 
‘exempt’exempt’exempt’ (EEE) system where income channelled through 
pensions is unlikely to be taxed at any point of the life-cycle. 
 
The revelations that ARFs were being used as a tax avoidance device and that 
employer contributions could be used by senior executives to get around the cap on 
the earnings contribution led to the introduction in 2006 of a number of limits on 
high earners’ pension arrangements to create greater equity in pension tax relief. 
The limits included a cap on the pension contribution out of earnings which would 
be eligible for tax relief and a limit on the lifetime size of the pension fund which an 
individual could accumulate, In addition, Approved Retirement Funds to which some 
high earners could transfer their pension fund on retirement were made subject to 
taxation as if a specified percentage of the fund is drawn down each year.7 As the 
Department of Finance (2006, p. 26) report pointed out these changes were 
“...aimed at proprietary directors and senior executive staff who are in a position to 
tailor their remuneration structure and the level of their employer’s contributions 
so as to extract maximum benefits under the current regime.” 
 
The Department of Finance (2006) report did not reveal the names of the 
individuals who had accumulated very large pension funds. However,  Murphy and 
Devlin (2009, p. 287) and Keena (2010) reported subsequently  that some chief 
executives of banks and building societies had accumulated pension funds in excess 
of €13 million. 
 
7  The owners of ARFs were taxed in 2006 as if they had drawn down one per cent of the fund.  This tax was increased to 
two per cent in 2007 and to three per cent in 2008 and subsequent years. In 2011 the tax on the assumed draw down 
was increased to five per cent of the fund. 
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These developments led the Revenue Commissioners and the Department of 
Finance (2006) to consider whether greater equity could be created in the 
arrangements for pension tax relief by including employer contributions within the 
age-related and annual earnings limits. However, it was decided that the best 
constraint on employer contributions would be a limit on the maximum allowable 
tax-relieved pension fund. Hence, a cap of €5 million was imposed in 2006 on the 
lifetime size of individual pension funds (see Table 6). The introduction of the 
standard fund threshold had no effect on the overwhelming majority of those 
covered by pension schemes as their annual contributions and the size of their 
pension funds are far below the Revenue Commissioners’ limits.  It did not force the 
116 individuals who already had an ARF of more than €5 million to reduce the size 
of their pension fund although the tax on the assumed draw down may eventually 
result in some reduction. These owners of ARFs were allowed to apply to the 
Revenue Commissioners to keep the fund which they had built up and to increase it 
in line with the indexed value of the standard fund threshold (see Hughes, 2007 for 
further discussion of this issue).    
 
The threshold did have an effect on executive directors whose pension funds 
amounted to around €5 million. As we have shown, some of those whose pension 
funds were in excess of the threshold were given cash payments by their companies 
in addition to or in lieu of pension contributions. 
 
TABLE 6 Limits on Annual Pension Contributions and the Size of the Pension Fund, 1999-2011 
 
Tax Year Annual Contribution 
Earnings Cap 
Limit on Size of Pension Fund Maximum Tax 
Relieved Employee 
Contribution 
1999 £200,000 (€254,000) No limit £60,000 (€76,200) 
2006 €254,000 €5 million or value of fund at 7/12/05 €101,600 
2007 €262,382 €5.165 million or  indexed value of the 
personal fund threshold (as agreed with 
Revenue) 
€104,953 
2008 €275,239 €5.418 million or indexed value of the personal 
fund threshold (as agreed with Revenue) 
€110,095 
2009 €150,000 €5.418 million or indexed value of the personal 
fund threshold (as agreed with Revenue) 
€60,000 
2011 €115,000 €2.3 million or indexed value of the personal 
fund threshold (as agreed with Revenue) 
€46,000 
Note:   Marginal tax rates 1999, 46 per cent; 2006, 42 per cent; 2007 to 2011, 41 per cent. 
 
The intention behind the pension caps was made clearer by the Minister for 
Finance, Mr Lenihan, when he slashed the earnings cap almost in half from 
€275,239 in 2008 to €150,000 in 2009. He said in his budget speech on 14 October 
2008 that this major reduction would “...promote greater equity in tax relief” (see 
Department of Finance, 2008). On the same day the Tánaiste, Ms. Coughlan, 
elaborated on this point when she said in the Dail: 
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The measure will only affect taxpayers on higher incomes and will save the 
Exchequer €100 million in a full year. However, for the vast majority of 
taxpayers who save for retirement through supplementary private pension 
provision, this change will have no impact. 
 
As the Deputies are aware, the Green Paper on pensions estimated the total 
cost of tax relief and supplementary pension provision for 2006 was close to €3 
billion. Over one-third of this cost is estimated to be accounted for by relief on 
employee contributions to occupational schemes and individual contributions 
to personal pension plans. 
 
Over recent years, many individuals and reports have raised the issue of the 
equity of the current tax relief arrangements given the significant Exchequer 
costs involved and the fact that the reliefs are skewed significantly towards 
those on higher incomes. Apart from helping to meet the challenging 
budgetary circumstances we are now facing, the decision to reduce the 
earnings limit should also be taken as a signal of the Government’s intent to 
move towards more equitable tax arrangements generally for private pension 
provision in the context of the development of the long-term policy framework 
for the pensions. 
 
Nevertheless, as the age-related percentage limits and the annual earnings cap 
apply only to pension contributions by individuals there is a loophole which may 
permit senior executives to frustrate efforts to create greater equity in pension tax 
relief. Employers are left free to contribute whatever amount they wish to 
employee pensions subject only to the constraint on the lifetime size of the fund.8 
Consequently, as the Minister for Finance (2009) noted in a written reply to a 
Parliamentary Question by the Labour TD Roísín Shortall on 6 October 2009: 
...changes could be made to the terms of employment contracts, due to the 
reduction in the annual earnings cap, to provide for a switch from employee 
contributions to employer contributions.  
 
The Covered Institution Remuneration Oversight Committee reported that some 
financial institutions were already doing this and it criticised the practice: 
 
8  The Department of Finance (2006) report gives an example of how employer contributions can be used to circumvent 
the cap on the earnings contribution. Over a nine year period aggregate contributions of almost €14 million were made 
to two individual occupational pension schemes. These contributions were largely paid by the employer. The maximum 
contribution eligible for tax relief that an owner of an RAC or a PRSA could have made over the same period would 
have been €685,800. 
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We consider that pension arrangements for top management should be 
reviewed. We have become aware of a practice in which cash allowances were 
paid to compensate for the effects of the “pensions cap” imposed by the 
Finance Act, 2006. Pension schemes should reflect public policy and tax law 
and it is unacceptable that arrangements should be put in place which would 
be inconsistent with the intent of the relevant legislation. (See Department of 
Finance, 2009, par. 5.21) 
 
The reductions in the Finance Act 2009 and the Finance Act 2011 of the annual 
earnings limit on pension contributions to €150,000 and then to €115,000 are 
welcome steps toward creating greater equity in the pension system. Unfortunately, 
the reduction in the earnings limit that occurred in 2009 was not accompanied by 
any reduction in the standard fund threshold despite the recommendation of the 
Commission on Taxation (2009, Recommendation 10.8) that: 
There should be a correlation between the annual earnings limit and the 
standard fund threshold, and the reduction in the annual earnings limit 
suggests that there should be a corresponding reduction in the standard fund 
threshold. 
 
However, the National Recovery Plan published in November 2010 pointed out that: 
Equity of the existing tax arrangements could be improved by further 
downward adjustments to the annual earnings cap for pension contribution 
purposes and to the maximum allowable lifetime limit for a tax relieved 
pension fund (the Standard Fund Threshold – SFT), both adjustments would 
impact on higher earners. (Dept. of Finance, 2010, p. 94) 
 
Subsequently, the standard fund threshold was reduced to €2.3 million in the 
Finance Act 2011 when the earnings limit was reduced by the Fianna Fáil/Green 
Party coalition government to €115,000.  
 
4 WHAT SHOULD THE EARNINGS CAP AND STANDARD FUND THRESHOLD BE? 
If the standard fund threshold had been based on the amount needed to provide a 
maximum private pension of half salary for someone earning £115,000 in 2011 (i.e., 
a pension of €57,500), the lifetime size of the pension fund ought to have been 
reduced from €5.418 million to €1.32 million (= €57,500 x 20 + €115,000 x 1.5) using 
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a valuation factor of 20:1 to convert a defined benefit pension to a cash equivalent 
and allowing for payment of a lump sum of 11/2 times salary out of the fund.9 
 
None of the political parties proposed a standard fund threshold very close to this 
figure in the manifestos issued during the general election in 2011 as Hughes and 
Stewart (2011) point out. Table 7 shows that the Fine Gael proposal that the 
threshold should be €1.5 million is closest to the figure of €1.32 million.  
 
TABLE 7 Pre-Budget 2011 Pension Tax Arrangements, Political Party Election 2011 Manifesto Proposals for 
Pension Tax Reliefs and TCD Pension Policy Research Group Pension Reform Proposals 
 
Pension 
Component 
Pre-Budget 
2011 
Fianna Fáil 
& Green 
Party 
Fine Gael Labour Sinn Fein TCD Pension 
Policy Research 
Group Proposals 
Max. subsidised 
pension   €60,000   €27,050 
Max. tax free lump 
sum 
€1.350 
million €200,000 €250,000   €112,500 
Earnings 
contribution cap €150,000 €115,000   €100,000 €75,000 
Standard fund 
threshold 
(€ million) €5.418 €2.3 €1.5   €0.622 
Marginal tax relief 41% 20% in 2014 41% 41% 20% 20% 
Temporary levy on 
pension funds   0.5%     
Estimated 
reduction in cost 
of tax exp.  
€700 million 
from 2014 €575* million 
€500 
million  €1 billion 
 
Source:  Hughes and Stewart (2011). 
           * The temporary levy of 0.6 per cent imposed on pension fund assets by the Fine Gael/Labour government in 2011 is estimated 
 to yield €470 million per year over a four year period. 
 
The proposals for pension caps by the political parties shown in Table 7 and the 
proposal in the Programme for Government “...to cap taxpayers subsidies for all 
future pension schemes for politicians (and indeed for everybody) that deliver 
income in retirement of more than €60,000” (see Department of Taoiseach, 2011) 
are focused on the private pension system and do not take account of the State 
contributory pension. The Pensions Board (1998) in the National Pensions Policy 
Initiative report argued that in retirement income from all sources, including Social 
Welfare and private pensions, should replace 50 per cent of pre-retirement income 
subject to the Social Welfare pension replacing 34 per cent of average industrial 
earnings.10 Most funded DB schemes integrate their pension benefits with the State 
 
9  The 20:1 rate (capitalisation factor) is given in section 19, of the Finance Act, 2011.  
10  The Fine Gael/Labour maximum pension figure of €60,000 is somewhat more than the maximum pension of €57,500 
implicit in the cap in the Finance Act 2011 on the earnings contribution of €115,000.  
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pension to limit the amount they have to pay to the difference between the 
percentage of earnings replaced by the State pension and 50 per cent of 
pensionable earnings. The National Pensions Framework (Department of Social and 
Family Affairs, 2010, p. 14)) endorses the integration of State and private pension 
benefits when it says that the government “...will seek to ensure that the level of 
the State Pension is maintained at 35 per cent of average weekly earnings where 
earnings are calculated by the CSO Earnings, Hours and Employment Costs Survey.” 
 
The Fianna Fáil/Green Party coalition set the earnings contribution limit for private 
pensions at €115,000. Fine Gael did not specify an earnings limit but it proposed 
that the maximum subsidised private pension should be €60,000 although its 
spokesman on Finance in 2009, Richard Bruton (2009) had suggested a lower limit 
of €40,000. Implicitly, therefore, the Fine Gael earnings limit is €120,000. Sinn Fein 
proposed an earnings limit of €100,000 so its implicit maximum subsidised private 
pension amounts to €50,000. The Labour Party did not specify either an earnings 
limit or a maximum subsidised pension in its manifesto but it stated that the 
amount of tax relief currently being given for private pensions is no longer 
supportable and that it favoured capping the tax relief on both employer and 
employee pension contributions and reducing the maximum pension fund and 
maximum tax-free lump sum payable on retirement. In the Programme for 
Government the Labour Party agreed with Fine Gael that the maximum subsidised 
private pension should not exceed €60,000. Implicitly, therefore, the Labour Party 
earnings cap is €120,000.  
 
The earnings limits proposed by the political parties would allow a combined private 
pension and State contributory pension to replace more than 50 per cent of pre-
retirement earnings up to limits of €100,000 to €120,000. These limits do not serve 
to target tax reliefs for private pensions at earners at the middle and lower end of 
the income distribution, as recommended by a number of commentators (Hughes 
and Stewart (2007), Tasc (2010), OECD (2009), Social Justice Ireland (2010)).  The 
TCD Pension Policy Research Group in conjunction with Tasc (2010) argue that this 
could be done by using the PRSI ceiling of €75,000, which was about twice average 
earnings in 2010, as a benchmark to which the earnings contribution ceiling should 
be reduced.  
 
An earnings contribution ceiling of €75,000 implies that the maximum subsidised 
pension should be €37,500 and the maximum tax free lump sum should be 
€112,500. If the State Pension had met the 35 per cent target mentioned in the 
National Pensions Framework it would have amounted to €12,623. However, it 
actually amounted to €11,976 or 32 per cent of the target pension. Hence, an 
integrated private pension would have had to provide an income in retirement of 
about €25,500 to ensure that the replacement rate target of 50 per cent for the 
maximum subsidised pension would be met. Applying the 20:1 valuation factor to 
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this sum and allowing for payment of the lump sum out of the fund indicates that a 
standard fund threshold of €622,500 in 2010 would have been sufficient to achieve 
the 50 per cent target.  
 
The reduction in the earnings contribution limit from €275,239 in 2008 to €115,000 
in 2011 and in the standard fund threshold from €5.4 million in 2009 to €2.3 million 
in 2011 and the abolition of employee and employer PRSI relief on pension 
contributions shows that there is a desire to create greater equity in pension tax 
arrangements. A continuation of the policy of reducing these limits taking account 
of the contributory State pension in order to target pension tax reliefs at middle and 
lower income earners could result in a considerable levelling of the playing field 
between executive directors and other employees. 
 
5 CONCLUSION 
The evidence presented above shows that there is not a level playing field for 
executive directors and employees pensions. The replacement of DB schemes with 
DC schemes has affected other employees more than executive directors of publicly 
quoted companies. Proportionately, more executive directors continue to enjoy 
access to a DB scheme which is generously funded by their employer who bears the 
risk of poor performance of the fund. 
 
Executive directors have far more favourable pension terms than other employees 
in terms of the percentage of salary their employer contributes to their pension 
fund. The average employer contribution rate for an executive director amounted to 
around 26 per cent compared with 6.9 to 8.5 per cent for private sector employees. 
 
Executive directors benefit from much larger employer pension contributions 
(€100,000 on average) than other employees (€2,700 on average). The size of the 
employer contribution to executive pensions is related to the size of their salary 
(€396,100 on average) which is more than ten times greater than the average 
earnings of other employees (€36,490) or nine times greater than the average 
earnings of employees covered by an employer provided pension scheme (€43,678). 
 
Although the data on executive directors’ normal retirement age is limited they 
indicate that executive directors’ pension schemes specify a lower retirement age 
than the schemes to which other employees belong. There are better data on the 
average pension to which executive directors would be entitled if they had retired in 
2009. It shows that the average executive director would have been entitled to a 
company pension of about €199,100. This compares with an annual income from a 
State pension of €11,976 for single adults with no occupational pension and with an 
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income from all sources of €17,985 for single adults aged 65 and over (see CSO, 
2010, Table 1.4). On average, therefore, if the executive directors in our sample had 
retired in 2009 they would have been entitled to a pension 17 times more than the 
State pension which the majority of single pensioners were living on in 2009 or 11 
times more than the average income of single adults aged 65 and over from State 
pensions and other sources.  
 
Consideration of what the earnings cap and standard fund threshold should be to 
create a more even playing field between executive directors’ and employees’ 
pensions indicates that if the objective of public policy  were to take account of the 
State contributory pension and to target pension tax reliefs at middle and lower 
earners, as the TCD Pension Policy Research Group and others argue, the earnings 
contribution should be capped at €75,000 and the standard fund threshold should 
be capped at €622,500. 
 
Although companies are not obliged to provide information on the pension 
arrangements for other employees they are required to provide detailed 
information in their annual accounts on the pension arrangements for executive 
directors. Unfortunately, not all of them do so. It is difficult, therefore, to make 
detailed comparisons of how the pension arrangements for these two groups differ. 
The reporting requirements for executive directors’ pensions should be enforced 
and broadened to include information on pension arrangements for other 
employees.  
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Appendix 1 
APPENDIX TABLE A1: Executive Pension Arrangements in 47 Non-Financial and Financial Companies 
Quoted on the Irish or UK Stock Exchanges in 2009 
 
IT Rank: 
Non-
Financial 
Name of Company Listed on Irish (ISX) or  
UK Stock Exchange (UKSX) 
Annual Report 
Year End 
 1 CRH ISX 31/12/09 
 4 Smurfit Kappa Group ISX 31/12/09 
 6 DCC ISX 31/12/09 
 8 Kerry Group ISX 31/12/09 
 12 ESB  NL/Semi-state 31/12/09 
 15 Ryanair ISX 31/3/09 
 16 Grafton Group ISX 31/12/09 
 17 Aryzta ISX 31/7/08 
 20 Total Produce ISX 31/12/09 
 21 Glanbia ISX 2/1/10 
 27 Diageo Ireland ISX 30/6/09 
 30 United Drug ISX 30/9/08 
 31 Kingspan Group ISX 31/12/08 
 36 Origin Enterprises ISX 31/07/09 
 41 Independent News & Media ISX 31/12/09 
 45 Aer Lingus ISX 31/12/08 
 47 Bord Gais Eireann NL/Semi-state 31/12/09 
 51 Vodafone Ireland LSX 31/3/09 
 53 Greencore Group ISX 25/9/09 
 59 BT Ireland LSX 31/3/09 
 68 An Post NL/Semi-state 31/12/08 
 69 National Lottery Company NL/Semi-state 31/12/08 
 81 Icon Clinical Research ISX 31/12/09 
 84 Tullow Oil ISX 31/12/08 
 89 Dublin Airport Authority NL/Semi-state 31/12/08 
 92 Fyffes ISX 31/12/08 
106 C & C Group ISX 29/2/09 
115 FBD Holdings Plc ISX 31/12/09 
147 Irish Continental Group ISX 31/12/09 
179 Paddy Power ISX 31/12/09 
181 Eirgrid  NL/Semi-state 30/9/09 
236 CPL Resources ISX 30/6/09 
273 Irish Aviation Authority NL/Semi-state 31/12/09 
348 Donegal Creameries ISX 31/12/09 
364 Hilton Food Group LSX 31/12/09 
371 RPS Group LSX 31/12/09 
388 IFG Group ISX 30/12/09 
 Kenmare Resources Plc ISX 31/12/09 
 Merrion Pharmaceutical ISX 31/12/09 
 TVC Holdings Plc ISX 31/3/2010 
 UTV Media ISX 31/12/09 
 Worldspreads Group Plc ISX 31/12/09 
IT Rank: 
Financial 
   
 F2 Bank of Ireland ISX 31/3/09 
 F4 Allied Irish Bank ISX 31/12/09 
 F5 Anglo Irish Bank NL 31/12/09 
 F7 Irish Life and Permanent NL 31/12/09 
 F14 Educational Building Society NL 31/12/09 
 F23 Irish Nationwide Building Society 
 
NL 31/12/09 
 
NL = not listed. 
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